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Abstract 
Traditionally, the member states have been especially concerned with national sovereignty in 
matters pertaining to energy. On this background, then, it is astonishing that a procedure that 
codified a decision-making process that was to result in a set of harmonized rules at the 
European level was passed by the European Union in 2009. Moreover, this mandate was 
given to non-state actors acting within European bodies outside the formal structure of the 
EU.  
This thesis seeks to explain why the procedure for developing common cross-border network 
codes for electricity was enacted in its particular form. As a procedural rule, this represented a 
case of institutional change. Therefore, a complementary institutional approach was taken for 
analysing the process leading up to the formal decision from different perspectives in 
isolation and in combination. An important finding in this study was the decisive role played 
by non-state actors for the specific allocation of roles and tasks within the enacted procedure. 
Moreover, these non-state actors had emerged through a gradual transformation, which 
represented vertical specialization within government, and horizontal specialization within the 
industry. These changes fed back into their transnational associations, which were 
subsequently redefined. 
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1 A novel procedure 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2009, the European Union (EU) formally passed a third package of legislative acts aimed at 
creating a single European energy market for electricity and gas, respectively. Since the initial 
launch of the internal energy market in 1988, two packages had already been enacted, but an 
internal energy market remained a vision rather than becoming reality. Member states were 
concerned with national sovereignty, and restricted the delegation of regulatory power to the 
EU in matters of energy (Buchan 2010; Eikeland 2004). Traditionally, energy had been 
particularly receptive to such concerns because of the strategic importance for national 
economies (Buchan 2010). Moreover, high costs of constructing infrastructure for the 
production and transport of electricity and gas, respectively, had facilitated close ties between 
national governments and their respective energy sectors (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995: 13-14; 
Nowak 2010: 27). As a result, only limited regulatory power had been delegated to the EU, 
and the EU-level laws that passed Council muster were heavily watered-down (Eikeland 
2004). 
The existence of different rules across the member states for technical and market issues 
regarding the physical cross-border ‘transport’ of electricity acted as a barrier to market 
integration. In several instances, these rules had the effect of protecting national markets, and 
obstructing a level playing ground, and suboptimal practices had been identified (Commission 
2007a: 48; 2007b, 2007e; de Nooij 2011; Eberlein 2003). As a result, growth in the level of 
cross-border flows was slow, representing 10.7 per cent of total electricity consumption in 
Continental Europe in 2004, up from 8-9 per cent in 2000 (Commission 2005: 5).
1
 
Harmonizing rules, then, could facilitate cross-border trade, and aid the integration of national 
(or regional) electricity markets. While voluntary negotiations aimed at agreement on 
common rules had been attempted within the electricity sector (Eberlein 2003; Eberlein & 
Grande 2005), progress was slow, and little achieved (Commission 2007f). Harmonization 
could have been imposed from a supranational level, but given the lack of delegation to the 
                                                 
1
 UCTE zone. 
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EU in energy matters, the ‘regulatory gap’ applied equally to cross-border electricity 
transmission issues (Buijs, Bekaert & Belmans 2010). 
On this background, then, it is astonishing that a procedure that laid down a decision-making 
process that was to result in a set of common – harmonized – EU-level rules was included in 
the third package, and moreover that it had remained largely intact from proposal to law. 
These rules were termed ‘network codes’, and would cover the technical and market issues for 
cross-border electricity exchange that were mentioned in the previous paragraph.
2
 Despite 
member states’ reluctance to delegate power, this procedure meant that a clear mandate had 
been given to make legislation at the European level, legislation that moreover would apply to 
cross-border electricity transmission. This is the puzzle that this thesis strives to solve. 
In the following, a brief introduction to electricity transmission is offered, before moving on 
to describing this change of a procedural rule more in detail. This is then seen in light of 
previous research on institutional change within the EU in general, and in light of previous 
research on EU energy market reform in particular. Further, the meaning of the change is 
elaborated on, before a research question is formulated, and an approach for answering this is 
presented. An alternative approach to studying this will also be given attention. Finally, the 
structure for the remainder of the thesis is noted. 
1.1.1 Brief introduction to electricity transmission 
Electricity is bound to its infrastructure, and transported over networks. In Europe, there is no 
single electricity network, but rather 27 national networks constructed in various ways at 
different points of time (Pollak, Schubert & Slominski 2010: 25). These networks are 
transmission networks – high-voltage power grids for transmitting bulk electricity. A ‘special’ 
feature of electricity is the need for instantaneous balance between production and 
consumption at all times. This has two reasons, one of which is related to that which is transmitted, 
and the other to the system through which it is transported: first, electricity must be used the same 
instant that it is produced, because storing electricity at the present does not represent a viable 
economic option, and second, deviance from this balance could cause the electricity system to 
collapse, with ensuing power outages (blackouts). System operation is the activity seeking to 
retain such a constant balance.  
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 In early discussions, network codes were often referred to as technical and marked codes or standards. They 
were also referred to as grid codes. 
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In Europe, this task is usually carried out by Transmission System Operators (TSO), although 
other options are possible. A TSO is an enterprise with monopoly on transmission in the area 
covered by its network. Monopoly rights are allotted to the TSO due to the high costs of 
infrastructure for transporting bulk electricity, which makes it unprofitable to have competing 
sets of networks. This has been referred to as constituting a ‘natural monopoly’ (Mosca 2008; 
Samuelson 1948). Moreover, the costs incurred by a TSO are socialized: users of the network 
– producers/suppliers of electricity as well as some large industrial consumers – pay fees for 
access to and use of the network. To avoid abuse, TSOs are heavily regulated by the state, but 
ownership can usually be in public as well as in private hands. Historically, TSOs were 
integrated with companies producing electricity, but have over time become increasingly 
independent entities in Europe (ENTSO-E undated-c; UCTE 2009). Most European countries 
have a single national TSO. 
National systems are linked together through interconnectors. These are transmission 
networks operated jointly by the TSOs at each end: the respective TSOs at each side of the 
border coordinate this between them.
3
 Internally, the individual national networks are 
relatively well-connected, whereas the degree of connection between these national markets is 
substantially lower. This represents a physical barrier to cross-border electricity flows 
(Meeus, Purchala & Belmans 2005: 29). The background for this is that interconnections 
between the national systems were not initially created for the purposes of extensive cross-
border electricity flows (Zeit 2006b). The network codes given attention in this thesis regard 
the coordination of TSO on interconnectors, because the purpose and goal of the procedure is 
to establish a common set of rules for cross-border electricity exchange. Thus, while not 
affecting the amount of physical capacity on interconnectors per se, it might affect the use of 
this capacity. Thus, these codes could influence cross-border network operation as well as 
cross-border trade across borders. 
1.1.2 New associations engaging within a new procedure 
Beyond the procedure for developing common cross-border network codes for electricity 
(‘the NC procedure’), the two pan-European associations – European Network of 
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 Many national electricity systems are part of a synchronous zone (Continental Europe, the Nordic countries, 
and the UK are examples of such zones), within which balance also must be retained, thus requiring cross-border 
coordination among the TSOs within a zone. 
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Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and the Agency for Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (ACER) – were established with the third package.4 ENTSO-E was a 
single, comprehensive EU-level association for TSO cooperation, whereas ACER was a 
European regulatory agency. A regulatory agency, or regulator, can be defined as a body 
separate from its sector ministry that carries out public tasks (Christensen & Lægreid 2006a). 
These two bodies would moreover carry out central tasks within the NC procedure. Network 
codes would be drafted by the TSOs acting within ENTSO-E. Network codes would apply 
generally for the transmission of electricity across national borders within Europe, and they 
could be made legally binding. Moreover, the TSOs were to draft network codes in 
accordance with non-binding framework guidelines created by the national energy regulators 
through ACER. Framework guidelines, moreover, would be based on priorities laid down in 
the procedure. The NC procedure was part of the Electricity Regulation, which made these 
tasks mandatory. Failure to deliver a particular network code within a specified timeframes 
would be sanctioned in the sense that this would then be transferred to ACER, or eventually 
the European Commission.
5
 Similarly, for ACER, failure to deliver a specific framework 
guideline on time would mean that the Commission would write it on their behalf.  
1.1.3 Previous research on institutional changes within the EU 
Formally changing a procedure is an institutional change. This has been studied for the EU in 
general as well as pertaining to the EU energy market reform in particular. Located within the 
literature of the former, Kelemen and Tarrant (2011) find interests to be the decisive factor, 
claiming that the level of distributional conflict among the member states is decisive for the 
direction of institutional change: a high distributional conflict will result in a compromise on a 
network, whereas a lower conflict makes a compromise on establishing an agency more 
likely. In a similar vein, Héritier (2001) finds support for such bargaining processes where 
actors’ preferences are influenced by distributional effects, but that simultaneous negotiation 
on multiple issues allows for package deals or issue-linkages (Héritier 2001: 61). On a related 
note, Dehousse (2008) argues that the establishment of European regulatory agencies reflects 
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 ENTSO-E through Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, and ACER E through Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. These 
regulations will be referred to as the Electricity Regulation and the ACER Regulation, respectively. ENTSO-E 
was established by the TSOs in December 2008, before the third package entered into force in 2011 (ENTSO-E 
2011b). 
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an agreement among multiple actors to delegate, yet as a least common denominator, such 
agencies remain relatively weak.  
To this, Thatcher (2011) adds the vested interests of national regulators. He claims that the 
shape of institutional design in terms of the power allotted to such agencies is a function of 
differences in pre-existing arrangements. While a self-interested Commission might support 
such agencies, the existence of networks of national regulators have represented a barrier to 
this kind of institutional change due to concerns of the latter with their individual influence.  
Pierre and Peters (2009), however, indicate that such transnational networks can indeed be 
replaced with EU-level agencies. In a case study of institutional change, they find that this is 
best explained by an agencification trend, which means that the establishment of agencies in 
related EU policy-areas created a functional pressure for a similar step (Pierre & Peters 2009: 
351). Establishment of EU agencies has become an important part of the European executive 
order (Egeberg & Curtin 2008). Generally, such a trend has also been reported by Egeberg 
(2006a, 2006b); and Martens (2006). However, Pierre and Peters (2009) also find that this 
trend was reinforced by interests: a Commission interested in expanding its regulatory scope, 
as well as industry’s demand for legal uniformity across Europe (Pierre & Peters 2009: 351-
352). Finally, McNamara (2001) draws attention to normative changes, and shows how rules 
had to be adapted according to the dominant norms in order to legitimize an organization and 
its policies. 
Thus, previous research on institutional change in Europe has found this to result from 
different factors, including self-interested actors like the Commission and the member states; 
the pre-existing institutions already in place among non-state actors (e.g. national regulators 
or businesses) and the perceptions of these; and trends in terms of institutional shape (notably 
an agentification trend). 
Previous research on EU energy market regulation has noted that the presence of a threat of 
intervention by the Commission gave rise to the Florence Forum (an informal biannual 
gathering of various actors within the electricity sector) and kept the deliberations going 
(Eberlein 2003). Referred to as a “shadow of hierarchy” within the governance literature on 
the EU, such a threat has been expected to affect the influence the behaviour of actors 
engaging in negotiations (Börzel 2010: 194-197). However, while the Commission’s shadow 
might have contributed to the establishment of the Florence Forum, consistent with the 
argument made by Héritier and Eckert (2008) that self-regulation through transnational 
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networks is more likely to emerge under a shadow of hierarchy, for resolving differences in 
negotiations this shadow arguably lacked credibility due to the well-known resistance among 
the member states to more ambitious energy market legislation, and because the 
Commission’s power could only initiate legal proceedings against individual transgressors of 
competition law. 
Research on the European energy and climate policy has also looked at developments through 
the lenses of integration theory, comparing the extent of decision-power transferred to the 
supranational level for the two policy areas (Wettestad, Eikeland & Nilsson 2012). Regarding 
the relationship between these two, Pollak et al. (2010) see climate change as a major driver 
for developments in internal energy market policy, whereas Hildingsson, Stripple, and Jordan 
(2012) claim the opposite by regarding the internal energy market as an important driver for 
renewable policy. 
Moving to previous research on the third legislative package, attention has been given to 
research has focused on ownership unbundling, which was regarded as an important issue in 
the Electricity and Gas Directives, respectively. This was proposed as becoming mandatory, 
yet the Commission’s proposal was watered out following controversy among the member 
states (Eikeland 2011a, 2011b). Scholars have also looked at the establishment and role of 
ACER as a new EU-regulator, regarding it as rather weak (Böttger 2010; Hancher & 
Hauteclocque 2010). The analysis by Böttger (2010) corresponds to the above mentioned 
findings in Dehousse (2008). Finally, it has been pointed out that the effects of the third 
package’s institutional changes, pertaining to cross-border electricity regulation, remains to be 
seen, as this will reflect still evolving practice (Eckert 2011; Hancher & Hauteclocque 2010).  
Some researchers have given attention to the NC procedure (Eckert 2011; Hancher & 
Hauteclocque 2010; Hauteclocque & Talus 2011; Squicciarini, Cervigni, Perekhodtsev & 
Poletti 2010). While some regard it as an incremental change that represents little 
modification to the de facto status quo of TSO self-regulation (Hauteclocque & Talus 2011), 
others note that the new procedure could indicate a “a radical departure from the bottom-up 
approach of the regional process” (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 15). While the two latter 
contributions give more attention to the NC procedure, this is part of another, larger research 
objective. To this author’s knowledge, then, no systematic study has previously been 
undertaken of this procedure. 
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1.1.4 The research question 
It is surprising that the member states would allow such centralization at the European level 
given the mentioned reluctance to delegate power to the European level. In this thesis, then, 
the main undertaking will be to explain why the procedure for developing network codes was 
enacted in its particular form. This consequently represents the research question of this 
thesis. As the practical implementation of the third package is a relatively recent process – in 
some cases incomplete – this remains outside the scope of this study.6 Moreover, while a 
similar Regulation equally part of the third package was passed for the related gas sector, this 
will not be studied due to concerns for limited time and resources. 
This represented a change of the electricity market regulation in Europe. Regulation is here 
defined as the “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that 
are valued by a community” (Selznick 1985: 363) for the purpose of correcting for market 
failure (Majone 1996). Within the NC procedure, however, an association consisting of 
regulated enterprises with national monopoly on transmission networks, ENTSO-E, would 
partake in the making of rules that would apply to cross-border transmission. Nonetheless, 
this work would build on framework guidelines and the priorities set by the EU in the 
Electricity Regulation, as well as monitored by ACER and the Commission. Notably, non-
compliance would be subject to sanctions. 
A common approach to changes in EU legislation is through integration theory. Integration 
theories seek to explain the transfer of decision-making power from the national to the 
European level (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger 2006). Such theories have also been utilized 
for studying incremental integration as a result of ‘normal’ policy-making, , i.e. through 
directives, regulations and decisions (Hix & Høyland 2011). However, integration theory does 
“not tell us what specific rules and policies emerge, or what organizational form supranational 
governance will acquire” (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998: 16). For this purpose, integration 
theory is too general, as it concentrates on the conditions influencing when decision-making 
competence is transferred to the EU level, and not on the specific manner of how legislation 
passed within the EU system looks like. As a result, middle-range theories rather than grand 
theories are more adequate for addressing the research objective in this thesis. Nevertheless, 
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 In October 2011, 6 months after the deadline for transposing the third package, it was reported that 
infringement procedures were being considered against 18 member states that had failed to implement this 
legislation completely and/or correctely (EurActiv 2011). 
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as the former offers a complementary account to the latter by explaining phenomena at a 
lower level of abstraction (Rosamond 2010: 108), the relation between the NC procedure and 
integration of energy policy will be discussed in chapter 6. 
The NC procedure was a formal change of a procedural rule, and as such represents a case of 
institutional change. Therefore, an institutional approach will be taken. 
1.2 An institutional approach 
As indicated in the presentation of previous research on institutional change – a tip of the 
iceberg – there is a large body of research that subscribes to the statement that “institutions 
matter”: institutions are considered important causal factor in accounting for the content and 
output of public policies. There are several perspectives on institutional change and 
institutional design, and differences exist as to which causal factors are utilized for 
explanatory purposes. This will be discussed in chapter 2, suffice here to briefly state that the 
perspectives to be applied in this thesis are the following: a power-oriented perspective that 
looks into the interests of those actors supporting a change; a sociological perspective tracing 
the origins of the particular shape and form of the outcome; and a historical perspective that 
addresses the role of sequencing of events and the effect of initial choices on later 
developments. While these perspectives have differing understandings of institutions as well 
as of institutional change, they all include a formal change of a formal rule. 
Moreover, a process-approach will be taken in order to identify the presence and impact of 
these causal factors in the steps leading up to the EU’s formal decision on the procedure for 
developing cross-border network codes in 2009. A further elaboration on the advantages of 
such process-tracing is found in chapter 3. 
1.2.1 Defining the outcome to be explained 
The phenomenon to be explained in this thesis is the institutional change and the shape of this 
change. The change was a formal change of a procedural rule. Why did it end up looking like 
it did? What factors influenced its institutional design? As such, the primary object of interest 
is the specific shape and form of the procedure. A procedure is a rule for how to make a rule. 
In general, rules “prescribe appropriate behaviour in particular settings and thus are collective 
attributes” (Stone Sweet, Fligstein & Sandholtz 2001: 6). Moreover, rules vary along three 
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dimensions: prescriptions of behaviour range from broad to specific (‘precision’); from the 
informal to the codified (‘formality’); and finally, the extent to which transgressions give rise 
to sanctioning, ranging from the voluntary to the compulsory (‘authority’) (Stone Sweet et al. 
2001: 6-7). 
Procedures represents a particular type of rule because these rules “determine how actors and 
organizations make all other rules” (Stone Sweet et al. 2001: 6). This entails that procedures 
describe what tasks are to be carried out by which actors, and how the latter are to relate to 
one another. The level of precision in such a description can be general or detailed. Moreover, 
the formality with which this information is contained spans from informal standards to 
codification in a legal document. Finally, while the actual influence of a procedure is an 
empirical question, its formal influence on the decision-making process is a function of its 
bindingness, ranging from voluntary to compulsory. An additional feature pertaining to the 
latter is whether or not deviation from prescribed behaviour is linked to sanctions – a link that 
equally may vary along the three dimensions. 
As such, a procedure formalizes the roles and tasks of actors involves in a decision-making 
process on making specific rules, in this case common cross-border network codes. A 
procedure can describe which (type of) actors are to be involved in the making of a given set 
of rules, as well as how and where these rules are to be constructed and/or revised. A 
procedure can describe the relationship between actors, for instance through regulating voting 
rules and assigning veto power to specific actors at various stages of the process of making 
rules. Figure 1 summarizes the dimensions on the dependent variable. 
Features of rules and procedures Precision (broad-specific) 
Formality (more-less) 
Authority (voluntary-compulsory) 
Figure 1: Dimensions on the outcome of interest. 
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1.3 Outline of the thesis 
In this chapter, the topic and the research question were presented. The topic of chapter 2 is 
the theoretical framework, and three neo-institutional perspectives are presented in depth. 
Instead of regarding institutions as sources for stability only, the presentation will focus on 
explaining institutional change. Moreover, the different understandings of factors bringing 
about institutional change are seen in relation to the possibility for institutional design. 
Moreover, theoretical expectations to the case are derived, before concepts are 
operationalized. In chapter 3, the method used for collecting relevant data is presented. 
Through process-tracing, factors expected to have caused the change of the procedural rule 
will be identified, which also provides an opportunity for tracing the link connecting the 
expected explanatory factor to the enacted NC procedure. In chapter 4, the empirical 
development over time is presented, starting with the situation prior to liberalisation of the 
energy sector, followed by a presentation of the development from the 1990s including the 
first and the second legislative packages, and until the formal decision on the Third Package 
in 2009. In chapter 5, the empirical data is analysed first separately from each perspective, 
before a comprehensive analysis is undertaken. In chapter 6 concludes the thesis. In that final 
chapter, the main findings are presented, and methodological implications are evaluated. 
Implications for further development of EU energy market regulation are drawn, and the 
question is raised as to the effect on the pace towards the internal energy market. Further, 
implications for theory and aspects for future research are indicated. Attached in the annex is 
the list of organizational affiliation of informants and the interview guide. 
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2 Theory 
As stated in chapter 1, this thesis aims to explain why the procedure for developing common 
cross-border network codes for electricity (NC procedure) was enacted in its particular form. 
As a change of a procedural rule, this represents a case of institutional change. In the 
following, attention will be given to a complementary use of multiple perspectives, before 
each perspective is presented more in detail. Expectations as to why the procedure for 
developing network codes was enacted in its particular form will be offered, along with 
operationalization. While there are stabilizing aspects to institutions, in this chapter the 
emphasis is on the factors of change. 
2.1 A complementary approach 
Because the purpose here is to explain the formal decision on a new procedure, this represents 
a case of formal institutional change. Therefore, perspectives will be drawn from neo-
institutionalism, a stream of thought inquiring into the effect of institutions on outcomes. As 
noted by Hall and Taylor (1996) as well as Peters (2005), neo-institutionalism is a diverse 
theoretical group, which thereby offers the opportunity for a complementary approach 
(Ostrom 1990). The case for a complementary approach is further strengthened because 
different neo-institutional perspectives have different theoretical underpinnings, and explain 
different aspects of institutional design (Hall & Taylor 1996; Tallberg 2010). Institutional 
design refers to “the process whereby institutions are created or emerge with a specific set of 
properties” (Tallberg 2010: 634). Moreover, chapter 1 showed that expectations from 
different neo-institutional perspectives have been confirmed in previous research. With a 
purpose of explaining why an institutional change occurred as well as the ensuing institutional 
design, then, a complementary approach will be utilized in this thesis – drawing on different 
perspectives in order to explain as much as possible of this particular outcome. Thus, the 
purpose of utilizing multiple perspectives is not to test theory, which would require a cross-
case approach rather than a single-outcome study. 
Inspired by previous categorizations (Hall & Taylor 1996; Tallberg 2010), the three 
perspectives that will be utilized are power-oriented, sociological, and historical 
institutionalisms. These perspectives with their respective expectations approach institutional 
change from different angles: power-oriented institutionalism draws attention to the role of 
12 
 
power and interests; historical institutionalism points to the importance of initial choice 
followed by path-dependent developments; and sociological institutionalism underlines the 
role played by legitimate models and their subsequent imitation. These perspectives will be 
utilized separately and in combination in order to explain the outcome.  
As highlighted by Roness (2009), different strategies for the usage of several perspectives 
exist. This thesis makes use the strategy of complementing, where different theoretical 
perspectives are utilized in order to explain as much as possible of the case at hand (Roness 
2009: 3). The purpose of using several theories is that the sum of these parts will give a more 
complete picture of the truth – a picture that might be less fit for generalizing (Roness 2009: 
7-8). This resembles the domain approach (Tallberg 2010), where different utilized 
perspectives explain different parts of a phenomenon, thus complementing one another. While 
the complementary strategy has no absolute requirement that perspectives should not overlap 
– in the sense that they should explain different parts – the domain approach has a stronger 
demand for such a clarification, thus resembling another strategy presented by Roness (2009) 
namely that of contrasting. This strategy seeks to find the best perspective among several 
utilized and thus competing ones, and the purpose is thus to test the theories with the aim of 
generalizing the findings. As competitors, delineating the ‘borders’ among the perspectives 
becomes important (Roness 2009: 3, 9-10).  
As already noted, the strategy of complementary perspectives will be used in this thesis, 
because of the shape of the research question, which seeks to understand why the EU passed 
this particular procedure. It can be useful to approach a phenomenon from different angles in 
order to get a more complete explanation. Nevertheless, indicating the ‘domain’ of the 
perspectives might still be relevant, because it facilitates understanding which particular 
factor caused a particular part of this phenomenon. Therefore, separate analyses will be 
carried out before integrating these to a comprehensive explanation. The integrated analysis 
has the potential to offer a deeper explanation of why this procedure was enacted by the EU 
than as seen from separate perspectives seen in isolation. Thus noted, the different 
perspectives will be presented in the following. 
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2.2 Power-oriented institutionalism 
This perspective regards the interests of actors and their respective relative power as the main 
factors influencing institutional outcomes, in this case in the formal decision on the NC 
procedure in its particular form. 
2.2.1 Logic of consequences 
Interests are within this perspective seen as reflecting concerns for distribution. Actors are 
seen as particularly concerned with the relative distribution of power, which follows from the 
basic axiom of self-interest. Distributive implications can be defined as consequences for an 
actor’s share of something, normally the share of material goods, but it could also be 
immaterial goods like formal influence or role/task allocation. Moreover, interests are seen as 
exogenous to institutions (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000: 7), in the sense that they are causally 
prior to these. 
Behaviour occurs according to a logic of consequences, where actors evaluate alternatives in 
terms of expected outcomes (March & Olsen 1989: 23). It should be noted that rationality is 
bounded as actors do not possess complete information regarding outcomes, and as such the 
expected distributive outcomes become the relevant factor. Actors are thus seen as 
instrumental, because their behaviour stem from consistently ordered preferences that are 
deducted from given interests (Hall & Taylor 1996: 944). Striving to realize their interests, 
then, “institutional actors seek policy outcomes that correspond as closely as possible to their 
preferences” (Rosamond 2010: 110). Finally, action is strategic, as actors choose the course of 
action that is optimal given the course of action that other actors are expected to choose (Hall 
& Taylor 1996: 945). 
2.2.2 Plastic institutions chosen by the dominant coalition 
As within the ‘rational choice institutionalism’ of Hall and Taylor (1996), institutions remain 
in place due to the benefit offered to the affected actors. Actors cooperate when they consider 
it to be in their interest. Politics are considered “a series of collective action dilemmas” (Hall 
& Taylor 1996: 945), where individual rationality can cause collective irrationality. Strategic 
actors might therefore agree to establish institutions in order to avoid such unwanted 
outcomes. Benefits could be achieved by reducing transaction costs as commitments are made 
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more credible. As a rational tool for realizing interests, this explains the establishment, as well 
as the survival, of institutions: Institutions survive as long as they are supported by the 
strongest coalition of actors (Hall & Taylor 1996: 945; Tallberg 2010: 634).  
In a situation in which no actor is hegemonic, change can be brought about following a 
change tipping the winning coalition (see e.g. Eikeland 2011b). This applies to European 
politics, where some nation-states are more powerful than others, yet where no single actor is 
powerful enough to push through changes on its own. With an interest in change, an actor will 
support the coalition for change. Moreover, a coalition can gain or lose support if there is a 
change in interests or preferences of actors; or if the relative influence of actors is changed in 
a manner that changes the relative support of a coalition. A change in preferences implies a 
change in an actor’s evaluation of the distributive terms of the status quo versus those of 
alternative solutions. 
History is seen as effective in the sense that interests of the powerful actors are seen as 
reflected by the institutional framework (Tallberg 2010: 636). Moreover, institutions are seen 
as plastic, because they change relatively quickly in accordance with changing coalitions, 
thereby reflecting power relations. Existing institutions, then, can be regarded as a snapshot of 
current power relations. The ability for a given actor to attain its highest preference is a 
function of the relative power of this actor (or of the coalition supporting this) as compared to 
that of other actors.
 
In an institutional setting, the decision-rules will reflect this distribution of 
power. 
Self-interested actors will try to shape institutions to their advantage, with the more powerful 
actors more able to attain such an outcome. When negotiating everything is ‘up for debate’, 
i.e. changes are subject to the support of the required majority. Institutions are designed to be 
tools that can be utilized in order to realize preferences, and rational actors make sure to be 
updated on the various possibilities available in the tool box as well as previous experiences 
with these different tools (Røvik 1998: 32). With an instrumental view of institutions, 
moreover, preferences could be expected to be adjusted according to experiences in the sense 
that a failure of an institution to fulfil its function will cause actors to change their stance 
towards this tool (Peters 2005: 62). 
In general, then, institutions are initiated, maintained (or dissolved) and shaped by the most 
powerful actors; serving to “safeguard and advance, rather than challenge and circumscribe 
the interests of the dominant parties” (Tallberg 2010: 636). As a result, institutional stability 
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as well as change is the product of actors’ preferences. The preference of an actor towards 
institutional reform is a function of the expected distributive gains this actor can get from 
changing an institution as compared to the status quo. If the gains yielded to an actor under 
the existing arrangements are greater than those expected following change, this actor would 
defend the status quo, and oppose change. Opposite, if the expected gains from a potential 
alternative are greater than the ones yielded by the status quo, the actor will support change. It 
thus matters whether an actor has a vested interest in changing or maintaining the status quo. 
Change, moreover, is a “conscious process” (Peters 2005: 62), because it results from an 
active choice by actors to support a formal change. Thus, institutional change is a matter of 
choice, subject to the support of a majority representing the ‘winning’ coalition. Actors 
instrumentally choose the institutions they want based on an evaluation of gains and losses. 
2.2.3 Applying this framework on the EU 
This perspective regards the actors with a formal influence on decision-making as relevant. In 
the EU legislative processes, the main organizations are the Commission, Parliament and 
Council. As such, inter-institutional relations and the relative influence of actors could affect 
outcomes, with drafts usually being passed back and forth between organizations. Consulted, 
yet without a formal role, are private or subnational organizations (e.g. national regulators, 
TSOs, business), which therefore are left outside the scope of this perspective. Here, actors 
are organizations. For analytical purposes, such actors are treated as unitary, meaning that 
internal divisions are regarded as being solved internally, with the organization behaving as a 
single actor externally. An exception from this is made for Council, where, given the power of 
national governments, will be treated as an arena rather than as a single actor. This is a 
pragmatic and empirically reasoned approach. 
The influence of the Commission and EP depends on the extent of power that is delegated to 
the supranational level – or, alternatively, retained nationally. Until the Lisbon Treaty, energy 
was a policy area where the distribution of competence was implicitly shared between the EU 
and its member states.
7
 Shared competence implies that member states and the EU have the 
competence to make and adopt legislation, and that competence remains with the member 
                                                 
7
 An explicit and comprehensive treaty basis for EU-level competencies on energy only came into force with the 
Lisbon Treaty (Pollak et al. 2010: 109). Energy remains an area of shared competence (EU 2008: article 4.2; Hix 
& Høyland 2011: 6) – with some important exceptions pertaining to e.g. energy mix (EU 2008 : article 194.2). 
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states until exercised by the EU (Hix & Høyland 2011: 6). With powers being implied rather 
than explicitly given, there was a need to refer to formal competence. In the past, “policy-
makers borrowed legal competence from the economic and environmental parts of the treaties 
to justify proposing and passing energy measures (Buchan 2010: 360). With this dynamic 
inherent pertaining to issues of shared competence, this could be expected to give the member 
states a leverage vis-à-vis the Commission and Parliament, because it is relatively easy to 
reject proposed legislation on grounds of lacking a basis in the treaties. 
Expected preferences of the relevant actors 
Actors evaluate options in light of their distributive terms, and, drawing on Kelemen and 
Tarrant (2011), the following preferences of EU actors can be identified: In general, the 
Commission has a general preference for more integration and supranational solutions, as well 
as an institutional self-interest in expanding its own powers (Kelemen & Tarrant 2011: 927). 
While its first preference is delegation to itself, a second-best would be the delegation to an 
EU-level agency or an EU-level network (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2011: 56; Kelemen & Tarrant 
2011: 927). With regard to network code development, then, the Commission’s first 
preference would be to do this itself, with a second-best option being an EU-level body 
mandated with this task. 
In a similar vein to the Commission, the European Parliament is also seen as preferring 
integration and supranationalism. Parliament is also seen as in possession of an institutional 
self-interest: increasing its power vis-à-vis the Commission, and especially the Council. The 
strategy of Parliament here is to increase its oversight powers of comitology, i.e. “oversight 
power with respect to EU executive bodies that implement EU directives” (Kelemen & 
Tarrant 2011: 928). Being more receptive to diffuse interests, Parliament has promoted 
transparency and accountability in comitology and in general: “To this end, the Parliament 
has demanded the establishment of transparent, accountable regulatory bodies and processes 
that can be subject to fire-alarm oversight by the diffuse public interest groups that are 
strongly allied to the Parliament” (Kelemen & Tarrant 2011: 928). Parliament’s first 
preference, then, would be delegating the task of developing network codes to an EU-level 
body, with an oversight role given to Parliament itself (e.g. within comitology). A second 
preference would be a general mechanism of regulatory oversight carried out by an EU-level 
actor independent of national governments and of the Commission. 
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Member states within the Council will seek to institutionalize cooperation in order to reduce 
transaction costs, among others by enhancing credible commitment. However, the shape of 
this institutionalization is affected by concerns for distributive terms: In cases of high 
distributional conflict, member states are less likely to delegate power to the supranational 
level (as desired by the Commission and EP), but when they do, it is expected that they 
delegate tasks to a loose and horizontal network (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2011: 56; Kelemen & 
Tarrant 2011: 930). This is because member states have an interest in retaining control over 
policy areas with distributive implications. In cases of low distributional conflict, on the other 
hand, member states expect potential losses to be small, and are expected to enter into a 
compromise with the Commission and Parliament to establish an independent EU-level 
agency. The agency, moreover, is given authority to make regulatory decisions applying for 
the entire EU, yet national representatives are represented within this agency, usually by 
national regulators (Kelemen & Tarrant 2011: 931). Member states thus have two preferences, 
with are conditional: first, if the distributional conflict is low, the member states will accept 
an EU-level regulatory agency; and second, if the distributional conflict is high, member 
states will opt for the looser alternative of a network. If network code development is 
characterized by the need for a European solution, yet at the same time by a high 
distributional conflict, member states will opt for a network. In a similar vein, if the 
distributional conflict is low, member states will accept a formal EU body mandated with this 
task. 
Under the co-decision procedure, then, in order to have been enacted, it is expected that the 
procedure for network code development would have had the support of the Commission as 
well as majorities within Council as well as Parliament. It is expected that the Commission 
had received a mandate by the member states to table a formal proposal on this. The mandate 
of ENTSO-E and ACER within the procedure for developing network codes is expected to 
have been perceived by member states as of low distributional conflict by member states, with 
Commission and Parliament supporting this as their respective second-bests. 
Distributional conflict is operationalized as high if member states state that a proposed 
measure will intervene with national governments decision-power over their respective 
energy sectors; and low if they state that it does not affect these national arrangements. A 
mandate given to the Commission by member states is operationalized as official statements 
from the Council calling for legislative proposals. An interest is operationalized as position 
towards a formal proposal for institutional change, with preferences divided between 
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supportive and opposed. With a support preference, an actor will join the supporting coalition, 
whereas an actor with an opposing preference, it will join the opposing coalition. For the 
Commission, support is operationalized as initiation of a legislative proposal, whereas for 
Parliament and the Council this is operationalized as a majority voting in favour on this piece 
of legislation, respectively. 
2.3 Historical institutionalism 
The historical institutionalism to be applied here differs somewhat from other understandings 
of this perspective. While other scholars have drawn elements from the socialogical or rational power-
oriented perspectives (Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 2005), here, an intermediate approach resembling 
that of Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) is utilized. The second perspective resembles the power-
oriented perspective in its definition of institutions as formal rules, procedures and 
organizations. However, the historical perspective is distinct in that it places actors and their 
respective interest in a temporal context. This has implications for the possibilities for 
institutional design. According to (Pierson 2000), there are two key theoretical parts of this: 
First, a path-dependent development must be identified. Here, the separate stages of this path-
dependency must be identified, explaining why and how subsequent developments remained 
on this path. Second, this development must be placed on a temporal dimension in the sense 
that it must be analysed “in the context of other processes of historical change” (Pierson 2000: 
80). Specific for this perspective, then, is the view that “institutions emerge and are embedded 
in concrete temporal processes” (Thelen 1999: 371). 
2.3.1 Path-dependent institutions 
The relative stability of institutions over time has brought scholars to regard institutions as 
path-dependent. Pre-existing institutions have been described as pushing subsequent 
developments in a certain direction (Hall & Taylor 1996: 941); channelling and constraining 
change (Pierson 2004: 133); constraining the range of possible alternatives (Rosamond 2010: 
111); or constraining change (Thelen 1999: 387). Studying path-dependency, however, 
requires identifying the initial step that put subsequent developments on a path, as well as the 
mechanism by which these remain on this path. Seen in the light of its consequences for the 
later course of events, this initial step is a critical juncture, and has been described as a 
“period of significant change” (Collier & Collier 1991: 29). A critical juncture generates 
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positive feedback (Pierson 2004: 51, footnote 26), which is the mechanism through which 
path-dependency arises. The initial path is strengthened over time due to positive feedback – 
it becomes path-dependent. Over time, this makes an alternative course of action that was 
possible earlier, less likely to be taken later on. This is due to the processes of positive 
feedback that reinforce the initial choice, and increases the distance to other initially available 
options (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007: 341; Pierson 2000: 74-75): “once a response is adopted, 
it may generate self-reinforcing dynamics that put politics on a distinctive long-term path” 
(Pierson 2000: 82). 
Critical junctures and positive feedback 
Critical junctures have been understood as “relatively short periods of time during which 
there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of 
interest” (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007: 348). Moreover, it occurs in a situation where “the 
structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political 
action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period” (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007: 
343). This initial choice, then, is taken by influential actors utilizing a window of opportunity 
(Kingdon 2003) in a time of “institutional fluidity” (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007: 354). A 
critical juncture triggers new and other feedback effects, and this increases the probability that 
the outcome to be explained will ensue – on this new path, it is more likely to occur than on 
the previous path (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007). Because of the difficulty of operationalizing a 
situation of institutional fluidity, the approach to critical junctures in this thesis will be to 
define these in terms of their consequences: if feedback effects are identified that differ from 
those found at an earlier period, a critical juncture is understood as having taken place. This 
differs from a functionalist approach, because the juncture is not defined in light of its 
consequence on the outcome of interest. This juncture will moreover be traced back to its 
initial constitutive step: behaviour by actors situated in larger macro-structural processes.  
Critical junctures create new mechanisms of positive feedback, which means that changes in 
positive feedback signal that a critical juncture has occurred. Positive feedback effects flow 
back to institutions, and subsequently reproduce and maintain them (Pierson 2004; Thelen 
1999). Thus, positive feedback effects keep institutions on a particular path. Without these 
mechanisms of reproduction, institutions would not endure, as the latter are “embedded in a 
context that is constantly changing” (Thelen 1999: 396). Institutional stability, is not 
automatic, but dependent on reproduction. Feedback effects can be divided into two broad 
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groups, the first being coordination effects. Actors adjusting to institutions concomitantly 
reaffirm and uphold them (Thelen 1999: 392). Further specification is offered by Banchoff 
(2002), who notes that institutions give rise to actor constellations with vested interests in the 
survival of this institution (Banchoff 2002: 5-6). Given actors’ limited resources, moreover, 
invested resources reduce the amount of resources available for backing reform efforts 
(Banchoff 2002: 3).
8
 Invested resources could also contain sunk cost, i.e. start-up costs of 
adjusting to an institution, implying that switching in itself would entail additional costs. 
Thus, coordination effects represent increasing returns, and give rise to institutional stability: 
Organizations with vested interests and invested resources in institutions will defend these. 
The second group of feedback effects consists of distributional effects of institutions, where 
institutions are not neutral, but rather have effects on the relative power relationship between 
groups: Institutions “reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power 
distribution in politics” (Thelen 1999: 394).  By structuring political conflict between groups, 
in which some are privileged and others not, institutions thus structure outcomes (Hall & 
Taylor 1996: 937-938). Moreover, “institutions distribute power unevenly across social 
groups” (Hall & Taylor 1996: 941), and over time these asymmetries can exclude or empower 
groups, with the possibility of the latter groups being able to institutionalize their upper hand 
by changing “the rules of the game…to enhance their power (Pierson 2004: 36). The result is 
institutions that can be seen as “enduring legacies of political struggles” (Thelen 1999: 388). 
This becomes self-reinforcing as powerful actors that over time change the ‘rules of the game’ 
to their benefit give rise to more asymmetry in relative power. Whereas coordination effects 
pertain to the interests of actors in relation to existing arrangements, distribution effects 
influence relative power. Thus, actors and their interests are endogenous to institutions 
(Thelen 1999: 375), because the constellations of actors as well as their interests are 
influenced by path-dependency. 
With causal importance given to critical junctures, this perspective allows for the possibility 
that cause and effect can be separated by a long period of time, because the effects of early 
institutional choices can be long-term (Peters 2005: 71; Rosamond 2010: 111). This opens for 
the possibility that institutions can develop in ways that were neither foreseen nor desired by 
                                                 
8
 Banchoff includes a third factor, which relates to the effect of equating a practice with the definition of a 
policy-area, thus limiting the scope for change (Banchoff 2002: 5). While certainly compatible with historical 
institutionalism, this represents a more sociological vein, and is therefore not included in this more power-
oriented application of the historical perspective.  
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the actors who made the initial choice, and for whom the outcome might represent an 
unintended consequence (Hall & Taylor 1996: 938; Rosamond 2010: 111). Consequently, 
history is not necessarily effective in producing functional and optimal institutions – 
institutions can be dysfunctional (Peters 2005: 79). Path-dependency structures the behaviour 
of organizations, thus limiting the scope for agency. The historical perspective thus differs 
from the power-oriented perspective’s view of institutional outcomes as reflecting the logic of 
consequences. 
Path-dependent change 
Due to the described positive feedback effects, institutions remain stable. Positive feedback 
does not, however, mean that institutions are ‘locked in’ for all time (Pierson 2004: 52). On 
the contrary, institutional stability is intertwined with institutional change, because change 
occurs in path-dependent ways. As positive feedback reinforces the existing institution, 
incremental changes occur within a given path (Pierson 2004: 52). This has been referred to as 
“bounded change” (Pierson 2000: 76). The reason is that reinforcement entails more than 
mere maintenance, because the former strengthens a tendency, whereas the latter only retains 
it. Understanding the stability of institutions, then, is a criterion for understanding change 
(Thelen 1999: 399), and this stability is moreover explained by “the origins rather than the 
functions of the various pieces” (Thelen 1999: 382). 
2.3.2 Contextual change 
The second key theoretical step when analysing from a historical perspective is to place this 
path-dependent development in a greater historical context (Pierson 2000: 80). This is 
because path-dependency does not happen in a vacuum: “Where the context is changing, 
those who are invested in particular institutions re-evaluate their interests in light of these 
changes” (Thelen 1999: 396). Thus, contextual changes can affect the mechanism of positive 
feedback to the effect to strengthen or weaken these. While a crisis could shake the system, 
shifting developments to another path (Peters 2005), reform within related fields could trigger 
changes for the context of a path-dependent institution: “changes in one institutional arena 
can reverberate, provoking changes in other, complementary institutions” (Thelen 1999: 396). 
Contextual factors are macro-level changes in the economy, or meso-level changes within the 
energy sector. 
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Moreover, the impact of contextual changes depends on when in a path-dependent sequence 
they occur. It matters in which order events happen for subsequent developments, because 
their relative timing affects the interaction among them (Pierson 2004: 68-71). However, 
because a sequence “is given by the way in which social interactions unfold in time, rather 
than being something that someone selects” (Pierson 2004: 62, emphasis in original), the 
scope for agency is reduced: the order of events cannot necessarily be controlled by actors, 
yet it influences their behaviour. As a result, outcomes are also affected (Thelen 1999: 388). 
Thus, while historical institutionalism has been described as less able to explain change 
(Peters 2005: 79), this thesis regards the influence of existing institutions as providing insight 
into change via the effects of feedback mechanisms on actors and their interests. Because an 
outcome is the result of critical junctures, actors that took the initial decision did not 
necessarily have this in mind when negotiating. Moreover, the temporal separation between 
cause and effect entails that the latter is not fully controllable by actors, in particular due to 
the feedback effects reinforcing the initially chosen path. Thus, institutional change is not 
fully controlled by actors, but rather subject to a path-dependent sequence of events resulting 
from a critical juncture. 
2.3.3 Applying this framework on the EU  
Because feedback mechanisms are specific to a given institution (Thelen 1999: 397), 
understanding change “requires an analysis of the particular mechanisms through which 
previous patterns were sustained and reproduced” (Thelen 1999: 399, emphasis added). This 
calls for an eclectic approach for studying “who has vested interests in particular institutions 
and what sustains these investments over time” (Thelen 1999: 398). A broader conception of 
actors may be required, because relevant actors are those directly affected by the institutional 
reform (these will also have vested interests) as well as those making decisions on 
institutional change and design, respectively. 
Expectations from the historical perspective 
From the historical perspective, resistance to change is expected. As a second expectation, 
however, change occurs according to the path set by an initial decision. This rests on the 
following sub-expectations: 1) The initial is decision was taken by actors that were influential 
at this point of time; 2) this decision triggered positive feedback effects, 3) positive feedback 
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effects caused path-dependency; 4) path-dependency eventually led to the adoption of the NC 
procedure in its particular form. Additionally, it is expected that larger historical processes 
affected the context that path-dependency took place in. 
An initial decision is operationalized as a single or relatively small set of decisions made by 
the EU. These could be informal agreements or formal legislation. Actors influential during 
the critical juncture are those that held formal and informal power within EU legislative 
process at the time that the initial decision was taken. While a critical juncture is defined 
through the identification of different positive feedback effects during a previous period of 
time; positive feedback is operationalized as consisting of stated support of existing 
institutions by stakeholder orgenizations and major EU bodies (coordination effects: vested 
interests), amount of time, personnel and money used on existing institutions (coordination 
effects: invested resources) by stakeholders and major EU bodies, and formal influence of 
some stakeholder organizations and/or major EU bodies at the expense of others (distribution 
effects). Stakeholder actors are sub-national organizations (regulators, producers, transmitters 
of electricity) that participate in institutions pertaining to cross-border coordination on 
electricity. Major EU bodies are the Commission, EP and Council. Path-dependency is 
operationalized as incremental changes increasing the probability that the NC procedure 
would be enacted. Larger historical processes are operationalized as other reforms 
undertaken within the electricity sector in Europe. 
2.4 Sociological institutionalism 
2.4.1 Logic of appropriateness 
The third perspective, sociological institutionalism, regards the shape, or design, of 
institutions as is the direct result of concerns for legitimacy. This perspective addresses the 
adoption of “specific sets of institutional forms, procedures or symbols” (Hall & Taylor 1996: 
947) head-on. Thus, this perspective is considered to be of great explanatory value in 
accounting for the shape of institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996: 947; Tallberg 2010: 638): it 
traces the origins of a given institution’s particular shape by looking to the role of norms and 
ideas (Tallberg 2010: 635). A norm can be defined as a moral guideline for expected social 
behaviour, and is closely related to legitimacy. Legitimacy, moreover, will shape institutions. 
This perspective has a broader understanding of institutions, seen as including “formal rules, 
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procedures and norms, but [also] the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates 
that provides the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall & Taylor 1996: 947). This 
thesis thus utilizes a combination of a more normative and a more cognitive understanding of 
institutions, although most emphasis is placed on the cognitive aspect rather than the 
normative, because legitimacy is seen as an imperative, something taken for granted, rather 
than something one ‘ought to’ comply with. When the term ‘appropriate’ is utilized, it is in 
this meaning. 
Legitimacy is constitutive to institutions. Institutions, moreover, shape behaviour by offering 
normative templates for action or interpretation: “Institutions as systems of meaning do 
convey a sense of how their members should behave” (Peters 2005: 118). Hence, 
organizations and their behaviour alike are seen as guided by institutions that have an 
ideational basis. When organizations make institutions, then, the institutional design is 
directly shaped by a ‘logic of appropriateness’, rather than by a logic of consequences (March 
& Olsen 1989: 23). Actors want to do “the right thing” (Börzel & Risse 2009: 10) rather than 
maximize own gains.
9
 Institutional shape is seen as an end in itself, rather than a tool for 
realizing interests. As a result, this perspective admits actors less scope for agency as 
compared to power-oriented institutionalism, because actors behave according to factors 
outside their control. Similarly as within the historical perspective, interests and actors are 
seen as endogenous (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000: 7). As distinct from the previous 
perspective, however, is that “action is tightly bound up with interpretation” (Hall & Taylor 
1996: 948): their behaviour reflects conceptions of appropriateness. This legitimacy is 
moreover found in the organizational field, a term that refers to “those organizations that, in 
the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services 
or products” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 148). An organizational field can thus be compared 
to a sector or an industry. An organization will adapt to that which is considered legitimate 
within its organizational field (Peters 2005: 107), thus spreading a practice across this 
organizational field (Hall & Taylor 1996: 947). 
                                                 
9
 With rationality pertaining to the relationship between means and ends, this is contained in both logics of 
action. While the logic of appropriateness might direct attention to process-elements, this entails rationality in 
the sense that, given the goal of doing something the right way, behaving accordingly becomes a rational means 
to achieving that end. 
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2.4.2 Institutional legitimacy and diffusion 
The institutions themselves are seen as stable and stabilizing. Once in place and perceived of 
as legitimate, institutions will be maintained and reproduced through action.
10
 However, 
institutional change is also possible. Drawing on Selznick (1957), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) see this as resulting from concerns for legitimacy: Institutional change happens as new 
practices are adopted because they are perceived as enhancing legitimacy. New practices have 
normative aspects, and are thus not neutral. Legitimacy can thus give rise to stability as well 
as change. Due to the necessary delineation of scope, this thesis will not focus on the initial 
appearance of practices. Suffice to note here that this might be result from a demand-driven or 
functional process, where an institutional design develops in response to a specific problem 
(Scott 2008: 104). This can proceed as a self-reinforcing process of increasing adoption rates 
and legitimacy, respectively. Once perceived as legitimate, this spurs further adoption, which 
feeds back to enhancing the legitimacy of this practice. Practices are adopted by organizations 
because they are considered the appropriate way of doing things (Finnemore 1993: 575; 
Tolbert & Zucker 1983: 26), thereby enhancing legitimacy (Hall & Taylor 1996: 949).
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Whereas initial appearance might be demand-driven or functional subsequent adoption is 
supply-driven. 
This supply-side argument entails that changes in institutional design results from the 
diffusion of a solution offering a ‘one size fits all’-practice to a variety of problems in 
different contexts (Scott 2008: 104). Diffusion is a “socially mediated spread of some practice 
within a population” (Strang & Meyer 1993: 487). The perception of legitimacy driving 
diffusion, however, is no individual evaluation, but rather reflects the view of the collective, 
in this case the organizational field. Thus, organizations change the institutional design 
according to collective conceptions of legitimacy (Tallberg 2010: 635). In this thesis, the 
imitation of pre-legitimized practices will be studied. 
2.4.3 Carriers and mimesis 
Carriers are vehicles that ‘transport’ practices, and the type of carrier can influence 
institutional change. In the following, two types of carriers are presented: symbolic and 
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed theoretical account of such a process, see Berger and Luckmann (1967). 
11
 Such a solution-driven development could also be actively propagated by prior adopters (Finnemore 1993).  
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relational systems, respectively (Scott 2008: 70, 140).
12
 Symbolic systems emphasize the 
interpretation of a practice. Categorization influences interpretation because the way things or 
ideas are understood is affected by how they are distinguished from one another. Referred to 
as decontextualization or theorization, this entails a process where some elements are 
emphasized and crystallized at the expense of others, thus removing a practice from its initial 
context to a more general level of abstraction through interpretation (Strang & Meyer 1993: 
492). Moreover, the message conveyed from this abstract level is that “similar practices can 
be adopted by all members of a theoretically defined population, with similar effects” (Strang 
& Meyer 1993: 496). This facilitates diffusion because theorized practices at a higher level of 
abstraction are able to ‘travel’. It should be noted that it is not the practice itself that spreads, 
but its theorized version (Strang & Meyer 1993: 499).  
According to Strang and Meyer (1993: 500), theorization and rationality are closely 
interrelated, with the former drawing on the latter in order to specify the reasons as to why a 
given practice or idea should be adopted: “why the potential adopter should attend to the 
behaviour of one population and not some other, what effects the practice will have, and why 
the practice is particularly applicable or needed given the adopter” (Strang & Meyer 1993: 
500). Moreover, theorized practices are regarded as effective in achieving desired ends 
(Strang & Meyer 1993: 488), thus supporting the perception of legitimacy.
13
 As a 
‘rationalized myth’ (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness & Røvik 2004: 67), effectiveness might 
nonetheless be fictional (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). This illustrates how symbolic systems 
can aid diffusion by way of framing, because this particular way of presenting a practice – as 
effective – facilitates a particular interpretation or response: the practice is regarded as 
legitimate and adopted. A final aspect belonging to symbolic systems is bricolage, which 
entails creatively combining elements from different sources (Scott 2008: 140-142). Thus, 
legitimized templates for institutional design that are regarded as valid and applicable as 
solutions within different contexts are diffused. 
Relational systems make out the second group of carriers, where practices are diffused via 
social relations. Here, the shape of the relationship between prior and potential adopter 
matters. This can be relations among “among individuals, groups, and organizations” (Scott 
                                                 
12
 Scott presents two further carriers not treated here (routines and artefacts). 
13
 This differs from a more functionalist account in which changes would occur because they do in fact increase 
effectiveness and/or efficiency (Strang & Meyer 1993: 488). 
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2008: 142) that are “members of a social system” (Rogers cited in Strang & Meyer 1993). 
Practices are more likely to be diffused between organizations that resemble on another in the 
sense that they are seen as having “common cultural ties” (Strang & Meyer 1993: 487), and 
thus as “falling into the same category” (Strang & Meyer 1993: 490). Such categories are 
collective social constructs that facilitate diffusion (Strang & Meyer 1993: 491). A group of 
such organizations constitutes an organizational field: organizations adopt legitimized 
practices from within their own organizational field, imitating those that they perceive as 
similar, and as “more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). This is 
particularly relevant in the face of uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151), policy failure 
or dissatisfaction with the status quo (Börzel & Risse 2009: 12). 
There are several ways that diffusion can occur, one of which is mimesis (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983).
14
 This entails a process in which a potential adapter imitates – copies – a prior adapter. 
Finnemore criticises this for describing the how, but not the why, of diffusion (Finnemore 
1993: 592). Moreover, it is criticised for being “an unmediated process; it locates the impetus 
for imitative actions in the imitator” (Finnemore 1993: 592). However, if combined with the 
carriers from the relational and symbolic systems – common cultural ties and theorization, 
respectively – mimesis is given more explanatory weight, and the impetus for imitation can be 
seen as existing within the organizational field rather than located within the individual 
organization that imitates. This illustrates that imitation is heavily influenced by the logic of 
appropriateness, entailing a more cognitive aspect as well in the sense that the adoption of 
practices might reflect orthodoxy (Scott 2008: 51). As such, while it might be rational to learn 
from the experiences made by others (Strang & Meyer 1993: 489), imitation does not reflect a 
rational choice, but rather a cultural imperative.
15
 
This has been characterized as convergent change, because it supports and strengthens 
practices already present within an organizational field (Scott 2008: 133). However, as 
practices travel, innovation can be introduced. Emphasizing that practices can change as they 
are transmitted to other contexts, innovation can also occur as practices are ‘translated’ to a 
new context (Christensen et al. 2004: 85). How the ‘end-user’ makes use of a practice can 
also be innovative (Scott 2008: 133). Moreover, by imitating multiple practices 
                                                 
14
 Other mechanisms mentioned are normative and coercive diffusion (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). 
15
 Experiences would nonetheless be interpreted in a social context, and it is not given that the link between 
cause and effect is recognized by actors. 
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simultaneously, thus combining different models in a bricolage, a new institutional design can 
appear. As a result, there is no necessary contradiction between imitation and innovation. 
Consequently, different institutional arrangements are not just regarded as means to achieve 
an end, but seen as ends in themselves, because certain ways of doing things are regarded as 
more appropriate than others. Institutions will change when conceptions of legitimacy change. 
For institutional design, this entails that specific institutional features are realized because 
they are regarded as legitimate. Consequently, the possibility for individual organizations to 
actively change institutions is therefore limited, because changes in institutional design reflect 
collective perceptions of legitimacy diffusing through the organizational field. 
2.4.4 Applying this framework on the EU 
Expectations from the sociological perspective 
The procedure for developing network codes was enacted in its particular form because this 
was regarded legitimate. The particular contents of the procedure imitate theorized practices 
found and positively evaluated within the organizational field of those organizations making 
changes to the institutional shape of the procedure. Due to the Commission’s role in drafting 
legislation, it is expected that its organizational field was of particular importance. 
Uncertainty is operationalized as statements and references by organizations involved in 
making EU legislation that they are not sure as to what means could achieve the desired goals, 
or the provision of multiple viable alternatives. Policy failure and dissatisfaction are both 
operationalized as statements and references made by these organizations that the existing 
practices are illegitimate, insufficient, wrong or inappropriate etc. Common cultural ties are 
defined as existing within an organizational field. The organizational field of the unit 
(Directorate-General for Transport and Energy) within the Commission responsible for 
drafting the proposal is operationalized as other Commission units as well as other 
organizations within the energy sector. For Parliament, its field consists of Eurogroups – EU-
level non-governmental organizations and business groups respectively – and transnational 
networks gathering national public actors. The organizational field of Council is national 
governments. A legitimized theorized practice is operationalized as statements and references 
that in generic terms describe the way other organizations within the same organizational field 
do things. Moreover, the practice is described by an organization as applicable for itself. 
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2.5 Institutions and institutional change 
In this chapter’s final section, an elaboration of the relationship between institutions and 
institutional change within the three perspectives is offered. The perspectives have differing 
definitions of institutions, as well as different conception of how these can influence actors – 
and thereby affect outcomes. The power-oriented perspective tends to view institutions as 
formal rules that specify conditions for access to – and participation in – decision-making 
within formal organizations, thus regarding actors and their interests as exogenous to 
institutions. The historical perspective, while also defining institutions as formal rules and 
organizations, are more concerned with the positive feedback effects from initial choices that 
affect institutions and actors alike. The sociological perspective is different in that actors are 
considered less important, because the logic of appropriateness drives behaviour. Legitimacy, 
moreover, is seen as a collective construct rather than reflecting the view of an individual 
(actor). That which is considered legitimate is less of an individual view, and more one of 
collectives. Institutions, then, are perceived as consisting of “values and cognitive frames” 
(Peters 2005: 116) that could be informal or have been formalized in e.g. rules or 
organizational structure. 
This has implications for the perspectives’ respective understanding of institutional change. 
As the power-oriented perspective regards institutions as formal rules, institutional change is 
here explained by the rational behaviour of those actors with a formal say in the decision-
making. If these actors have an interest in changing (or establishing) an institution, they will 
act instrumentally on this preference to change the institution, an outcome that will ensue 
subject to sufficient support among actors. The historical perspective, on the other hand, 
studies how an initial decision can constitute a critical juncture by triggering path-dependent 
institutional development, which eventually leads to an outcome. Thus, the causes of 
institutional change can have long roots. The final and sociological perspective explains 
institutional change by looking at how models perceived as legitimate are imitated. Thus, 
despite diverging – yet not entirely different – understandings of what an institution is and 
how it influences outcomes, all three perspectives allow for the possibility that institutional 
change can result in a formal rule or procedure. 
What does this entail for the possibility of actors to engage in institutional design? The 
power-oriented perspective regards this as fairly high, limited only by the need for agreement, 
i.e. the need to make compromises. The historical perspective sees scope for agency in the 
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initial design, but because this can develop in ways unanticipated and unintended outcomes 
by the actors, this entails a substantial limitation to the possibility for organizations to engage 
in institutional design. The sociological perspective does not really see scope for action, 
because organizations simply imitate more legitimate models, but unintended innovation can 
result from combinations.  
In this chapter a theoretical framework for analysing the observed change was presented. In 
the following chapter, the methodological implications of the theoretical framework will be 
discussed. 
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3 Method 
The nature of the research question and of the theoretical framework – already presented in 
previous chapters – has implications for choice of research design (Gerring 2007: 71). The 
purpose of this chapter, then, is to present the method for how sources for data were located, 
and how data was collected and treated in order to answer the research question. At the end of 
the chapter, then, the foundation for making inferences from the data will be discussed by 
evaluating the validity and reliability of the research design (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). 
3.1 Choice of method 
Research question: Why was the procedure for developing common cross-border network 
codes enacted in its particular form? 
As indicated by the research question, the research objective is to explain the change in a 
specific procedural rule. Causal factors were presented in the theory chapter. During the 
course of the empirical study, then, two things had to be clarified: 1) are the assumed causal 
factors present? 2) Is there a causal relationship between these and the change of the 
procedural rule? 
The first question was addressed by means of the congruence method (pattern matching), a 
case study approach for comparing the consistence between the theoretical and the empirical 
world (George & Bennett 2005: 181). A case study approach is “a detailed examination of an 
aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events” (George & Bennett 2005: 5). 
Pertaining to the congruence method in particular, this entailed looking for correspondence 
between the causal factors and the outcome of interest. Theoretically deduced expectations 
were presented in the previous chapter. As the outcome (the observed change) was already 
known, attention was drawn to theories explaining this change, with expectations formulated 
in rather deterministic terms: given the presence of a factor, institutional change will ensue. 
Thus, the three perspectives offered complementary explanations as to why the change 
occurred, yet drew attention to different aspects pertaining to this change. This was treated 
more extensively in chapter 2, suffice to note here that the purpose was to explain as much as 
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possible of the matter at hand, and that in the case of contradictory findings that are mutually 
exclusive, this must be evaluated qualitatively. 
Ascertaining congruence between the causal factors and the change of the procedural rule, 
however, would not have been sufficient, as it must be established whether there was a causal 
mechanism between these (Gerring 2007: 71). Process-tracing was utilized to address this 
concern, as this approach seeks to uncover the mechanism linking causal factors to outcomes 
(George & Bennett 2005: 206). Considering not only the presence of the specified causal 
factors and, fast-forwarding to the outcome, the change of a procedural rule, process-tracing 
also carefully analyses the steps in between. In this thesis, this was be done by means of a 
‘detailed narrative’ in which the course of events was presented (George & Bennett 2005: 
210). This reduced the risk of spuriousness – a situation in which the assumed causal factor 
and the outcome are both actually caused by another factor not taken into account – as the 
narrative allowed for a consideration of potential factors not expected by the theories (George 
& Bennett 2005: 188). 
Finally, an inquiry into whether or not a causal factor is a necessary (and/or sufficient) 
condition for the outcome was required (George & Bennett 2005: 185). Limited time and 
resources prevented the consideration of a wider, comparable set of cases for similar or 
different patterns. However, in-depth knowledge of the case – attained through careful 
analysis of the process – formed the basis for an analytical assessment of the probability of a 
situation in which either causal factors or the procedural rule would have looked differently 
(discussed in the analysis chapter). Specifically, this posed the question of whether or not the 
outcome could have ensued without the presence of the assumed causal factor(s); and whether 
or not a different outcome could have occurred despite the presence of the assumed causal 
factor(s) (George & Bennett 2005: 189-190). 
3.1.1 Choice of case and contribution to theory 
This study was motivated by an interest in explaining an observed empirical change (Lijphart 
1971: 692). With a research objective of revealing why the formal change in this particular 
case occurred, it was quite relevant to study the specific case (George & Bennett 2005: 83). 
As a case in the “everyday language” sense (Geddes 2003: 137), it was studied over time, thus 
increasing the number of observations. These relate to the situation prior to the change (before 
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the initiation of the legislative process for a Third Energy Market Package), during (during 
the legislative process), as well as after the change (assessment of the outcome).  
The selection of this case, then, is substantially reasoned rather than representatively sampled, 
and as such cannot yield a statistical generalization. Nevertheless, every case study should 
have an interest beyond explaining the empirical phenomenon at hand (Gerring 2007: 20). 
The ambition should be to contribute to theory. In the absence of cross-case comparisons, 
however, even contingent generalizations, limited in scope to a subclass of phenomena under 
certain conditions (George & Bennett 2005: 75-76; Gerring 2007: 76), cannot be made. The 
reason for this is that a case study is usually not a sufficient basis for proving or discarding a 
perspective (whose expectations have been confirmed or rejected, respectively). 
As a building block, however, a single case study can provide useful information for future 
research. Thus, lessons learned for studying institutional change is will be presented in 
chapter 6. Despite not being able to be used as a basis for making contingent generalizations, 
separate case studies – that by themselves did not represent a sufficient basis for making 
generalizations – can be tested on other, comparable cases within the same universe. Defined 
in analytical rather than statistical terms then, the universe is a function of the research 
question (George & Bennett 2005: 69; Yin 2009). This study focuses on the particular 
transformation occurring in the regulation of cross-border electricity exchanges, and is studied 
as a case of a change of a procedural rule. Moreover, applying theoretically derived 
expectations on a specific case can also help refine theory. Utilizing different perspectives, 
scope conditions and nuance of these (in comparison to each other) can be identified (George 
& Bennett 2005: 115). Thus, the study can provide further specification of different streams 
of institutional theory. 
3.2 Sources for data 
The outcome to be explained is a change of a procedural rule – a formal legal change. Thus, 
data from official documents pertaining to the formal legislative process within the EU should 
be included. In order to study the unfolding process, data covering the span of this historical 
period (2005-2009 in particular) must be gathered. Such processes are well documented in 
public records, thus providing a viable source for data. Additionally, the interaction among 
affected parties, and their responses to events and steps of the process leading up to the final 
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decision on the Electricity Regulation (as part of the third legislative package) will be studied. 
On the positions of actors, position papers and press releases can be utilized. 
Relevant media coverage will be utilized for contextualization, complemented by semi-
structured interviews with elite informants that participated in or closely observed the process 
leading up to the 2009 decision. The latter will be invaluable for a more substantial insight to 
the process, including the less formal steps. 
3.2.1 Qualitative document analysis 
Written documents were assessed systematically through qualitative document analysis 
(Bowen 2009: 27). Documents utilized here were public records, position papers and 
newspaper articles were assembled “without a researcher’s intervention” (Bowen 2009: 27), 
and the analytical task consists of “finding, selecting, appraising (making sense of), and 
synthesising data contained in documents” (Bowen 2009: 28). 
Data from public records and documents 
The Legislative Observatory – cross-checked with the PreLex database – was used to identify 
relevant documents pertaining to the legislative process, thus concentrating on public records 
from the major EU bodies (Commission, Parliament, Council), leaving out others, like 
ECOSOC, CoR, ECJ, national institutions (although including some member state position 
papers submitted to the Council).
16
 Older EU documents were retrieved from the Archive of 
European Integration.
17
 Position papers were retrieved from the respective organizations’ 
websites. 
The advantage of using public records was that they thoroughly documented the process, from 
the legislative proposal (with an explanatory memorandum attached) presented by the 
Commission, to preparatory documents by Coreper; to minutes, declarations and press 
releases from EP and Council meetings, along with reports and legislation decided on. 
Drawbacks however included watered-down documents presenting a picture in which conflict 
                                                 
16
 Legislative Observatory is the European Parliament's database for monitoring the EU decision-making 
process: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil. The Commission’s PreLex database serves a similar purpose: 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en   
17
 The AEI is hosted by the University of Pittsburg, and found here: http://aei.pitt.edu/  
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of interest is often played down at the expense of consensus. Moreover, not everything is 
written down, and the selection of content to be recorded for publication might be subjected to 
negotiations (Council records in particular). However, comparing data from different sources 
(other documents, as well as other kinds of sources, like media and interviews) provided a 
check. 
Data from media coverage 
Additionally, relevant media coverage was used for contextualization of above-mentioned 
official documents, providing information on coinciding events, processes, and linkages 
between these. Moreover, the electricity sector responses to the different steps in the 
legislative processes taking place within the EU were also found from this source in addition 
to through, or in the absence of, public records or position papers. Moreover, journalists often 
seek to portray issues in a (possibly exaggerated) conflict dimension, and thus provided a 
useful corrective to official documents. 
Given temporal restrictions, the online news portal EurActiv was utilized, with some 
additional articles from other newspapers. This was a practical and pragmatic choice, with 
only minor implications for validity since this general source for data was not given as much 
weight as public documents and interviews. Relevant articles were located through search for 
key words, and available thematic dossiers on EU energy policy were also utilized. Articles 
related mainly to the period 2006-2008, thus providing contextualization to the formal 
legislative process within the EU on the Third Energy Market Package. 
3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Written sources were complemented by qualitative interviews. Elite informants were chosen 
as data would be needed from individuals that had participated in or closely observed the 
process leading to the outcome. Moreover, with public records in the EU often oriented 
towards attaining consensus, informants were seen as able to provide useful information on 
diverging views and interests. 
Informants were selected on the basis of their organizational affiliation, notably, in terms of 
organizations having participated or closely followed the legal process within the EU. 
Snowball sampling was also utilized (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981: 141). Asking key 
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informants to suggest further informants proved a useful approach for checking whether the 
interviews already conducted (or planned) were appropriate. Scholars within the field were 
also conferred on the matter. This is thus a controlled sample. With the need to talk to specific 
individuals, a randomized selection of informants was not a viable option. 
Given limited time and resources, it was regarded most important to talk to representatives 
from the formal EU institutions (Commission, EP, Council), as well as from organizations of 
the kind that were given major roles in the procedure of developing network codes. The latter 
included TSOs, market actors and national regulators or, alternatively, their associations. 
Representatives from the Commission, a TSO, ETSO, EURELECTRIC and a representative 
from a national delegation were interviewed.
18
 The informants had different relations to the 
course of events being studied in this thesis. Two had not followed the at the time unfolding 
process as closely, and as a consequence, provided less information on this. They did however 
provide insightful assessments of the outcome as well as on the nature of network codes 
(technical/political; cross-border/affecting national). The other three had however been 
centrally placed, all of which were still involved in related processes. This was positive in 
getting their assessment of the outcome as well as their preliminary experiences with the on-
going development of network codes. 
By interviewing informants with different organizational affiliations, different views could be 
compared. Therefore, a standard set of open-ended questions were utilized, with planned 
follow-up questions and probes. This allowed for standardization – making comparison easier 
– with the needed flexibility that allowed for the insider’s view. The interviews were 
conducted in English and Norwegian. Quotes were checked by the informants in order to 
reduce the possibility of misunderstandings as well as (where relevant) to avoid 
misrepresentative translation. The interview guide is found in the appendix. 
Informants’ memory was a potential issue, with implications for validity and reliability 
(Andersen 2006). This was indicated by informants at a few occasions hesitating, 
                                                 
18
 Requests to individuals represented (at the time) in Parliament were sent, but did not result in an interview. 
Interviewing representatives from the Council configurations having assembled at the time were moreover 
beyond the limits set by time and resources. Positions and processes of both institutions were fortunately 
available in public records. Due to limited time, no formal interview with a national regulator was conducted, yet 
the positions of their associations were well documented through position papers and press releases, as well as 
being well given much attention by other informants. Due to limited time and resources, other stakeholders were 
also not interviewed, notably traders, (large) consumers, power exchanges, environmental groups. 
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remembering only roughly when a given step in the process had occurred. In general, 
however, informants were able to recall the course of events with impressive detail – less 
surprising, perhaps, as several were still working with matters tied to these developments, 
thus keeping the matter fresh in memory. Moreover, some of the informants had been 
working rather intensively on these issues at the time, which too could have been expected to 
have had a positive effect on their recollection. The temporal dimensions also made it less 
likely to suspect informants of withholding information – the questions mainly related to the 
period 2005-2008. Informants provided rather exhaustive replies to answers, and spoke rather 
openly on most aspects. 
A recurrent issue in interviews, positive self-representation (Berry 2002: 680), might have 
occurred, but this is corrected through interviewing informants providing accounts from 
different perspectives, as well as by using data from other kinds of sources. Further, 
informants are not obliged to tell the truth (Andersen 2006; Berry 2002), and could also have 
had an interest in portraying the course of events in a particular way – especially as the actual 
process of making network codes is an on-going process. This, however, is not necessarily a 
disadvantage. On the contrary, getting perspectives that differ due to different interests 
provide useful insight. Moreover, this information can be compared to data provided by other 
informants as well as by other sources, such as public records and media coverage, thus 
strengthening validity. 
As data would be gathered from individuals, the study was reported to the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services (NSD). Informants were contacted by e-mail in advance, and given a 
broad presentation of the project as including the purpose of conducting an interview. Also 
provided was a rough description of the interview (shape and content), and a note on how 
(long) the data would be stored and used. All informants were offered the possibility of 
anonymity, and no names were included in the transcribed documents.
19
 Entailing a slight 
departure from the ideal of transparency, then, informants were referred to as representatives 
of their (former) organization. Moreover, protected by anonymity, informants were able to 
talk more freely, and provided exhaustive answers to my questions. 
                                                 
19
 As some informants wished to remain anonymous, this treatment was applied to all informants in order to 
ensure equal treatment – also due to the fact that the group of people involved in these processes was limited, 
thus making it easier to identify those who wished to remain anonymous once others (who would be named) 
were eliminated. 
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Subject to informant’s permission, the interviews were tape recorded. Additionally, notes 
were taking. One interview was not recorded, with the potential loss of detail being 
compensated for by the informant speaking rather freely on sensitive issues. Moreover, 
interviews were carried out within a relatively short time span, and transcribed afterwards. 
Finally, informants were given the option of reading through quotes intended for use, which 
also helped reduce the potential for misunderstandings and inaccuracies, with positive 
implications for validity – despite the risk of informants withdrawing quotes.  
3.3 Evaluation of the research design 
Using multiple sources for data (interviews, documents, media) allowed for balancing 
potential biases, as well as by providing a stronger basis for making inferences, thus 
improving validity and reliability (Gerring 2007) Most attention was given to primary sources 
(public records) and interviews (with most weight given to first-hand accounts) in order to 
avoid bias in terms of interpretation often attached to secondary sources (George & Bennett 
2005: 90). Moreover, all sources of data were approached seeking to trace the process, i.e. in 
search of collecting data of the various steps of the development occurring over time. Care 
was taken in comparing the ‘story’ of the process as told by one informant with that 
articulated by other informants, as well as reports from the media and the ‘official version’ 
described by public records. In case of contradictory accounts, this was evaluated on a case-
by-case basis, with some aspects being subjected to further discussion in the analysis chapter. 
To a large extent, the different sources rendered a similar story, thus enhancing validity and 
reliability.  
Validity is important because it addresses the question of whether the data gathered can be 
used to say something about the research question: “Validity refers to measuring what we 
think we are measuring” (King et al. 1994: 25). The research design applied in this thesis 
required an assessment of internal validity as well as construct validity (Lund 2002: 104). 
Internal validity refers to whether or not the inference of causality between the expected 
factors and the outcome of interest is valid (Lund 2002: 104). While different expectations 
from different streams within institutionalist theory were utilized, time and resources limited 
the use of further expectations, which consequently leaves some uncertainty related to the 
inferences made as regards internal validity. However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
process-tracing by means of a narrative allowed for an inquiry as to whether or not the 
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outcome was caused by the expected factors. Moreover, this could also capture omitted 
factors, i.e. those not expected by theory, and reduce the threat posed by spuriousness. 
Construct validity refers to the operationalization of theoretical concepts to empirical 
indicators that can be measured (Lund 2002: 104). Operational indicators were presented in 
chapter 2, and while different operationalizations could have been made from general terms 
the indicators seem to capture the theoretical concepts. For critical junctures in particular, the 
operationalization here differs from other uses, because it proceeds via the operational 
indicators for positive feedback. However, as stated in chapter 2, defining a critical juncture 
as single or a set of decisions taken in a time where the institutional constraints are relaxed 
(Capoccia & Kelemen 2007) or periods of major change (Collier & Collier 1991) is 
problematic because it cannot be taken for granted that this is the juncture that triggered new 
positive feedback. Although indirect, using changes in positive feedback to identify a critical 
juncture is a useful approach because it highlights and capitalizes on the interrelationship 
between the two. 
A study displays reliability to the extent that other researchers should be able to get the same 
results by using the same method (King et al. 1994: 25). Therefore, care was taken to describe 
the method for gathering and treating data utilized in this thesis. Where possible, moreover, 
data was gathered from sources like official records and media coverage available online, thus 
facilitating replication of the study. Replicating the social dynamics in an interview is more of 
a challenge, but the questions asked are available in the interview guide (see annex). The 
anonymity of informants is also a complicating factor, yet this trade-off was deemed 
necessary due to ethical considerations, and mitigated somewhat by referring to informants’ 
organizational affiliation. As interpretation played a role in the handling of data in the 
research design applied in this thesis, absolute reliability is not possible. However, care was 
taken in separating the presentation of the empirical data from the analysis conducted on the 
basis thereof. 
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4 Empirical inquiry 
In this chapter, the course of events leading up to the formal decision on the procedure for 
network code development will be presented in chronological order. Starting with a brief 
historical backdrop, this is followed by a presentation of the previous two energy market 
packages as well as previous cooperative schemes, before moving on to the early EU 
discussions of a third package, leading up to the Commission’s proposal for the Electricity 
Regulation in September 2007. Here, a closer look will be taken at the proposed NC 
procedure within this proposal, going more in detail as to the Commission’s reasoning of the 
steps thus suggested. Then, I will look into the legislative process through which amendments 
of relevance to the NC procedure were made before the presenting the final version of the 
procedure adopted in 2009. 
4.1 Pre-liberalisation 
There is a long history of energy being linked to the EU project, starting with the European 
Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM, but little competence had been delegated to the 
supranational level within this policy area. As general economic EU law developed, 
pertaining to the free movement of goods and services, the electricity and gas sectors, 
respectively, were shielded from this (Wasenden 2008: 33). In post-war Europe, security of 
supply was a major concern (UCTE 2009). Electricity and gas were treated as ‘special’ due to 
their strategic importance for economic development in general (sufficient and stable supply 
of energy is an important factor), but also, and, perhaps more importantly, due to particular 
traits: both depend on costly infrastructure – with networks constituting ‘natural monopolies’ 
– and are highly expensive to store, making instant usage neccessary. As a result, ensuring 
constant balance between production and consumption of electricity and gas, respectively, 
was – and arguably still is – the ultimate task of actors responsible for operating national 
networks. 
Prior to liberalisation, the situation pertaining to electricity in Europe was one of separate 
national markets, each of which usually was dominated by a vertically integrated company, 
with a large extent of state ownership (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 1). Vertically integrated 
companies – major companies whose activities included the entire value chain from 
production to transmission to customer supply – were predominant in the electricity sector, 
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with customers often without a choice as to which company they would get their electricity 
from, but where the companies in many cases had ‘public service’ obligations. 
The amount of cross-border electricity exchanges was relatively low, but conducted with the 
aim of improving energy supply, with cooperation among vertically integrated companies 
“focusing more on system security and on the efficient use of generation resources than on 
genuinely commercial objectives” (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 1). In Continental Europe, for 
instance, the Union for the Coordination of Production and Transmission of Electricity 
(UCPTE) had been established as early as 1951, by France, West-Germany, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands. Engaged within this 
organization were vertically integrated companies with production and transmission activities. 
Moreover, cooperation within UCPTE dealt with issues of ensuring secure supply of 
electricity, an important factor in rebuilding Europe after World War 2 (UCTE 2009: 11). 
Over time, UCPTE was extended to include other parts of Continental Europe. In a similar 
vein, vertically integrated companies in the Nordic region had been cooperating within Nordel 
since 1963 (Nordel 2009: 4). Also representing the interests of vertically integrated 
companies were the Union of Producers and Distributors of Electricity (UNIPEDE) whose 
roots stretched back to 1925 (UCTE 2009: 8), and EURELECTRIC, founded as aBrussel-
based lobby group in 1989 (Jabko 2006: 105) 
Energy was regarded a utility, and competition was low (Wasenden 2008: 33).This, however, 
started changing during the course of the 1990s and onwards, cf. figure 2. 
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 EU developments Cross-border electricity 
exchanged (TWh) 
1988 Commission launches internal energy market 138,6 
1990  170,9 
1992  168,2 
1994  170,2 
1996 1
st
 package: 1
st
 Electricity Directive 221,7 
1998 1
st
 package: 1
st
 Gas Directive 
Florence Forum 
ETSO (1999) 
232,7 
2000  297,3 
2002  332,0 
2003 2
nd
 package 
ERGEG 
 
2004  342,5 
2005 Hampton Court 
Sector inquiry launched 
 
2006 Commission green paper 383,2 
2007 Jan: Commission communication on IEM 
Jan: Sector inquiry final report 
Mar: Spring Council meeting 
Sept: Commission proposals for 3
rd
 package 
 
2008 Council reading 
EP reading 
376,4 TWh 
2009 Decision on 3
rd
 package  
 
Figure 2: Internal energy market development over time. Data on cross-border electricity exchange are from 
ENTSO-E (2010: 17).
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4.2 Dawning liberalisation efforts (1986-2004) 
4.2.1 Early steps from above and below 
Since the decision on the Single European Act in 1986, which launched a large initiative for 
general market integration in Europe, talks on energy market integration had taken place 
within the Council (Eikeland 2011a: 17). In 1988, the Commission proposed an internal 
energy market (Communities 1988). The Commission used the momentum gained from the 
general single market initiative, as well as on the early experience with UK energy sector 
liberalisation; and was supported by the UK (McGowan 2011: 200). According to Pollak et al. 
(2010: 78), the launched idea of an internal energy market was also indirectly influenced by 
the high prices experienced during the oil crisis of the 1970s. 
Route to the 1st legislative package 
EU internal market policy thus formed a starting point for the thinking around an internal 
energy market. The Commission wanted to liberalise the electricy sector by deregulating and 
opening up markets and networks to competition (Pollak et al. 2010: 80). This included 
integration across borders. In terms of measures, then, the Commission tried to facilitate 
market integration and liberalisation via the single market principles of free movement of 
goods (Buchan 2010: 360; Pollak et al. 2010: 79). The route via single-market powers was 
sought in part due to the lack of an explicit treaty basis giving the EU competence to legislate 
on energy matters (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 1).
20
 
Inspired by the successful utilization of competition law within the other ‘utility sectors’ like 
telecommunications and civil aviation sectors (El-Agraa & McGowan 2001: 301), the 
Commission nonetheless had to reduce its ambition due to member state opposition. 
Consequently, the legislative route taken required unanimous consent by the Council as well 
as consulting the European Parliament (Eikeland 2011b: 249). On this route, however, the 
Commission’s proposals were met by resistance by the member states (Pollak et al. 2010: 80). 
After experiencing its proposals being either rejected or heavily watered-down by the 
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 With the Lisbon Treaty the competence of the EU to legislate on energy has been expanded, cf. article 194 
(EU 2008). 
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Council, the Commission opted for a more bottom-up strategy entailing extensive 
negotiations with national representatives and experts within working groups. Eventually, 
following repeated negotiations between in particular the Commission and Council, this 
brought about the first legislative package, with an electricity directive passed in 1996, and a 
gas directive passed in 1998 (Eikeland 2004: 5; Wasenden 2008: 34). 
1st package: early deregulation and unbundling of accounts 
The two major changes included in the first electricity directive were different varieties of 
third party access to transmission networks, and unbundling of accounts (requiring an intra-
organizational separation between network operation, and the commercial market activity 
constituted by producing and supplying electricity) (Wasenden 2008: 34-35). Moreover, a 
deadline for market opening – in terms of competition – was set, from which point in time 
both producers and consumers of electricity could “negotiate purchases and sales of electric 
power” (Wasenden 2008: 34). 
This package did not bring about major changes, and “resulted in only minor commitments 
from Member State governments” (Eikeland 2011b: 249). Notably, while seeking to remove 
exlusive rights to produce and transmit electricity, thus extending market liberalisation 
somewhat, the provisions included in the two directives left a large scope for member states to 
decide measures in their own pace (Eikeland 2004: 6). Regarding third party access – 
providing commercial actors witout network ownership access to engange in cross-border 
electricity trade – for instance, several options were available, spanning from negotiated or 
regulated third party access, to the single buyer model (Hauteclocque & Talus 2011: 2). 
The first package represented “a compromise between countries that had started liberalization 
and those that contemplated it as a very remote possibility” (Trillas 2010: 71). By the time the 
first package was passed, some countries had already taken liberalisation a step further: “the 
United Kingdom, Sweden and [EEA member] Norway had already liberalised their markets 
to an extent wider than that required by the [Electricity] Directive” (Wasenden 2008: 34). 
However, the directives contained provisions allowing for further inquiry into barriers to 
establishing an internal energy market (Eikeland 2004: 7). Thus, the Commission continued 
its work on identifying shortcomings (and their remedies). While working on amending the 
directives, then, the Commission also carried out benchmarking and evaluations of existing 
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legislation and the implementation thereof. Moreover, it focused on “cross-border physical 
and tariff-based barriers to trade” (Eikeland 2004: 8). 
Own associations for transmission system operators 
In addition, the Commission sought to make its bottom-up strategy for reaching agreement on 
measures for energy market integration more targeted by establishing the Florence Forum in 
1998. This provided a meeting place where attendees from the electricity sector – representing 
national regulators, national governments, TSOs, traders, utilities, large consumers and 
consumer associations, power exchanges as well as from the Commission itself – assembled 
regularly for deliberations (Eikeland 2004: 8).
21
 
In addition to meeting within the Florence Forum, TSOs also assembled within their own 
TSO-specific organizations. In 1999, UCPTE was redefined as an association of TSOs, taking 
the name Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) (UCTE 2009: 
35). By 2009, UCTE would have 29 TSOs from 24 countries as its members (ENTSO-E 
undated-b), with approximately 8 people in the secretariat (ETSO interview). Cooperation 
within UCTE dealt primarily with the more technical issues, such as system operation 
(Commission 2007a: 52).
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During this period, cooperation within UC(P)TE was deepened: In 1991 agreement on an 
operational handbook – laying down common principles for network operation – was reached, 
with subsequent revisions undertaken during the 1990s (UCTE 2009: 34). Through 
negotiations, the UCTE TSOs agreed on and revised voluntary rules and recommendations 
(interviews ETSO, Commission). This work would continue in the early 2000s. 
Having taken steps during the 1990s in line with the early liberalisation within the Nordic 
region, Nordel became a TSO organization in 2000 (Nordel 2009: 4). Although limited in its 
geographical scope, the Nordic cooperation was rather extensive, focusing on the more 
technical system operation as well as market issues and infrastructure investment planning 
(ETSO interview). Cooperation within Nordel was less formal than within UCTE. This was in 
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 An equivalent forum for gas was established in 1999 in Madrid. 
22
 I.e. transmission system operation, or grid operation. 
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part due to the countries having much in common in terms of culture and language, yet even 
so, the style was more casual (ETSO interview). 
Other regional TSO associations existed, some of which were noted to be less substantial 
(UK and the Irish isle), and others that cooperated closely with UCTE, eventually becoming 
integrated into the synchronous UCTE zone (Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries).
23
 
In 1999, following encouragements from the Commission on facilitating consultation 
(Buchan 2010: 366), the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) was established 
with regional TSO organizations as its founding members,
24
 becoming an association with 
direct TSO membership in 2001. At the time, 32 TSOs representing 15 EU countries as well 
as Norway and Switzerland were members of ETSO – by 2009 another 8 TSOs had joined 
(ENTSO-E undated-a). Thus, as a European organization, ETSO had a wide geographic 
scope. Its scope in terms of cooperation was, however, more or less limited to market 
questions (ETSO interview). Moreover, a Commission informant described ETSO as a 
“typical lobbying organization,” which concentrated on monitoring EU legislation. A former 
ETSO representative noted that ETSO’s secretariat consisted of three people. 
Summing up the 1990s 
During the 1990s, early steps were taken by the EU to facilitate liberalisation of the European 
energy sector, with developments occurring faster in some member states and slower in 
others. The Commission suggested a number of liberalisation measures to facilitate 
competition, but many of these did not pass through the Council due to a lack of agreement 
among the member states. A first legislative package was passed, leaving member states with 
a large scope for action (or inaction), yet two further strategies were utilized by the 
Commission: on the one hand, the first package allowed the Commission to continue to 
monitor developments and barriers; and on the other hand, the Commission sought to address 
the electricity sector directly through the newly established Florence Forum, as well as 
encouraging TSOs to cooperate on a European level through ETSO. Moreover, sector 
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 ENTSO-E has 6 regional predecessor organizations: UCTE (Continental Europe), Nordel (Nordic countries), 
BALTSO (Baltic countries), UKTSOA (UK TSOs), ATSOI (Ireland and Northern Ireland) and CENTREL 
(Eastern European countries). Since the mid-90s, UCPTE and CENTREL were synchronized (UCTE 2009: 35). 
24
 ETSO was founded by ATSOI, UKTSOA, Nordel and UCTE. 
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associations were redefined as associations among TSOs, as opposed to the previous 
combined production and transmission associations. With liberalisation developing at an 
uneven pace across Europe, members of these TSO associations were in some cases 
companies with transmission acticities only, whereas others members were vertically 
integrated companies. 
4.2.2 Strengthening EU legislation, deepening TSO cooperation  
In 2001, a Commission benchmarking report called for further legislative action by the EU 
regarding the internal energy market, due to lacking implemention of existing legislation by 
several member states, but also due to increasing market concentration (Eikeland 2004: 8). 
More detailed EU legislation was called for, thus introducing EU Regulations which would 
apply directly, in addition to revising the existing directives which would have to be 
transposed into national law by member states (Eikeland 2004: 8-9). 
2nd package: legal unbundling, regulatory oversight, cross-border networks 
Subsequently, in 2003, a second package was passed by the EU, amending the two directives 
on electricity and gas, respectively, as well as introducing two regulations – one on electricity 
networks, and one on gas networks. The amended directives contained provisions on market 
opening within specified deadlines, and required legal unbundling of vertically integrated 
companies (separating production/supply tasks and network tasks into separate entities).
25
 
Moreover, having an independent energy regulator in each member state now became 
mandatory (Eikeland 2004: 9). While a lower limit was set for the power of national 
regulators, practices varied across the member states. A common feature, however, was a 
national orientation – legally imposed – of these regulators (Buchan 2010: 366-367). Most 
regulatory competence remained at the national level, causing a ‘regulatory gap’ at the 
European level (Eberlein & Grande 2005; Vasconcelos 2005). 
In addition, an Electricity Regulation was introduced.
26
 This regulation laid down the specific 
rules for cross-border electricity networks, with guidelines part of the regulation and in an 
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 E.g. by placing networks in a subsiary to the company (Buchan 2010: 361). 
26
 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 (EU 2003). 
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attached annex, which were subject to further deliberations within a regulatory committee. In 
the Regulation, the previously optional regulated third party access (cf. section 2.1 – the other 
two alternatives were negotiated third party access and single buyer model) now became 
compulsory (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 4) – although small differences had been noted in 
practice between this and the previously available alternatives (Hauteclocque & Talus 2011: 
4). Third party access was now not only regulated, but regulated in a particular way: market-
based methods should be the norm for congestion management on interconnectors. Roughly 
stated, this meant that capacity on – access to – cross-border networks should be allocated 
through auctions, where commercial actors wanting to engange in cross-border electricity 
trade would bid on the available capacity on a given interconnector. This would be subjected 
to further deliberations within the regulatory committee. The Regulation was however silent 
on how such methods within member states should look like (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 4). 
Alongside the second package, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG) was established through a Commission Decision, with the aim of facilitating 
cooperation among national regulators in order to reach the goals stated in the directives. 
ERGEG would also cooperate closely with the regulatory committee laid down in the 
Electricity Regulation, without interfering with its work (Commission 2003). ERGEG would 
have an advistory role vis-à-vis the Commission (Pollak et al. 2010: 90), and vis-à-vis the 
regulatory committee (Sanden 2009: 206). 
While the directives of the second package entered into force in 2005, the Regulation entered 
into force in July 2004. A requirement contained in the latter – market-based methods for 
allocating capacity on interconnectors – was not fulfilled at that time: more than half of the 
most congested interconnectors did not meet this obligation (13 of 25, to be specific) (Meeus 
et al. 2005: 30). 
Developments in TSO cooperation and outlook 
The contents of the Electricity Regulation had been shaped within the Florence Forum, where 
sector-specific actors had, one step at a time, reached an agreement (Hauteclocque & Talus 
2011: 7). Following identification by the Commission of impediments to market integration, 
sector representatives had deliberated within the framework of this forum – on a voluntary 
basis. While diverging views remained as to concrete steps, over time a general consensus on 
a number of issues was established (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 3). 
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Moreover, cooperation within UCTE took a step forward, with an extensive agreement signed 
by its member TSOs in 2004. The Operation Handbook was updated, expanded and 
connected to a separate agreement (the ‘Multilateral Agreement’) in which procedures for 
monitoring compliance with the operation standards was described (UCTE 2009: 42). 
However, as a Commission informant noted, the legal status of these outputs was unclear. On 
the other hand, a representative from the former ETSO, described these rules as quite detailed, 
and noted that UCTE had monitored its members by gathering data and conducting 
inspections. Noncompliance could be sanctioned by fines. The ETSO informant noted that 
UCTE’s work was very structured and comprehensive, going very much into detail – hardly 
surprising, as it spanned a large area with different cultures and languages, yet the UCTE 
members emotionally dedicated to these rather slow-moving processes. 
According to a former ETSO representative, during deliberations on the second package, the 
TSOs thought that, given their role regarding developing the market, they should have a 
special position. The idea of TSOs taking an active role together with national regulators on 
cross-border issues, however, was still an alien thought in Brussels, the same informant noted. 
At this point in time, the former ETSO representative added, the general outlook was of a 
national scope, yet amongst TSOs, internal discussions on these matters were picking up 
speed (ETSO interview). 
TSOs from all over Europe discussed market issues within ETSO; Continental European 
TSOs cooperated on system operation within Continental European synchronous zone; and 
within the Nordic synchronous zone, the Nordic TSOs cooperated on operation, market and 
infrastructure investments. Thus, whereas the Nordic TSOs could “talk about everything” 
when they met within the Nordel setting, continental European TSOs concentrated on either 
market issues or operation issues, depending on the whether they met within UCTE or ETSO 
(ETSO interview). 
Summing up the early years of the new millenium 
During the early years of the new millenium, new actors emerged following developments 
taking place at the European and at the member state level. The establishment of energy 
regulators was now mandated by the EU, although having already been in place in most 
countries, with some exceptions. With liberalisation progressing at an uneven pace, 
transmission system operators (TSO) were emerging as separate entities from the previous 
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vertically integrated companies in many countries. Ownership unbundling was not mandated 
by the EU, as opposed to the mandatory legal unbundling, but nevertheless developing in 
practice in a number of countries as national energy markets were liberalised, with the UK 
and the Scandinavian countries as early movers. Nonetheless, in many cases large production 
companies still owned the networks, although the networks were placed in a separate 
subsidiary company. 
4.3 Prelude to the 3rd package (2005-2007) 
This part will focus on the period of time leading up to the formal presentation of the 
Commission’s proposals for a third package. 
4.3.1 High prices and low competition 
As the deadline for transposing the second package came and went, the Commission was 
satisfied with neither existing legislation nor the member states’ implementation thereof 
(EurActiv 2006a; Zeit 2006a). Implementation deadlines had been missed by a number of 
member states. Moreover, since the initiation of energy market liberalisation, a series of 
mergers and acquisitions had occurred. National champions like EDF, Enel, EON, RWE, 
Vattenfall, Endessa and Electrabel were taking over companies in other countries (Meeus et 
al. 2005: 30). These ‘seven brothers’ (Thomas 2003) responded to deregulation by expansion 
in order to retain their market share, which had been made possible by the very same 
liberalisation process (Domanico 2007: 5067). 
Coinciding with this was a rapid increase of global energy prices, which triggered critique of 
the liberalisation project which many saw as not delivering on the promised results in terms of 
lower energy prices as well as threathening security of supply (IEA 2005). 
Responding to these developments, the Commission’s DG TREN and DG COMP launched a 
sector inquiry, using reinvigorated competition powers passed in 2003. The study put 
electricity and gas markets under the spotlight, officially motivated by  concerns for increased 
ownership concentration and following an increase in energy prices (Commission 2007e). 
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4.3.2 Early EU discussions 
At a meeting of the European Council in October 2005, having assembled at Hampton Court, 
European member states agreed to launch a common energy policy for Europe. It was 
reported that this had been brought about following a UK change of position. A 
comprehensive approach was called for, one in which energy and climate change issues 
should be integrated. Notably, one of the suggestions contained in this initiative put forward 
by Tony Blair, British prime minister at the time, was “better interconnection between the 
EU’s power grids in order to establish one single grid.” Agreement was general, however, and 
did not cover any concrete steps (EurActiv 2005). 
In March 2006, the Hampton Court summit was followed by a green paper from the 
Commission. Here, six priority areas were mentioned, one of which dealt with an internal 
energy market, which could contribute to lower prices, security of supply and competition, the 
latter which was postulated as being positive for the environment (Commission 2006b: 5).
27
 
Notably, it was pointed out that a “European grid code could encourage harmonised, or at 
least equivalent, grid access conditions” (Commission 2006b: 6, emphasis in original). 
Moreover, the Commission pointed to ongoing work within CEER and ERGEG regarding this 
matter, but evaluated this as moving too slow.
28
 At this point, the Commission mentioned an 
option of a European energy regulator with decision-power on common rules, possibly 
assisted by a formal network of TSOs (Commission 2006b: 6). Under reference to a blackout 
in 2003, such a TSO network could also contribute to enhanced cooperation on system 
security, including common standards (Commission 2006b: 8). 
At this point in time, then, renewed calls for EU legislation within the energy sector were 
heard, and early discussions on European network codes,which could be created by an EU 
energy regulator together with TSOs, took place. 
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 The remaining five were security of supply, sustainable and diverse energy mix, climate change, technology 
innovation, and an external energy supply. 
28
 The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) was established by national regulatory authorities in 
2000, existing alongside ERGEG in the years 2003-2011, and alongside ACER since 2011. 
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4.3.3 Interruptions in energy supply and calls for more cooperation 
As a prelude for subsequent developments, issues of security of supply gained some salience 
following the EU enlargement in 2004, with the new central and eastern European member 
states being concerned about their dependency on Russian energy supplies. However, at this 
point, few advances in energy security were made by the EU (Buchan 2010: 373). In 2006, 
attention was again drawn to security of supply. Coinciding with the Commission’s work on 
the sector inquiry, interruptions in electricity and gas supplies occurred (EurActiv 2006b). 
In January 2006, gas supplies to Europe were also interfered. Due to a disagreement on prices 
between Russian and Ukrainian energy companies, Russia cut off its gas supplies to Ukraine, 
subsequently causing an interruption of supply to EU countries (EurActiv 2006c). The gas 
crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 contributed to placing security of supply on the 
agenda (Norway’s Mission to the EU interview). 
The Commission responded to the incident by calling for more coordination of member 
states’ energy policies (EurActiv 2006c), whereas the Council at its subsequent Spring 
meeting called for better coordination mechanisms with which potential future incidents could 
be managed (Council 2006: 5).
29
 Specifically, the Council drew attention to the need for 
better cooperation between TSOs and national regulators (Council 2006: 6). 
Later in 2006, the Commission Decision of 9
th
 of November amended the annex of the 2003 
Electricity Regulation according to a comitology procedure laid down in the Regulation.
30
 
The annex contained guidelines on the management and allocation of available transfer 
capacity of interconnections between national systems (Commission 2006a). The new 
guidelines were based on work conducted within regional ‘Mini-Fora’ from 2004. Initiated by 
the Commission and the Council for European Energy Regulators (CEER) (later joined by 
ERGEG), these meetings gathered TSOs, stakeholders, power exchanges and member state 
governments for deliberations. With objectives and measures defined in wide terms, the 
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 At this meeting, the European Council also adopted an Action Plan for 2007-2009. 
30
 When legislation is passed by the EU, particular requirements can be imposed on the Commission in its work 
in preparing this legislation for implementation. Comitology refers to a requirement that the Commission 
conduct its executive tasks together with a committee (here, different variants exist) consisting of national 
representatives (Bergström & Héritier 2007: 171). 
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results of this work were mixed, because a variety of practices were possible within the same 
framework (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 5-8). 
In November 2006, a blackout caused interruptions in electricity supply within the continental 
European synchronous zone, affecting large parts of Europe.
31
 Adding a blackout originating 
in Italy in 2003, a Commission representative described these two incidents as major factors 
for bringing about the establishment of ENTSO-E and the procedure for developing network 
codes. Moreover, this convinced many about the concept of having a common set of binding 
network codes. The reason was that these events revealed the flaws in the arrangements for 
TSO coordination existing at the time: due to the physical interconnectedness of national 
transmission networks, cooperating on the interface between them – i.e. between these 
national systems – was not enough. Moreover, these events “shifted the majority in favour of 
this kind of approach,” noting that not everyone was convinced (Commission interview). The 
other informants, however, did not refer to these incidents. 
With general agreement among the member states and the backing of a Commission very 
much concerned by the interruptions in supply, the EU stepped up its efforts for making a 
new energy market package, in which the existing cooperative arrangement in place within 
the electricity sector would be subjected to evaluation. This was also supported by the 
European Parliament, which, in a response to the Commission’s green paper called on the 
member states to delegate powers so as to enable national regulators to regulate on cross-
border issues (EP 2006: amendment 86). Moreover, it called on the Commission and the 
member states to ‘promote’ TSO cooperation, adding that the need for a new formal TSO 
network – as suggested in the green paper – should be carefully evaluated, given the plethora 
of existing TSO associations that could be further developed (EP 2006: amendments 87, 90). 
4.3.4 EU discussions on measures and scope of a third package 
Commission: an internal energy market needs deeper cooperation 
By 2007, then, the EU was working on a third legislative package. In January, the 
Commission released several Communications regarding this (Commission 2007c, 2007e, 
2007h), one of which was the final report on the sector inquiry. This report indicated “serious 
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 A blackout can occur when the network is overloaded, thus causing a breakdown (Pollak et al. 2010: 25). 
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shortcomings in the electricity and gas markets,” with major barriers to competition 
(Commission 2007e).
32
 As a result, the current state of affairs in terms of competition and 
liberalisation was found insufficient. In the communication on an energy policy for Europe, 
the Commission pointed out that ‘technical standards’ essential for trade across borders were 
only slowly converging, and subsequently called for stronger measures in order to avoid 
blackouts: standards for system operation should be developed by a EU-level TSO 
association, and be made binding by energy regulators (Commission 2007d: 8-9). 
Consequently, the message explicitly conveyed from the Commission to the European 
Council and Parliament was – among others – to speed up harmonisation of such technical 
standards as well as establish a EU-level mechanism for cooperation among regulators to 
ensure an European outlook, with possibilities for review by the Commission in cross-border 
matters (Commission 2007d: 20) – referring to experiences with such arrangements within the 
telecommunication sector (Commission 2007d: 8). 
Concomitantly, in a communication pertaining in particular to the internal energy market, the 
Commission noted that the sector inquiry had given it “substantial insight” into the current 
state of affairs as relating to liberalisation (Commission 2007h: 22). Under reference to 
shortcomings for competition in terms of market concentration and increasing prices, the 
Commission underlined the need for more coordination at a European level, pointing to the 
blackouts in 2003 and 2006 as indicators for the interdependency between member states in 
terms of security of supply. As a result, the Commission made a case for legally binding 
‘operational security rules’ and improved TSO cooperation. It was also noted that competition 
could contribute to sustainability via a positive effect on energy efficiency as well as by 
facilitatating market access for renewable energy production (Commission 2007h: 3-9). 
Because electricity networks in Europe initially had been constructed as national networks 
rather than as a single European network, the Commission emphasized the need for enhanced 
TSO cooperation. Subject to requests by the Commission or national regulators, TSOs should 
address the issue of interoperability between the respective (national) networks, among others 
by establishing common standards on technical issues pertaining to secure operation. Such 
cooperation could be an extension of existing TSO associations that would get a more formal 
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 Identified shortcomings were “particular problems include high levels of market concentration; vertical 
integration of supply, generation and infrastructure leading to a lack of equal access to, and insufficient 
investment in infrastructure; and, possible collusion between incumbent operators to share markets” 
(Commission 2007b). 
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role (Commission 2007h: 16-17). In the Commission’s opinion, then, more TSO cooperation 
was needed to integrate the national networks, with the ultimate goal being a European 
network. Moreover, energy regulators at a national as well as at the European level should be 
strengthened,  with different options described for the latter: a gradual development of 
existing arrengements; a strengthened ERGEG able of making binding decisions on closely 
delineated technical issues and ‘mechanisms’ pertaining to cross-border issues; and a new EU 
body (Commission 2007h: 14). 
Council and EP: Extend existing practices, but respect national sovereignty 
In March 2007, the Council expressed its support to the suggestions presented in the 
Commission’s internal market communication, and concurred with the Commission on the 
need to set up a new EU-level cooperation mechanism for national regulators and for TSOs, 
respectively. The former, moreover, regarded ‘important’ cross-border issues, whereas the 
latter should deal with system operation while building on the cooperative arrangements 
among TSOs already in place. Moreover, the Council also agreed that a better system for 
conducting and managing cross-border electricity transfers, mentioning ‘technical standards’ 
in this context (Council 2007a: 17). Climate change issues were given much attention at this 
meeting. 
In a report tabled by the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 
(ITRE) support was expressed to the Commission’s proposal of establishing an EU-level 
regulatory agency for better cooperation among regulators on cross-border issues, with a 
given national regulators alone being responsible for issues pertaining only to the national 
market. Moreover, technical harmonization of networks should be carried out (EP 2007b). 
These aspects were kept in the plenary resolution passed by the EP in July, with the addition 
of requesting the Commission to make a road map for the creation of a single EU electricity 
network (EP 2007a). 
During the June Council meeting, a policy debate on the internal market was held, yet no 
further details are provided (Council 2007c). Prior to the June Council meeting, however, the 
German presidency had sent out a query to member states to map their positions on – amongst 
others – new cooperative structures at a European level for national regulators and TSOs, 
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respectively (Council 2007e). Most member states supported the need for better EU-level 
cooperation among regulators and TSOs, respectively.
33
 
Summing up the period from 2005 until mid-2007 
During this ‘prelude’ to the third package, existing legislation and practice were put under 
pressure by developments in the market: higher energy prices, market concentration and 
interruptions in supply contributed to discussions on energy market reform within the EU, 
which saw the need for more coordination within the European energy sector. Hence, early 
scoping for a third package was carried out, which signalled differing views among and 
within the EU bodies. 
4.4 Making a 3rd package (2007-2009) 
4.4.1 The package and the EU legislative process 
Internal energy market issues were subject to co-decision, meaning that the Commission 
would table proposals that would have to be passed by the Council and by the European 
Parliament (Buchan 2010: 363).
34
 In its work on making the proposals to the third package, 
the Commission’s Directorate-General for Transport and Energy (DG TREN) had consulted 
with 150 stakeholders, which provided input to an impact assessment accompanying the 
package (Pollak et al. 2010: 102). The TSOs had been successful in influencing the third 
package (EURELECTRIC interview). The package, moreover, was presented in September 
2007. The stated objectives were “consumer choice, fairer prices, cleaner energy and security 
of supply” (Commission 2007c, emphasis in original).  
Parallel to the work on a third energy market package, the EU also focused on climate change 
and sustainability. Consequently, negotiations on, on the one hand, the third energy market 
package, and on the other, climate change and sustainability, to a large extent coincided. 
Thus, climate change and sustainability were taken into consideration in the third package 
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 Too many to be referred to individually here, these documents were located through a search for document 
number 9905/07 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu  
34
 Co-decision largely corresponds to the ordinary legislative procedure introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. 
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(Norway’s Mission to the EU interview). Moreover, deliberations on the Lisbon Treaty were 
also taking place – in parallel to discussions on comitology, where the European Parliament 
would manage to increase its role (Guéguen 2011). 
Constituting a third legislative package on the internal energy market, then, the Commission 
tabled two directives and three regulations. With the exception of the regulation establishing 
an EU level energy regulator (the ‘ACER Regulation’), the package would amend existing 
legislation.
35
 While the legislation on gas will not be treated here, a short note on the 
Electricity Directive is called for. Here, the Commission proposed mandatory ownership 
unbundling, which would entail vertically integrated companies having to sell their networks. 
This idea was also put forward for the Gas Directive. Ownership unbundling raised 
controversy, with member states divided on the issue: while the UK supported the idea, 
Germany and France strongly opposed such a measure (Eikeland 2011a, 2011b). 
Part of the package was also a proposal for an amended Electricity Regulation (Commission 
2007f), which introduced the NC procedure.
36
 Such a procedure had not been part of the 
previous Electricity Regulation from 2003, which focused more on output than on process. 
The Electricity Regulation of 2009, on the other hand, was process-oriented as it codified not 
just the output that were to be achieved, but also the procedure through which these outputs 
would be produced. This included listing tasks and responsibilities of the different parties to 
partake in the procedure as well as being specific on deadlines and the course of action in the 
case of non-compliance with these. 
In the following, the various aspects of this procedure will be treated, from proposal to the 
formal decision making it EU law. The presentation will mainly concentrate on the 
developments pertaining to the Electricity Regulation, but attention will also be given to the 
ACER Regulation where the tasks and powers of ACER are relevant to the suggested 
procedure. 
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 Proposals tabled would amend the Directives on Electricity and Gas, respectively; and the Regulations on 
Electricity and Gas, respectively. 
36
 This would amend Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity. 
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4.4.2 The Commission’s proposal 
Insufficient state of affairs 
In its proposal, the Commission notably pointed out that with an increasingly complex energy 
sector, existing cooperative arrangements, in practice requiring unanimity among 27 
regulators and over 30 TSOs, were rendered as inefficient: “It has lead to a number of non-
binding codes and efforts to reach agreement on common approaches through ‘gradual 
convergence’ but has not lead to real decisions on the difficult issues that now need to be 
taken” (Commission 2007f: 10). 
The Commission pointed out the technical challenge faced by electricity companies due to 
network codes that differed “enormously” across member states – sometimes even within the 
same country (Commission 2007a: 48). While acknowledging the existence of regional 
network codes in addition to the national ones, ther Commission noted that these were 
recommendations (Commission 2007f: 14).
37
 This also applied to non-binding guidelines that 
had been issued by national regulators cooperating within ERGEG (Commission 2007a: 47). 
In documents attached to the proposals for the Third Package, the Commission credited the 
existing voluntary TSO associations with significant contributions to the internal market 
along with “efficiency and the safety of the networks” (Commission 2007a: 52; see also 
Commission 2007f: 13). There was a plethora of regional TSO organizations cooperating to a 
smaller or to a larger degree on many issues or on a more restricted set of issues. TSO 
cooperation revolved around the need to agree on the interface between systems understood to 
be more or less independent from one another. A Commission representative noted that, in 
terms of the energy spent on cooperation, TSOs “spent the time necessary towards that 
philosophy”.  
The Commission presented a rather sombre assessment if no steps were taken: In such a case, 
the TSOs would remain more or less nationally oriented, with limited cross-border 
coordination, thus giving rise to “a higher probability of capacity crisis (which may ultimately 
lead to blackouts in the case of electricity) and in any event artificial congestion created at the 
borders” (Commission 2007a: 52). Notably, it was pointed out that the shortcomings of 
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 E.g. the UCTE operational handbook for security and reliability of the electricity transmission networks 
(Commission 2007f: 14). 
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existing voluntary TSO cooperation had already been revealed: reference was made to 
blackouts caused by too little coordination among TSOs on network operation, to insufficient 
investment in the infrastructure itself; and to the slow progress in TSO negotiations on 
harmonising network codes (Commission 2007f: 13-14). 
Need for harmonized network codes 
The Commission pointed out that an internal energy market – in this case for electricity – had 
yet to materialize, and that attaining such a goal would require stronger measures. With this 
aim, a way of integrating national markets – possibly via a regional route – would be to 
harmonize network codes (Commission 2007a: 48): integration needed “a coherent set of 
technical and market codes” (Commission 2007f: 14). The purpose of this was twofold: On 
the one hand, such codes would facilitate the functioning of the marked, and, on the other 
hand, of the transmission system (Norway’s Mission to the EU interview). 
According to the Commission, there were three main problems with the existing network 
codes, which were 1) non-comprehensive, as they did not cover all issues; 2) often 
incompatible with one another, and 3) often not legally binding or enforceable (Commission 
2007f: 14). Moreover, the Commission argued that network codes had frequently been 
introduced by vertically integrated companies (Commission 2007a: 48). 
A formal procedure for network code development 
As a result, the Commission proposed that TSOs strengthen their cooperation on network 
code development (Commission 2007f: 14). Network codes were described as “technically 
complicated,” and as requiring efficient ways for making necessary revisions (Commission 
2007f: 14). The proposal for an amended Electricity Reguation included a procedure for how 
stakeholders were to interact for agreeing on network codes, with the possibility to make 
codes legally binding. Moreover, the Commission envisaged itself – or national regulators – 
charging TSOs with the making of these. The development of network codes should be 
coordinated at the EU-level, carried out by a TSO association. 
Specifically, the proposal sought to build on existing cooperation as regards network codes 
(Commission 2007f: 14). This idea had been endorsed by the European Council in March 
2007: the work of an ‘ETSO+’ should build on “existing cooperation practices” (Commission 
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2007a: 26, emphasis in original).
38
 Nevertheless, while allowing for the option of building on 
previous associations like ETSO, and crediting regional initiatives on network operation and 
investment planning in particular as having had a positive effect on market integration; the 
Commission underlined the need for an organization with a “central and permanent 
cooperation structure both in terms of organisation and practical tools for planning and 
operating the networks” (Commission 2007f: 15). 
A new European TSO organization 
In terms of organizational structure, the Commission suggested a new TSO organization, the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), which 
would be formally mandated at the EU level to carry out tasks like developing network codes 
(Commission 2007f: 15). Moreover, this development should be conducted “within a 
reasonable time” following a formal request by the Commission (Commission 2007f: 27). 
Finally, TSOs should cooperate on monitoring the implementation of such codes 
(Commission 2007f: 14). 
Mandating ENTSO-E with the task of developing network codes was regarded a ‘pragmatic’ 
solution, given existing voluntary processes and the technical complexity of the matter 
(Commission 2007f: 14). The picture emerging from interviews was one of TSOs in 
possession of more expertise on which network codes could be based – especially regarding 
system operation, which is a core TSO task – than the national regulators, or the Commission, 
for that matter (despite having accumulated substantial knowledge on this in particular over 
the two last decades). Thus, the Commission openly stated that it needed to “rely more on 
TSO associations' competences” (Commission 2007a: 26). This expertise gave TSOs 
influence (EURELECTRIC interview). 
ENTSO-E should, however, conduct its work in a transparent manner, and state its priorities 
as well as the network code specifications in an annual work programme “prepared in 
consultation with all stakeholders and the new Agency [ACER]” (Commission 2007f: 14). 
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 The terminology in use at this point referred to “technical standards for network security” and 
“recommendations on precisely defined technical issues such as standards and operational rules” (Commission 
2007a: 26). The term “grid codes” was also used. 
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Similarly, from the initiation of the process of drafting any network code, stakeholders should 
be consulted (Commission 2007f: 15).
39
 
Advisory input from national regulators 
In the Commission’s proposal, regulators were given an advisory role in the development of 
network codes. In a proposal for a separate regulation tabled by the Commission, ACER – a 
EU-level regulatory agency – was to be established (Commission 2007g). The Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER, also referred to as the Agency) was to replace the 
existing ERGEG. 
Acting through ACER, national regulators were to provide advisory input to the Commission 
as well as to ENTSO-E on network codes: the Commission would consult with ACER before 
“inviting” ENTSO-E to draft network codes. Moreover,  ACER could give an opinion on 
these if it considered the codes as failing to meet certain objectives (“ensure non-
discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market”), or in the 
case that ENTSO-E either did not develop network codes “within a reasonable time”, or its 
constitutive TSO members failed to implement these (Commission 2007f: art. 2e). 
Part of the Commission’s proposal, then, was regulatory oversight of the content of and of the 
compliance with such codes – including, the authority to enforce and/or adopt network codes 
if the TSOs were not able to do so themselves. Depending on the matter at hand, national 
regulators, ACER, and/or the Commission would conduct monitoring and enforcement tasks 
(Commission 2007f: 14). ACER would monitor the work of ENTSO-E, including the 
consultation processes (Commission 2007f: 15). Thus, a “general advisory role” was 
envisaged for the ACER (Commission 2007a: 50), both in relation to TSOs and towards the 
Commission. 
Regarding regulatory oversight, the Commission had considered several alternatives: the 
possibility of conducting such regulatory tasks itself (rejected due to requirements for 
expertise and resource usage), or creating a separate structure resembling the System of 
European Central Banks, the Network of Competition Authorities, or the European Economic 
Interest Grouping. The alternatives were however rejected on the grounds of lacking a legal 
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 Explicitly mentioned were producers, suppliers, customers and distribution system operators (Commission 
2007f: 15). 
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basis (Commission 2007a: 49-50), or due to not meeting “the objectives the Commission 
wants to achieve” (Commission 2007a: 50). Consequently, the Commission concluded that a 
regulatory agency was called for (Commission 2007a: 50). 
In creating the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), organizational 
features as well as location came into play: a Commission representative noted that the same 
person who had written the early draft of what would eventually become the ACER 
Regulation
40
 had been inspired by the European Railway Agency – initially, this person had 
more or less “put in place the railway agency”. This also had a practical reason: within the 
Commission, the energy sector was still organized in a Directorate-General together with the 
transport sector, and consequently, bureaucrats working on energy and bureaucrats working 
on transport were colleagues working within the same building. 
Network codes as EU hard law 
Network codes could be made legally binding through comitology. In the case that TSOs 
acting within ENTSO-E were to fail to develop network codes, this could also be done 
through a comitology procedure initiated by the Commission (Commission 2007f: 14). 
On this matter, a Commission representative stated that they had looked at the results 
achieved within the telecom sector as a rough indicator of what could be attained through 
comitology, without providing any details as to how this should be organized for the 
electricity sector. However, this informant pointed out that in the original proposal, the 
Commission had suggested “quite traditional comitology”. In terms of the legislative output 
made legally binding through comitology, i.e. the network codes, he compared this with 
legislation on within the aviation sector (airport safety) as well as the railway sector. 
Eager for a higher pace towards an internal energy market, then, the Commission had 
presented a proposal for a new pan-European TSO organization that would draft network 
codes which could be made legally binding across the EU. National regulators were to 
provide advisory input to the network codes through ACER, an EU level agency, and market 
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 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 (Commission 2007g). 
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actors would be consulted throughout the process. How did the TSOs, regulators and market 
actors respond to the Commission’s suggestion? 41 
4.4.3 Sector response to the proposal 
Transmission system operators’ response 
The TSOs were generally positive to the Commission’s proposal, noted informants from the 
Commission and ETSO. TSOs regarded the Commission’s proposal as involving concrete 
measures for how TSOs were to cooperate as well as on which issues. Moreover, network 
codes could be made legally binding. The TSOs saw that they were given “a powerful tool for 
changing the electricity market and enhancing TSO cooperation within the European 
electricity sector” (ETSO interview). 
The TSOs were interested in binding network codes. The Commission had provided for two 
types of network codes: on the one hand, codes that could be made binding through 
comitology, and on the other, codes that could be drafted and adopted by ENTSO-E on a 
voluntary basis. However, the TSOs were not particularly interested in the voluntary codes: 
“during this process [the making of the Regulation], the TSOs clearly said [that they] didn’t 
need voluntary codes, they need something that is legally binding” (Commission interview). 
The most important thing for the TSOs was getting the cooperative arrangements into place. 
Moreover, within a scheme of regulated tariffs, TSOs were willing to take on tasks beyond 
the national realm (ETSO interview). Thus, TSOs were interested in being entrusted with the 
task of promoting cross-border developments, regarding themselves as unpartial actors as they 
didn’t have strong commercial interests. Consequently, when the third package was 
announced, containing proposals for quite far-reaching TSO cooperation, this was welcomed 
by ETSO (ETSO interview). 
Albeit a majority of TSOs were generally positive, there was also scepticism towards change. 
This stemmed from “nostalgia” with existing organizations like UCTE (Commission 
interview). ETSO had welcomed the proposal (ETSO interview). Having cooperated 
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 Due to limited time and resources, the response of non-state actors has been limited to TSOs/vertically 
integrated companies, market actors and national regulators. 
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extensively within Nordel, the Nordic TSOs were also positive (Commission, ETSO 
interviews). Still, the latter group was concerned about losing the well-functioning regional 
cooperation within Nordel if replacing this with a European setting with implications for the 
level of ambition for TSO cooperation (ETSO interview). 
UCTE was worried (ETSO interview). They were concerned that the existing cooperation on 
system operation, which had come a rather long way, would be jeopardized, as they didn’t 
quite see that this could be carried over into new arrangements. Moreover, as one informant 
stated, this was also a matter of power: “those that ran the UCTE thought that this was the 
best way of doing things, and those that had positions within this organization were probably 
also worried about losing these” (ETSO interview).  
Within UCTE, however, differences existed. While the German TSOs had been rather active 
within UCTE, and that they had been “rather hesitant”, the French and the Belgian TSOs were 
positive. The French, notably, had taken “a global view on things”, recognizing the 
advantages of cooperating more extensively on a European level (Commission interview). 
Internal TSO discussions in 2008 
Once the proposals for a third package were on the table, TSOs realized that a completely new 
way of cooperating among TSOs was required, but at first the TSOs didn’t quite grasp the 
extent of this (ETSO interview). Soon, however, ETSO contacted the other organizations, and 
suggested initiating a project with the purpose of establishing a new organization (ENTSO-E) 
as called for by the Commission. With the proposed Electricity Regulation already on the 
table, it would be better for the TSOs to adapt as soon as possible, as it would require some 
effort to arrive at an agreement on how they would want the new organization to be (ETSO 
interview). This project was driven by its TSO members (ETSO interview). 
At first, UCTE was less receptive to the idea that TSO cooperation across synchronous zones 
was at all viable. The Nordic TSOs pointed out that they had managed to do this, as West-
Denmark is part of the Continental European (UCTE) zone, and East-Denmark belongs to the 
Nordic zone. Over time, however, continental – and European TSOs in general – accepted 
that they had to let go of the old organizations, with the recognition that old agreements could 
be carried over into the new organization (Commmission, ETSO interviews). 
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TSOs realized that it would be better if agreement could be found among the TSOs as to how 
ENTSO-E should look like, because if not, others might do this on their behalf ,  which was 
considered a potent threat at an early stage. The TSOs soon understood that the TSO project 
could be used as to attain influence. This project lasted throughout 2008, at the end of which 
the TSOs had agreed on a set of statutes and founded the new association (ETSO interview). 
When ENTSO-E became operational in July the following year (ENTSO-E 2011b), the 
regional associations were dissolved (ETSO interview). Reassured by the possibility to carry 
existing cooperative practices into new arrengements, TSOs welcomed the Commission’s 
proposal, which gave them a clear mandate to make network codes on a European scale. 
National regulators’ response 
National regulators were not satisfied with an informal, advisory role: national regulators, as 
represented by ERGEG and CEER, were “obviously not pleased with the Commission’s 
proposal to create a new body for cooperation among NRAs with no real powers” (ETSO 
interview). 
In 2006 and up to the presentation of the formal proposal to the Electricity Regulation, 
national regulators within CEER and ERGEG had worked on getting their voices heard. They 
had a number of meetings with persons within the Commission, EP and the Council that were 
centrally placed vis-à-vis energy policy-development (ERGEG & CEER 2006). Moreover, 
regulators had been working intensely on providing input to the Commission pertaining 
regulatory oversight, as indicated by a number of position papers published between Feburary 
and June 2007. Responding to the internal market communication, for instance, ERGEG 
called for a regulatory framework at the EU level, possibly by extending the ERGEG 
mechanism, which would oversee and approve network codes whose mandatory development 
should be carried out by TSOs acting within a formal EU-level body. Moreover, ERGEG 
referred to the 2006 blackout, noting the increased interdependence among European 
networks (ERGEG 2007). The Commission, however, had thought that it could work with the 
national regulators in an informal way,
42
 but as a representative from the Commission noted, 
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 In the original proposal, the Agency was to provide an opinion on network codes when these were not in 
accordance with the set goals, or when they were neither submitted on time nor implemented by ENTSO-E 
(Commission 2007f). 
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“the regulators didn’t trust that we would work this way, so they wanted to introduce 
themselves in-between the network codes and  comitology” (Commission interview).  
When the Commission’s proposal was presented, John Mogg (chair of ERGEG and president 
of CEER), expressed disappointment with the absence of a strong European regulator in the 
Commission’s proposal (EurActiv 2007c). In joint press releases, ERGEG and CEER 
underlined the need for effective regulatory oversight of TSOs at a European level (ERGEG 
& CEER 2007a), a strong ACER was needed in order to safeguard the public interest. 
Moreover, the TSOs had been given too much influence that went “beyond what TSOs should 
do” (ERGEG & CEER 2007b). National regulators regarded the role that they had been given 
in the Commission’s proposal, including their role in the development of network codes, as 
“too weak” (ETSO interview). In order to amend the Commission’s proposal towards a 
strengthened role of regulators, then, national regulators understood that they had to get 
support of the European Parliament (ETSO interview). 
Market actor response 
As the sector association representing the electricity industry at a European level, the Union 
of the Electricity Industry-EURELECTRIC (‘EURELECTRIC’) had followed the EU’s initial 
work with the third package: “We had been lobbying quite extensively when the third 
package came” (EURELECTRIC interview). Reading the proposal, however, 
EURELECTRIC wasn’t sure that the Commission’s suggestions to an amended Electricity 
Regulation would safeguard the interests of its members. Moreover, “many areas for 
improvements” were noted, because the proposal was regarded as “far from being balanced” 
(EURELECTRIC interview). 
EURELECTRIC was concerned about the amount of power given to TSOs. By allowing 
TSOs to draft network codes without regulatory oversight, the Commission was seen as going 
as far as to give TSOs regulatory powers, because the proposal was a “framework for 
regulatory issues that would be filled in by TSOs” (EURELECTRIC interview). The 
Commission had allowed this because they tended to regard unbundled TSOs as largely 
neutral actors, whereas EURELECTRIC saw TSOs as actors with vested interests 
(EURELECTRIC interview). Consequently, the Commission’s proposal would make TSOs 
“judge and party” – a step that EURELECTRIC saw this step as “unprecedented”, and as 
something that “should not be done again” (EURELECTRIC interview). 
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EURELECTRIC had publicly stated its support of regulatory oversight, underlining as well 
the importance of involving the Commission in this, noting that national regulators alone 
would not ensure a European outlook (EURELECTRIC 2007). Thus, EURELECTRIC 
teamed up with national regulators to lobby the European Parliament  for regulatory oversight 
as well as for strengthening the consultation mechanism through which stakeholders – 
amongst others commercial market actors represented by EURELECTRIC – would have the 
opportunity to get their voice heard (EURELECTRIC interview).  
4.4.4 Reading in the European Parliament 
Whereas TSOs had welcomed the original Commission proposal (ETSO interview), 
regulators and market actors were critical to the powers granted to the TSOs regarding 
network codes. EURELECTRIC had teamed up with national regulators to lobby the 
European Parliament for more regulatory oversight (EURELECTRIC interview). 
Seeking to influence the political game, some of the national regulators were more active than 
others, with the regulators from the major European countries like France and UK being seen 
as influential by the informants from the Commission and Statnett. Notably, the Commission 
informant indicated with some astonishment that he didn’t know “exactly what happened” as 
regards the German regulator, but noted that this regulator was “younger” (Commission 
interview).
43
 John Mogg, chairman of the British regulator Ofgem, was pointed out as an 
important player as head of ERGEG and CEER (Commission, ETSO, Statnett interviews). As 
a former Director General in the Commission, he was quite familiar with the system 
(Commission interview). Other informants had not observed a difference in terms of how 
active the different regulators had been (ETSO interview). In general, however, irrespective of 
the extent of independence from national governments, regulators were seen as being in close 
contact with politicians: “for regulators, it seems to be a natural thing to talk to politicians” 
(Commission interview). 
Supported by EURELECTRIC (EURELECTRIC interview), national regulators suggested 
‘framework guidelines’ (Commission interview). A framework guideline would be drafted by 
regulators, resulting in a political document on the problem(s) that a given network code was 
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 The German Bundesnetzagentur, while established in 1998, was not given the responsibility for the energy 
sector until 2005 (Bundesnetzagentur 2010). 
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to resolve. Drafting framework guidelines would be “a political process” thus removing the 
political issues from the network codes, which were to be drafted by TSOs (ETSO interview). 
Moreover, the regulators envisaged framework guidelines as becoming legally binding and 
connected to specific deadlines, which the Commission considered a less fortunate suggestion 
(Commission interview). 
The push for more regulatory oversight however resonated with the European Parliament: 
“many Members of Parliament saw the need for a strong European regulator, because they did 
not think that the TSOs would to be able to handle this [the responsibility given to them in the 
Commission’s proposal]” (ETSO interview). Parliamentarian support of a stronger ACER 
was also reported by the media (EurActiv 2008b). The rapporteur, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, 
called for more focus on harmonization of network codes and regulatory framework, adding 
that voluntary harmonization of “technical and market rules” would be insufficient (EP 2008: 
35).
 44
 This report also introduced the term ‘network codes’, a concept which until that point 
had been described as technical/market/security codes or standards.
45
 Moreover, he put 
forward the concerns raised by regulators and market actors that, if implemented in its 
original form, the Commission’s proposal would give TSOs regulatory tasks: “Transmission 
System Operators are given a quasi-regulatory status while the Regulatory Agency [ACER] 
seems to be reduced to the role of an advisory body” (EP 2008: 33). Moreover, this 
represented an allocation of tasks that did “not correspond to the actual and natural division of 
competencies at the national level” (EP 2008: 33, emphasis added). 
Moreover, Vidal-Quadras gave regulators a stronger role in the development of network 
codes via framework guidelines. Not only should the network codes be developed based on 
framework guidelines set by ACER, but these codes should also be subject to approval by 
ACER (EP 2008: 13-18), thus making framework guidelines binding. Specific deadlines were 
also included in Vidal-Quadras’ report. Important amendments regarding the NC procedure 
are listed in figure 3. 
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 Vidal-Quadras is a Spanish Member of Parliament and part of the Group of the European People's Party 
(Christian Democrats). 
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 For clarification purposes, the term ‘network codes’ is used more or less throughout this thesis. 
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- Emphasis is put on regional cooperation, yet this should be compatible with European integration. 
- ENTSO-E to submit draft network codes to ACER for approval. 
- ACER to monitor implementation of network codes – non-compliance to be notified to Commission. 
- ACER to be mandated by Commission to develop draft framework guidelines within 6 months 
- Within 6 months of ACER adoption of guidelines, Commission shall mandate ENTSO-E to develop 
draft network codes in accordance with framework guidelines 
Figure 3: Amendments relating to the development of network codes. Source: EP (2008). 
The TSOs were generally “supportive of a new regulatory authority”, and had been “quite 
positive when the regulators started discussing how one could lift the political parts out [of 
the network codes]” (ETSO interview). The TSOs supported letting regulators deal with the 
more political issues which would be contained within the framework guidelines: “I think 
they [TSOs] even liked the fact that they would get guidelines from regulators” (Commission 
interview). Still, this was the major concession for the TSOs (ETSO interview). 
Drawing the line between framework guidelines and network codes, however, proved an issue 
of some controversy. Grey areas between framework guidelines and network codes exist. 
TSOs defended their responsibility for network codes, wanting neither ACER nor national 
regulators to interfere with this task. TSOs “obviously did not want an Agency to do all of this 
work” because the technical expertise resides with the TSOs. The TSOs stayed very much 
alert to calls for a strengthened ACER, as they thought they knew “the technical details better 
than the others” – even with the aid of consultants ACER would have difficulties in agreeing 
on such codes (ETSO interview). TSOs were regarded as facing challenges in the political 
game, in the sense that the message they wanted to convey often concerned very technical 
issues that were difficult to communicate to politicians (Commission, ETSO, Statnett 
interviews). 
TSOs were therefor sceptical of the idea of making framework guidelined binding. As it 
turned out, however, the proponents of a more powerful ACER, one that could make legally 
binding decisions, faced a legal restraint posed by the Meroni Principle. According to EU case 
law, the EU could not vest new powers in another organizational body (ACER) without 
basing this in the Treaties. The Commission declared Parliament’s call for a stronger ACER 
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as legally unviable, given the absence of sufficient support among the member states for 
amending the treaties in order to create such a powerful EU Agency on energy. Thus, 
framework guidelines could not be made binding for the subsequent development of network 
codes, but the concept of ACER making non-binding framework guidelines was retained 
(Commission 2008: 2). According to an ETSO informant, this discussion between Parliament 
and the Commission took some time, with Parliament only reluctantly accepting a weaker 
ACER. Despite regarding the deadlines suggested by Parliament as “completely unrealistic,” 
the Commission conceded on this matter, and accepted that amendment, as recalled by a 
Commission informant. 
The interviews indicated that the European Parliament was attentive to the Electricity 
Regulation and to the NC procedure (Commission and EURELECTRIC interviews). While 
EP was seen as having taken a “pragmatic” approach (Commission interview), the Council 
was regarded as busy discussing other issues contained within the third package on which 
rather differing opinions among the member states existed (interviews with EURELECTRIC, 
ETSO, Commission). 
In Parliament, then, national regulators and market actors found an ally for strengthening 
regulatory oversight in general, and the role of ACER in the development of network codes in 
particular. The TSOs and the Commission accepted some amendments, like the introduction 
of deadlines and having the political parts settled by reguators in non-binding framework 
guidelines, but opposed the idea of making these framework guidelines binding for the 
development of network codes. 
4.4.5 Council reading 
The Council focused mainly on the Directives on gas and electricity, respectively, as well as 
the ACER Regulation. This was where the major political issues were seen to be 
(Commission interview). This focus is confirmed by Council documents (Council 2007b, 
2007d, 2008b, 2008c). 
Ownership unbundling became particularly salient, and was given particular attention in the 
Council, as reported by informants (Commission, EURELECTRIC, ETSO interviews), and by 
the media (see e.g. EurActiv 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). While this issue was noted by informants 
as an important driver to the third package, unbundling was “also why it got stuck” due to 
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differing member state positions (EURELECTRIC interview). Moreover, two informants 
noted that it was perhaps unfortunate that unbundling became such a controversial issue, in 
terms of the consequences for how much attention other issues within the third package was 
given (EURELECTRIC, ETSO interviews). 
The Electricity Regulation was regarded as “more technical” (Commission interview), and 
consequently, “it was not an issue for the member states” who were more concerned with 
unbundling (EURELECTRIC interview). Nevertheless, some political issues like comitology 
in general and the role of ACER “were influencing the content of the [Electricity] Regulation” 
(Commission interview). From public Council records it is clear that member states did 
discuss the role of ACER, with implications for the procedure (see e.g. Council 2007d). 
During the course of discussions of ACER, its role as regards the development of network 
codes was subjected to deliberations. A former ETSO representative noted that “several 
member states pointed out that it would be unfortunate if TSOs were to assess political 
issues”. The member states initially indicated different opinions regarding the tasks of ACER: 
“mixed-views were expressed as to the Agency [sic] possible involvement in technical 
matters (codes)” (Council 2008a: 6). As some member states wanted a stronger ACER, while 
others preferred to limit its role, the Slovenian Presidency submitted a compromise solution 
that “its involvement in technical matters (codes) should be of an advisory nature” (Council 
2008a: 10), a compromise that member states had agreed on by June (Council 2008b: 2). As 
suggested in Parliament, ACER would draft framework guidelines, but ACER was to be an 
advisory body, allowed to make binding issues only on a case-by-case basis. As a result, 
framework guidelines could not be made binding, but would still be “guiding the process” 
(Commission interview).  
Comitology was “somewhat sensitive” (Commission interview). At the end of the day, 
however the Council realized that, given the level of detail in network codes, it would be 
better if this would be settled through comitology rather than through inter-institutional 
negotiations (i.e. between Council and Parliament). Eventually, reassured by the inclusion of 
framework guidelines and that ACER would be established, Parliament eventually accepted 
this. With framework guidelines part of the procedure, the extent of comitology had been 
somewhat reduced, yet retained for making network codes legally binding (Commission 
interview). 
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The issue of whether the network codes would affect national arrangements was also raised 
during negotiations among the member states, resulting in an explicit formulation being 
inserted to restrict the scope of these network codes to cross-border issues (Commission 
interview). 
Compromise was also reached on the two outstanding issues – unbundling and ownership of 
networks within the EU by third country companies – by October (Council 2008c: 17). 
Moreover, agreement on the voting rules for ACER was also reached: “Germany had 
originally pushed for bigger countries, with larger energy networks, to have a greater say over 
the agency's decisions. But under the final deal, all countries will have the same voting 
weight” (EurActiv 2008a). At the October meeting, the Council restated the role of the 
member states in steering the process, referring to the meeting of the European Council 
tasking the Commission with tabling proposals for a third package (Council 2008c: 17). In 
December, the agreement in Council was finalized, and endorsed by Parliament. By the end 
of June 2009, the Electricity Regulation had been formally passed by Parliament and Council. 
The Council, then, used much ‘energy’ on discussing the more political issues, found in the 
directives and in the ACER Regulation, which however influenced the network development 
procedure, particularly the powers of ACER, but also unbundling, which would have 
consequences for what kind of actors would be involved in drafting network codes, e.g. 
whether or not these would be TSOs or vertically integrated companies. Split on the issue as 
to strengthening ACER or not, the alternative emerging from talks between the Commission 
and Parliament (non-binding framework guidelines) represented a viable alternative for a 
compromise the member states could agree to. 
4.5 The adopted NC procedure 
One of the major changes brought about by the third package was the formal mandate given 
to TSOs acting within a equally recognized organization, ENTSO-E, to develop network 
codes on system operation and market issues pertaining to cross-border electricity exchange 
(Commission interview).
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 It should be noted that some aspects of this procedure were left for the involved actors themselves to decide 
(e.g. how ENTSO-E would consult with market actors), with subsequent developments taking place after 2009 
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The NC procedure, and the Electricity Regulation in general, which many had considered as 
rather technical, had not changed that much from the proposal in 2007 until the adoption in 
2009. This is confirmed by comparing the two documents, but was also reported in 
interviews. An informant from the Commission reported that they had been quite surprised by 
this, noting that the Commission had been provided with a strong mandate (Commission 
interview). The main amendments were the introduction of framework guidelines – which had 
the effect of reducing the extent of comitology – and the specification of deadlines. 
A rough presentation of the various steps of the procedure is presented in figure 4. In a 
procedure initiated by the Commission, national regulators within ACER are to make 
framework guidelines, which then will form the basis for the network codes to be drafted by 
TSOs acting within ENTSO-E. Subject to approval in comitology, the network codes could be 
made legally binding as EU hard law. The network codes would be implemented by the TSOs 
themselves, and this will be monitored by ENTSO-E and ACER (art. 8-9). Here, lack of 
compliance with enacted network codes was also connected to sanctioning: the Commission 
could impose fines (art. 22.2), and the member states “shall lay down rules on penalties 
applicable to infringements” (art. 22.1). Following implementation, ENTSO-E and ACER 
were to monitor the effect of the network codes “on the harmonisation of applicable rules 
aimed at facilitating market integration” (EU 2009b: art. 8.8, art. 9.1). However, the network 
codes, should be “without prejudice to the Member States’ right to establish national network 
codes which do not affect cross-border trade” (EU 2009b: art.8.7).  
The ACER Regulation describes the internal voting rules for national regulators pertaining to 
framework guidelines. Each regulator is represented by one person with one vote, and a two-
thirds majority rule applies (EU 2009a: article 14.3). Regarding the internal voting rules of 
ENTSO-E for making decisions on network codes, this was not laid down in the Electricity 
Regulation. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
fleshing out the more detailed rules for the procedure in many instances being a practice still in the shaping. As a 
result, this has been left outside the scope of this thesis. 
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1. The Commission requests ACER to formulate (non-binding) framework guidelines on areas defined on 
a priority list  
2. ACER consults with stakeholders, and writes framework guidelines. Deadline 12 months 
3. ENTSO-E consults with stakeholders, and drafts network codes on the basis of the framework 
guidelines, taking, if appropriate, regional specificities into account 
4. ENTSO-E sends draft network codes to ACER 
5. ACER reviews the draft network codes, and writes an opinion on it. ACER could also send the draft 
network codes back to ENTSO-E with comments. 
6. ACER sends the draft network codes to the Commission 
7. Following evaluation by the Commission, the network codes might be subjected to comitology 
treatment, thus becoming legally binding 
Figure 4: Procedure for the development of common cross-border network codes for electricity. 
4.5.1 Aftermath 
The development of network codes was now a mandatory task for TSOs, and could become 
legally binding. This marked a shift from the previous bilateral or regional voluntary 
negotiations producing recommendations. The NC procedure represented something 
completely new, which was distinct from previous TSO cooperation (reported by all 
informants). The task of making network codes was understood as substantial (interviews 
with Commission, ETSO, EURELECTRIC, Statnett), and an increase in the use of resources 
for cooperation was reported (Commission, Statnett interviews). Moreover, cooperation 
among national regulators was reported as having gone through a change. From a situation 
with nationally oriented regulators less concerned with European integration, the role and 
outlook of these actors have changed somewhat, and regulators now had an “important role 
on the European scene” (EURELECTRIC interview). The third package had brought about 
some changes in the roles and interests of actors: it had “reshuffled the power game a bit” 
(EURELECTRIC interview). 
Moreover, the framework guidelines that had been added to the procedure during negotiations 
within the Council and Parliament were seen as innovative. A Commission representative 
referred to this as something completely new as compared to the railway sector, where the 
agency writes the codes. Here, on the other hand, was a “double system” in the sense that 
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ACER would make framework guidelines on which the network codes made by ENTSO-E 
would be based on. Thus, despite the end-product – network codes – being comparable to 
legislation within the railway and aviation sectors, the process for making network codes is 
different (Commission interview). 
However, some issues were not resolved in the Third Package. This relates to the delineation 
between cross-border and national network codes, and between framework guidelines and 
network codes. While specific deadlines were initially accepteded by TSOs, subsequent 
events would push these ahead in time. 
Starting with the delineation in geographic scope of cross-border network codes, a clear 
distinction between cross-border and national network codes was not established. Informants 
indicated that it would be difficult in practice to establish such a distinction at all, with the 
two being tightly related (interviews EURELECTRIC, ETSO, Statnett). However, this is also 
a legal question (ETSO interview). An informant from the Commission stated that the 
difference between what could be regarded as cross-border and what could be regarded as 
national disappears once one goes down into the level of details, noting that, in system 
operation, “even if there are different control areas, the cooperation between two TSOs in a 
way includes almost everything they do in their [respective] control areas [i.e. also 
nationally].” This informant also mused that transmission grids are developing towards being 
inherently cross-border, whereas the distribution grid remaining a national issue (Commission 
interview). In the end, this representative explained, this matter could be decided in 
comitology. Here, a member state would have to raise the objection that a given network code 
is not cross-border. If accepted, then, the network code would be regarded as a cross-border 
rule (Commission interview). The comitology step of the process was reported by informants 
as not finally clarified (ETSO, Statnett, EURELECTRIC interviews).
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Proceding to the delineation between network codes and framework guidelines, the former 
was regarded as technical because the more political aspects had been moved into the latter 
(interviews Commiossion, Statnett, ETSO). A representative from EURELECTRIC, however, 
displayed scepticism towards this view, drawing attention to the political aspects still inherent 
in network codes, although acknowledging that framework guidelines had reduced the 
political content of network codes (EURELECTRIC interview).Moreover, two informants 
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 This is in part due to the reform of comitology in general following the decision on the Lisbon Treaty. 
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regarded it possible that network codes might become politicized at a later stage, e.g. in 
comitology (Statnett, EURELECTRIC interviews). A former ETSO representative noted that 
there is a grey zone between framework guidelines and network codes (ETSO interview).
48
  
Finally, deadlines connected to the various steps of the procedure were seen as tight, yet 
likely to be complied with for by TSOs within ENTSO-E. Informants perceived the deadlines 
as excerting pressure on the TSOs (ETSO, Statnett interviews). While an informal scoping 
phase preceding the actual drafting had been intended to provide all actors, including TSOs, 
with more time as well as identifying difficult issues at an early stage (Commission 
interview), the time for such scoping was subsequently shortened: The goal set by the 
European Council in February 2011 to establish an internal energy market by the end of 2014 
pushed the schedule for network codes and other TSO tasks ahead in time (Statnett 
interview). 
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 This has proved to be an area of continued friction between ENTSO-E and ACER in the network code 
development procedure, as indicated by a letter ENTSO-E sent to ACER in 2011, where a framework guideline 
was criticised for being too detailed (ENTSO-E 2011a). 
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5 Analysis 
Returning to the framework for the outcome of interest as presented in chapter 1, the new 
procedure was more precise in that specific tasks and responsibilities were laid down in a 
formal procedure contained within EU legislation. Most importantly, perhaps, was that 
compliance with this procedure would be compulsory, as opposed to previous voluntary TSO 
cooperation, and non-compliance was attached to sanctions. This chapter will investigate the 
factors that caused this change by analysing the empirical data presented in the previous 
chapter through the lenses of each of the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 2. 
Finally, these are draw together in a discussion of the combined insights. 
5.1 Power-oriented institutionalism 
As noted for the power-oriented perspective in chapter 2, actors evaluate institutional design 
instrumentally: gains from the current state of affairs are compared to those expected from a 
potential alternative. Actors will support a procedure that corresponds to their preferences, 
taking concerns for relative power into account. Within the power-oriented perspective, in 
order to enact the NC procedure in its particular form this would have to have followed from 
the preferences of the actors with formal influence on EU decision-making. Expectations to 
the preferences were presented in chapter 2: The Commission’s first preference is a 
supranational solution with tasks delegated to itself – its second-best being a supranational 
solution in which an EU-level body is given the tasks. The European Parliament’s first 
preference is the delegation of tasks to an EU-level body with itself included in regulatory 
oversight – its second-best is that another EU-level body carry out such monitoring. When 
delegating, the preferences of member states vary according to the level of the distributional 
conflict: if this is high, member states will prefer a horizontal network solution; whereas a low 
distributional conflict allows for the establishment of a single agency. In the following, the 
expected preferences will be compared with the ones identified in the empirical data. First I 
will consider whether the actors supported making a formal EU procedure, touching upon the 
matter of integration; before moving on to analysing the content of the procedure as resulting 
from the preferences and influence of the different actors. Finally, this section will conclude 
with a preliminary discussion of the impact of interests and power on the formal decision on 
the NC procedure. 
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5.1.1 Actors supported an EU-level procedure 
First, these actors would have had to be supportive of having a procedure located at a 
European level. Looking at the period leading up to the presentation of the Commission’s 
proposal, the member states supported the idea of common network codes at the Hampton 
Court summit in 2005, following a UK U-turn. This was restated at later Council meetings. In 
its June 2007 meeting, most member states supported the need for better TSO cooperation at 
EU-level for cross-border issues, thus displaying a concern for national sovereignty. With co-
decision requiring the approval of Parliament, its support would also be necessary, and was 
indeed present: Parliament supported the need for an EU-level solution, calling for better TSO 
cooperation and technical harmonization of networks. This means that the member states and 
EP supported regulating this on the European level – without which the Commission, as a 
rational actor, would have been less likely to initiate a legislative process for making the NC 
procedure. 
For this procedure to be formally tabled, the support of the Commission was required. The 
Commission wanted a faster pace in harmonization of network codes, having evaluated work 
within existing arrangements (among TSOs and national regulators, respectively) as 
insufficient. The Commission’s preference for an EU-level procedure can be identified in 
public records, presented in chapter 4: it saw European harmonization of network codes as 
facilitating market integration. Having received positive signals from the Council as well as 
Parliament, the Commission was interested in tabling an EU-level procedure, because this 
corresponded to its preference for more supranational solutions. Thus, all the relevant actors 
supported making an EU-level NC procedure. This broad support was important in bringing 
about the NC, because its presence made enabled the Commission to table a formal proposal 
for a NC procedure. Moving on to the responsibility for the particular tasks within this 
procedure, I will now look at the more specific preferences of each actor, comparing those 
expected with the ones found through the empirical inquiry of the legislative process itself. 
5.1.2 Commission wanted to shape, but not draft network codes 
The empirical data from chapter 4 shows that the Commission did not prefer to draft the 
network codes itself. Noting the technical complexity of network codes and the need for an 
efficient way of revising these, the Commission wanted TSOs to do this through enhanced 
cooperation within a formal European organization (ENTSO-E). Nevertheless, giving TSOs 
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the role of drafting network codes could also be seen as a way of circumventing member state 
resistance, all the while reassuring TSOs that self-regulation would be sustained. Equally 
safeguarded was the Commission’s preference for expedient and centralized EU-level 
harmonization, because the previous voluntary self-regulation would became mandatory. 
Therefore, the Commission suggested a formal procedure where an EU-level body of TSOs 
would make the network codes. This corresponds to the Commission’s expected second 
preference, but according to the empirical data, this was actually the first preference of the 
Commission. The Commission wanted to entrust TSOs with the drafting task, but this trust 
was linked to mandatory ownership unbundling. The latter was seen by the Commission as 
important for assigning TSOs with European network code development, because the 
Commission did not trust vertically integrated companies to draft neutral network codes. For a 
Commission interested in market integration, it would not be rational to have vertically 
integrated companies drafting network codes. Mandating TSOs with network code 
development was therefore linked to ownership unbundling as suggested for the Electricity 
Directive. Thus, the Commission was instrumental in delegating this task to unbundled TSOs, 
because this was more rational given the goal of integrating national electricity markets. 
Nevertheless, the Commission did allot a role for itself, in line with its first preference and 
institutional self-interest: It would be involved within the early (priority-setting) and final 
stages (comitology) of the procedure. Moreover, the Commission reserved the right to take 
over ENTSO-E and ACER tasks if these were to fail to deliver on time. This ‘safety 
mechanism’ would enable the Commission to step in and ensure EU-wide harmonization in 
case of such non-compliance. This was a rational measure in light of the Commission’s 
dissatisfaction with the lack of speed in voluntary harmonization. A consequence of its self-
interest, the Commission had given itself a strong position regarding regulatory oversight in 
the procedure, with the input of national regulators or an EU-level regulator being of an 
advisory nature. The Commission, then, did not prefer to participate in the actual drafting of 
network codes, but envisaged itself having a role within the beginning and at the end of the 
procedure. This was a rational strategy, giving the Commission influence without having to 
spend resources on the actual drafting. This made the Commission suggest a procedure in 
which TSOs, based on priorities drafted by the Commission, would make the network codes 
that could be made legally binding through Commission-initiated comitology. 
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5.1.3 Parliament wanted a stronger ACER 
EP was generally supportive of the Commission’s proposal. However, it wanted to make 
some key changes pertaining to regulatory overview. First and foremost, it wanted to 
strengthen the role of national regulators acting through an EU body (ACER) in the 
procedure. Thus, it was rational to suggest binding framework guidelines, which, as legally 
binding would likely have to be publicly available, thus ensuring transparency. Moreover, 
increasing the role of ACER would have the effect of reducing the influence of the 
Commission within the NC procedure. This means that Parliament was concerned about 
regulatory oversight, as expected, but that it wanted another EU-level body (ACER) to be 
responsible for this – its expected second preference. Moreover, this indicated a concern for 
relative power, in that the influence that would be given to national regulators or ACER 
would come at the expense of that of the Commission – a more powerful Commission could 
have implications for the inter-institutional relationship between the Commission and 
Parliament. Thus, the influence of the Commission within the procedure was sought reduced 
by Parliament. 
5.1.4 Member states wanted a weaker ACER and less comitology 
For EP’s amendments to be sustained, they would need the member states’ support. In the 
Council readings, member states concentrated on the more ‘political’ issues, regarding the 
Electricity Regulation as more ‘technical’. Moreover, in a rational effort to protect national 
sovereignty, a clause was inserted underlining that network codes would apply to cross-
border issues – by definition not interfering with national markets. Thus, the terminology and 
this legal clause imply a low distributional conflict, which is consistent with previous research 
(Kelemen & Tarrant 2011: 932). Nevertheless, the power-oriented perspective would still 
expect member states to be engaged in discussions on issues of low distributional conflict, 
tolerating delegation to a single EU-level body (rather than a looser network, as expected in 
the case of a higher distributional conflict) as a rational step ensuring needed coordination and 
credible commitment. 
In this case, however, the member states were less involved, concerned as they were with 
other more salient issues like unbundling. However, member states had already shown their 
support of what would eventually become ENTSO-E prior to the formal proposal was on the 
table. Additionally, during the legislative process, the member states discussed the role of 
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ACER and comitology in general – both aspects that have implications for the procedure for 
network code development. Member states had different preferences on ACER, but agreed on 
establishing this single EU-body, as supported by the Commission and Parliament. 
Nevertheless, due to diverging interests, the member states supported neither a stronger 
ACER nor binding framework guidelines. The Commission, having written an opinion on 
Parliament’s suggested amendments, also responded negatively to this, stating that it was 
legally unviable. Non-binding guidelines were however supported by the Commission. This 
could be understood in light of the Commission’s interest in getting its proposal enacted, 
which could be achieved by facilitating agreement and compromise between Council and 
Parliament. While sufficient member state support could be established for non-binding 
framework guidelines, this became part of the NC procedure. 
Comitology was also discussed, with member states having a general preference that this 
should be restricted to making implementation rules, and not to make general rules – network 
codes would be located in the latter group. Despite the goals of comitology being to ensure 
member state control of implementation of EU legislation at a lower level of detail, 
Parliament and member states were concerned about the extent of comitology. The reason is 
that the Commission arguably has a larger influence within comitology than within the co-
decision procedure. Thus, the contours of institutional self-interest on behalf of all actors are 
revealed here: making general rules within comitology could give the Commission more 
relative influence, which neither member states nor Parliament were interested in. 
Nevertheless, given the level of technical detail, member states were not interested in the 
alternative to comitology: discussing this in inter-institutional negotiations with Parliament 
and the Commission. Thus, member state and Parliament’s interests did not exist in a vacuum, 
but were rather seen in relation to the use of limited time and resources.  Moreover, the 
inclusion of framework guidelines would reduce the role of comitology within the procedure, 
thus reassuring member state concerns for too much comitology. Because EP had attained a 
role within comitology following the previous comitology reform, and because it was 
reassured by the Council’s acceptance of framework guidelines – although non-binding – it 
could support the proposed comitology. The acceptance of Council and Parliament on this 
was instrumental in retaining comitology in the procedure for developing network codes. See 
figure 5 for a list of factors that reduced in particular member states’ concern for distributional 
implications of the NC procedure. 
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Member states could support the compromise reached between the Commission and EP 
Non-binding framework guidelines reduced the extent of comitology 
Network codes regarded as having low distributive implications 
Member states were reassured because network codes would apply to cross-border issues 
Framework guidelines would be made by an ACER controlled by national regulators 
Network codes would be made by an ENTSO-E controlled by national TSOs 
Commission would remain in the background unless the former two organizations could not agree 
National representatives could control the Commission within the comitology stage 
Figure 5: Factors that contributed to Council support of the procedure for developing network codes. 
Reassurance had also been provided to member states by the cross-border clause (mentioned 
above). This could be utilized by member state representatives in order to contest a given 
network code. However, in practice the burden of proof would be on the member state 
representatives rather than on the Commission: during comitology, the argument would have 
to be made that a given network code is not cross-border instead of the requirement that it is 
cross-border. If separating between the national and the cross-border of transmission networks 
in Europe were an easy task, this would have fewer implications, but as confirmed by 
informants as well by previous literature (Squicciarini et al. 2010: 13), such a distinction is 
hard or impossible to make. As the usage of comitology was accepted by the member states, 
however, this remained part of the procedure. 
5.1.5 Conclusion of the power-oriented analysis 
As a result of the broad consensus that TSOs would draft network codes, conflict of interest 
regarded the role of ACER, and the extent of comitology. On binding framework guidelines 
and the role of ACER, disagreement existed between, on the one hand, the Commission and 
Council, and Parliament on the other. Unable to muster enough support, Parliament had to 
drop the ‘binding’ in binding framework guidelines. Comitology, however, gave rise to a 
different constellation of actors, with the Commission on one side, and Parliament and 
member states on the other. Comitology openly concerned the institutional balance of power, 
as a substantial set of rules would be treated through comitology rather than through inter-
institutional negotiations. Nevertheless, the Commission was able to gather sufficient support 
to its position due to two factors: de facto reduction of comitology by acceptance of the 
amendment of (non-binding) framework guidelines, and the level of technical detail in 
network codes. Linking comitology and framework guidelines allowed for a compromise 
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among the actors, which was necessary in order to muster sufficient support as necessary for 
adopting the NC procedure. Thus, the adoption of the NC procedure as well as its specific 
allocation of tasks and responsibilities can be traced back to the interests of the actors 
considered here (Commission, Parliament, member states).  
5.2 Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism – as presented in chapter 2 – takes a temporal perspective, and 
regards outcomes as caused by an initial decision(s) constituting a critical juncture. This sets 
developments on a path, on which it remains due to positive feedback. Path-dependency 
eventually brings about the outcome to be explained. This process of cause and effect is 
moreover located in – and thus influenced by – a greater social context where external events 
unfold. A critical juncture is defined through the presence of new and other feedback effects – 
thus creating legacies. For the old path as well as for the emerging and new one, three 
operationalized indicators for positive feedback will be identified, with positive feedback 
located in a larger context of sector-specific reform. It is via these mechanisms of positive 
feedback that the critical juncture can cause the outcome.  
The first group of positive feedback mechanisms comprise of distribution effects, which 
concern changes in the distribution of formal influence. The second group consist of 
coordination effects, specified as the support of (vested interests) and resource usage on 
institutions by actors that are empowered by distribution effects. In the following, an account 
of this path-dependency will be presented in a chronological order. Here, a switch from a 
decentralized towards a centralized path is identified. Decentralization entails that the 
individual organizations engaging with transnational institutions (cross-border cooperation 
between non-state actors) are ensured a high degree of autonomy. Opposite, centralization 
reduces the influence of individual organizations, because an individual organization can be 
overruled. It should be noted that the temporal delimitations of the sections below are 
approximate. 
5.2.1 Path of decentralization (prior to 1986) 
Based on the previous chapter, cross-border cooperation during the pre-liberalization period 
represented a path-dependent decentralism. This path developed in the context of post-war 
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reconstruction and national electricity systems.
49
 The influential organizations during the pre-
liberalization period were vertically integrated companies. This affected the subsequent 
development of cross-border cooperation. Nationally oriented organizations supported 
decentralized cross-border cooperation (van der Vleuten & Lagendijk 2010). At least since the 
1950s, vertically integrated companies had cooperated on cross-border electricity flows 
within regional associations and/or bilaterally. This cooperation, moreover, did not aim to 
increase competition nor integrate national markets, but was established for purposes of 
ensuring stability of system operation and security of supply.  
As a result, transnational cooperation on cross-border electricity exchange that emerged 
during this period followed this path-dependent development, because actors with production 
interests controlled the transmission networks.These organizations had vested interests in 
decentralized systems of cooperation in order to retain control of their respective national 
markets. This fed into the existing transnational cooperation, which was kept at a minimum, 
and allotted with relatively modest resources compared to the use of resources on national 
matters. That most resources were used nationally reinforced the national orientation. 
Subsequently, the relatively low cross-border activity contributed to reinforcing this 
decentralized path and the national orientation of these organizations. 
5.2.2 Critical juncture: Initial decisions (1986-1996) 
During this period, developments were set on a different path, pointing in the direction of 
more centralization. The first half of this period was contextualized by a momentum from the 
general single market initiative. Later, the end of the Cold War allowed for expansion of the 
UCPTE synchronous zone (the later UCTE zone) to Southern and Eastern Europe. The 
context, then, was permissive to centralizing tendencies. Within the EU, the influential 
organizations at this stage were the Commission and the Council. Parliament mainly had a 
consultative role. With the goal of an internal electricity market in Europe, the Commission 
had sought to stake out a rather ambitious path, which however had been met by resistance in 
the Council. Emerging from prolonged negotiations among these, an approach was 
established: energy market legislation would be developed incrementally, yet existing 
voluntary decentralized transnational cooperation could be enhanced. The former reflected 
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member states’ concern for national sovereignty, whereas the latter had started out as an 
attempt by the Commission to push for more ambitious legislation by seeking to facilitate 
progress in attaining consensus through bottom-up processes in which it addressed the 
industry directly. 
The compromise, a combination of incremental legislation and voluntary transnational 
cooperation, would affect subsequent developments: Here was a scope for action that the 
Commission wanted to exploit in order to push for more top-down legislation, but whose 
effect would take perhaps unintended twists and turns. The combined approach represented a 
critical juncture that changed the direction of the path in a more centralizing direction. This 
would eventually bring about the NC procedure in its particular form, notably centralized 
outside the formal EU apparatus. This critical juncture stretched out in time: energy market 
integration had been discussed since 1986. The end of the critical juncture is difficult to date 
precisely, but at least the first electricity directive in 1996 marks its definite end. This was 
idenfied as a critical juncture because of its observed effects in terms of new and different 
mechanisms of positive feedback. 
5.2.3 Emerging changes due to positive feedback (1997-2006) 
However, given the nature of critical junctures and positive feedback, the changed course 
would need time to become manifest in institutions. In early stages of a sequence, then, 
decentralized cooperation would still be in place. Subsequently, due to positive feedback, this 
would start changing. National electricity systems were affected by the reform effort of 
energy market liberalisation, where the notion of competition and economic gains created a 
context in which economic interest in cross-border flows became salient. Different price of 
electricity across the member states created economic incentives for trade, whereas 
competition reduced the incentives for investing in infrastructure. Whereas trade favoured an 
integrative and centralizing direction, and reduced infrastructure investment upheld separation 
of national systems. At the very end of this period, moreover, a European blackout occurred 
in 2006, having been preceded by a blackout of smaller geographical scope in 2003. As will 
be shown below, liberalisation and the blackouts would strengthen a centralizing path.  
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Distributive feedback effects: Structural changes within member states 
Mandated specialization followed from the liberalisation effort. EU energy market legislation 
incrementally posed stricter requirements for unbundling between production and 
transmission (horizontal specialization within the industry); and independence of national 
energy regulators from industry and national governments (vertical specialization within 
government). This incremental legislation constituted the top-down-part of the critical 
juncture. It should be noted that this was also supported by reforms initiated at the national 
level, which however pointed in the same direction. A development towards unbundling had 
started with the requirement for unbundling of accounts in the first package, and was 
reaffirmed with the second package, which required legal unbundling. However, close ties 
and in practice vertical integration remained in place in several member states, changing more 
slowly. Nonetheless, in general the outlook was changing, because production interests were 
waning, becoming relatively less important with each step towards stronger unbundling, and 
transmission interests thus waxing, becoming relatively more important. This structural 
change contributed to reducing the influence of production interests, which was important for 
the decentralized path-dependency. 
National energy regulators were emerging as separate entities from national governments, a 
development that was reaffirmed with the second package, where the function of regulatory 
overview was to be placed in an organization that was separated from the more political 
decision-making within national ministries – a change that has been prominent in many other 
sectors (Christensen & Lægreid 2006a). While independent from the industry, however, the 
degree of independence from national governments differed, as many sector departments 
retained formal power over their regulator. Nevertheless, the political influence on regulatory 
overview was, relatively speaking, reduced. This contributed to reducing the relative 
influence of national governments, whose concerns for national sovereignty was important for 
the decentralized path-dependency. Thus, the incremental legal changes following from the 
critical juncture triggered changed outlooks. 
Coordinative feedback effects: New outlooks within transnational institutions 
These two processes of structural change reinforced the centralizing path, because the 
changed landscape of organizations at the national level fed back into the institutions for 
cross-border cooperation. Thus, distributional changes were decisive for preparing the scene 
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for the NC procedure: National regulators as separate and independent entities had come into 
being, and TSOs were becoming increasingly separated from producers. This consequently 
started affecting the vested interests of these actors as they were engaging within transnational 
associations. The character of regional associations like UCTE and Nordel changed as they 
were redefined as TSO associations (in 1999 and 2000, respectively). Moreover, further 
reinforcing centralization, a TSO association on the European level was established for 
market issues (ETSO). Towards the end of this period a changed position among TSOs was 
emerging, with an increasing willingness to engage in cross-border matters, which prepared 
the ground for the path of centralization. 
Coinciding with the restructuring of transnational TSO associations was centralization among 
associations for cross-border cooperation among producers, seen with the merger of 
UNIPEDE and EURELECTRIC (1999). Notably, distribution networks, to a lesser extent 
subject to unbundling requirements, were part of the new European producer association 
(Union of the Electricity Industry-EURELECTRIC). This illustrates how the changes among 
transnational associations were directly linked to the structural changes occurring at the 
national level – this reflects a path-dependent development. Rather than supporting the old 
cooperative organizations, the existing regional associations were redefined, and new 
associations moreover established. Such a change in terms of vested interests indicates a 
change in the positive feedback, thus indicating that a critical juncture had indeed taken place.  
The emergence of national regulators also fed back into cross-border cooperation among these 
as an advisory EU-network of regulators (ERGEG) was established by the Commission. 
Nonetheless, signs of the old path can be recognized: ERGEG did not have the competence to 
make binding decisions on cross-border issues because national governments had not 
delegated such powers to the EU-level. Nevertheless, the vested interests of organizations 
were adjusting according to the new path, as the transnational associations reflected the 
structural changes in organizations at the national level. This illustrates mechanisms of 
positive feedback, because the structural changes at the national level had started changing the 
outlook of the organizations participating within transnational association that subsequently 
were redefined. This would paved the way for a more centralized path. 
The creation of European associations moreover strengthened the role of the Commission. 
Having played a central role in facilitating their emergence, the Commission had carved out 
an institutional involvement for itself on a regular basis: The Commission participated in 
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ERGEG, met with ETSO, and organized Florence summits. As a result, the structural changes 
had affected vested interests, which changed the landscape of transnational associations – and 
this produced a distributive feedback effect in terms of giving the Commission a role. 
Nevertheless, the new associations remained decentralized in their respective structures, 
indicating that it was still early in the sequence. 
Moreover, in terms of resource usage, neither TSOs nor national regulators were using much 
of their capacity on cross-border issues, focusing rather on their national markets. Thus, large 
shares of their capacity were being used on matters that did not entail cross-border 
cooperation. For national regulators in particular, this was also the result of a lack of 
competence for making binding decisions within ERGEG. For TSOs as well as regulators, 
then, the effects of the old path could still be observed, indicating that this was relatively early 
in the new path-dependent sequence initiated by the critical juncture. The Commission, on the 
other hand, was directing relatively large resources towards carrying out investigations and 
making benchmarking reports identifying shortcomings of the existing regulatory framework. 
Thus, the Commission’s resource use had shifted according to the new path, indicating that 
the developments were occurring faster here, which would contribute to strengthen the 
centralization path. 
The vested interests of the Commission were moreover affected by its interpretation of the 
blackouts, reaffirming its support of centralization. This made the Commission see the need 
for better cooperative schemes among TSOs. Other informants did not note these blackouts, 
and while memory could have played a role here, it could also have been differently 
interpreted. Logically, then, the blackout was more likely to have influenced the 
Commission’s evaluation of the current state of affairs in a negative direction than for actors 
who did not share this interpretation. This is confirmed by previous research on the 2006 
blackout (van der Vleuten & Lagendijk 2010). As a result, this strengthened the latter’s stated 
support of a more centralized cooperation among TSOs. Moreover, although the Commission 
preferred more supranational solutions even prior to the blackout, this crisis strengthened the 
direction set by the new path. As such, this is a crisis whose effect differs from that often 
expected within historical institutionalist research. Instead of undermining an existing path-
dependent development, in this case it contributed to strengthening one that was already 
emerging following the occurrence of a critical juncture. 
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The incremental changes in legislation had brought about new constellations of organizations, 
which opened the dynamics within transnational cooperation to change. Without these 
changes in the actor landscape, the TSOs and the national regulators that would constitute the 
later ENTSO-E and ACER would not have been available to play a key role within the new 
NC procedure. Moreover, cooperation on cross-border electricity exchange displayed path-
dependency because distribution effects influenced the vested interests (coordination effects) 
that fed back into the system. This consequently kept developments on the path of 
centralization. 
5.2.4 Path of centralization (2007-2009) 
The consolidation of the new path occurred in a context of heightened attention to climate 
change and sustainability, which went together with a growth in electricity production from 
renewable energy sources that brought intermittency – due to natural fluctuations – already 
noticed by the TSOs operating the transmission networks. This context would facilitate the 
path of centralization, because it increased the need for coordination. 
As a result of the new transnational associations, national regulators and TSOs had had the 
chance to do some first experiences within EU-level associations like ERGEG and ETSO, 
respectively. TSOs had made experiences with negotiating on voluntary recommendations, 
where the challenge of ensuring credible commitment and compliance made them welcome 
the idea of network codes becoming EU law. Moreover, because it could now coordinate with 
a lower number of associations due to this centralization, this favoured the position of the 
Commission of integrating as the expense of member states’ scepticism of this. 
As the Commission tabled a proposal, then, the TSOs subsequently supported it.Not only did 
the proposal allow TSOs to continue making the network codes themselves, thus retaining an 
element of decentralism – but these would become binding, thus alleviating TSOs of efforts 
for ensuring compliance themselves. Bindingness as EU hard law implies centralization 
because it reduces the individual influence of TSOs in deciding on a course of action. Thus, 
the vested interests of TSOs had been subject to positive feedback from the critical juncture: 
Following EU-legislation, structural changes at the national level fed into existing and new 
transnational associations, which subsequently shifted the vested interests of these into 
supporting centralization to the gain of collective power and bindingness at the expense of 
individual autonomy as within the old path of decentralized cooperation. Moreover, this direct 
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empowerment of especially TSOs can be interpreted as the outcome of a chain of events 
following the critical juncture: now, enhanced bottom-up transnational cooperation would 
become centralized with top-down legislation.  
National regulators and market actors had in the past supported the decentralized model. The 
former as part of national governments, and the latter as part of vertically integrated 
companies. The European associations of both, ERGEG and EURELECTRIC, respectively, 
did not respond to the proposal by defending the existing decentralized model, but rather 
lobbied for strengthening ACER, which indicates a step in the direction of centralization. 
Affected by the increasing impact of unbundling, EURELECTRIC’s producers and suppliers 
(‘market actors’) had interests increasingly diverging from those of TSO – although, given the 
initial starting point and the uneven progress in unbundling across member states, overlaps in 
ownership and interests still existed. Nevertheless, that EURELECTRIC regarded TSOs as 
partial and diverging from those of their members is a strong indicator of just how much had 
changed from the days of vertically integrated companies. Now, rather than backing the TSO 
position, EURELECTRIC instead supported the position of ERGEG and CEER that network 
codes should be subjected to regulatory overview by national regulators. This alliance is path-
dependent because it follows from the structural changes that had occurred earlier in this path-
dependent sequence. Now, the conflict lines had shifted to intra-sectoral ones, rather than the 
previously more relevant national ones. 
5.2.5 Conclusion of historical institutionalism 
Thus, the adoption and shape of the NC procedure was the eventual outcome of a critical 
juncture. This is also an account of resistance to change, because change only arose when the 
mechanisms of positive feedback changed, which signalled that a critical juncture had taken 
place. The critical juncture, moreover, was the initial approach taken to internal energy 
market within the EU: an incremental top-down combined with expanding on voluntary 
transnational cooperation. The shape of the NC procedure reflects the localization in a path-
dependent sequence. Not long after the critical juncture, it was enacted at an intermediate (if 
not still fairly early) stage of the sequence. As a result, while positive feedback has influenced 
the procedure in a more centralized direction, clear signs of the continued presence of 
decentralized elements can be identified, cf. figure 6. 
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Decentralized  Centralized 
Regional cooperation sustained… …yet carried into a single TSO association 
Internal ENTSO-E processes not regulated by EU law …although EU is to give an opinion on it 
ACER governed by a board of national regulators with 
a seat each, voting with absolute majority 
Absolute majority, while less centralized than simple 
majority, is still a majority vote 
Framework guidelines will be non-binding Framework guidelines will guide network code 
development 
Network codes do not necessarily become binding …but they can be, and TSOs favour binding codes 
Network codes are cross-border codes Network codes will also be common. And distinction 
between cross-border and national hard to establish – 
burden of proof to argue that something is not cross-
border 
Figure 6: Decentralized vs. centralized elements in the procedure for developing cross-border network codes. 
Summing up this perspective, it is found that the industry’s voluntary cross-border 
cooperation had been developing in a path-dependent way. Vested interests in a decentralized 
model of cooperation pointed in the same direction as member states reluctant to delegate 
power in energy matters to the EU-level. Nevertheless, the critical juncture that triggered 
incremental legal changes and efforts at enhancing the voluntary cooperation over time 
shifted the path towards centralization by introducing a different dynamic in the mechanisms 
of positive feedback. Triggered by the initial EU approach to regulating on energy market 
issues through a combined approach consisting of imposing incremental liberalisation 
legislation within member states from above, while buttressing transnational cooperation from 
below, this had led the following: a procedure in which non-state actors – TSOs and national 
regulators – through their respective transnational associations became part of a  part of a 
“multilevel Union administration” whilst remaining part of the national one, thus becoming 
“double-hatted” (Egeberg 2006b). The structural changes moreover changed the dynamic 
between actors. Specialized either vertically (industry) or horizontally (industry), this gave 
rise to new conflict lines at the national level, which through the transnational associations 
also would take place at a European level, thus changing the dynamic of intergovernmental 
relations. 
5.3 Sociological institutionalism 
From the sociological stream within institutionalist theory, mimesis was picked for explaining 
the NC procedure, motivated by an interest in tracing the origins of the specificities in terms 
of institutional shape. Organizations seek legitimacy from their organizational field, thus 
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imitating practices that are positively evaluated. A practice can spread as a trend or fashion 
within this organizational field. This is in particular expected to influence behaviour in a 
situation characterized by uncertainty and/or dissatisfaction with existing policy. Specifically, 
this perspective analyses the comparisons that the Commission made when drafting the 
proposal for the procedure. Moreover, with amendments being made during the subsequent 
readings in Parliament and Council, the origin of these revisions will subsequently be 
analysed. First, however, a brief look at comparisons drawn in the past. 
5.3.1 From special to one of the networked ones 
Prior to the first package, electricity was treated as ‘special’, a categorization that would start 
changing gradually as liberalisation and competition was introduced to the electricity sector. 
Starting with the idea of an internal energy market, this was drawn from the general internal 
market. From the start, moreover, legislation for the two sectors of electricity and gas, 
respectively, developed in tandem, with parallel legislative acts in the three packages. 
Although some differences existed, the principles to a large extent corresponded. Moreover, 
during this period the Commission drew inspiration from similar sectors (other ‘utility’ 
sectors) like telecom and civil aviation, but also from ‘early movers’ among the member 
states like the UK and the Nordic countries that had already liberalised their national 
electricity markets. Subsequent legislation also to a large extent drew on the internal market 
and competition principles, e.g. that access to cross-border networks should be granted 
through market-based methods (EU 2003). Thus, models from similar sectors were utilized, 
perceived as similar due to the common trait of being network-bound (i.e. transport of the 
given good/service being dependent on infrastructure), with sectors like energy and 
telecommunications representing “sectors close to the state” with a history of self-regulation 
(Mayntz & Scharpf 1995). The model of liberalization, moreover, reflected a major trend at 
the time as part of the New Public Management representing a package of: “Structural 
disaggregation, autonomization, agencification, devolution, deregulation and market 
competition” (Christensen & Lægreid 2006b: 3). 
The Commission was not content with the existing cooperative schemes, regarding 
harmonization as proceeding too slowly, and considering cooperation insufficient for an 
increasingly complex sector. As the second package entered into force, the Commission had 
signalled its dissatisfaction with the status quo: existing legislation was too weak, and many 
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member states had failed to implement it. However, not previously regulated in a formal EU 
procedure, making a formal procedure for common network code development would 
represent a new step. Thus, there was some uncertainty as to how this should be done, thus 
giving rise to the expectation that inspiration and comparisons were found within the 
organizational field, where imitation of models could impact the procedure for network code 
development. 
5.3.2 Existing practices and other network sectors 
In the following, the different parts of the NC procedure as initially proposed by the 
Commission are traced back to their origins, showing how carriers facilitated diffusion by 
imitation. The proposed ENTSO-E was to build on existing cooperation, indicated by the 
referral to this as the ETSO+ option. Existing routines for voluntary and regional TSO 
coordination on network codes served as a model for the new procedure. The Commission 
was familiar with these routines through its meetings with TSOs and their associations within 
the framework of the Florence Forum. Through such direct relations, then, routines serving as 
models could travel, thus explaining the major role allotted to TSOs within the formal EU 
procedure on network code development. 
This was also affected by framing: It was communicated that existing cooperation could be 
carried over into the new arrangements (e.g. regional groups within ENTSO-E), which thus 
contributed to sustaining the role given to TSOs within the formal EU procedure, because this 
new procedure was inspired by existing practices. This is also a message that had been 
conveyed from the TSOs to the Commission prior to the making of the proposal. Here, a 
connection was made between the role of TSOs regarding national transmission networks and 
their role in developing the national market on the one hand, and cross-border transmission 
networks operated by TSOs which could give TSOs a role in developing a European market 
on the other hand. The suitability of this is indicated by the Commission representative’s 
referral to TSOs drafting network codes as a ‘pragmatic approach’ – it might not be ideal, but 
it is adequate. Consequently, it became part of the procedure formally tabled by the 
Commission. Thus, this means that the an existing model of self-regulation prevalent in this 
sector converged with the newer trend of autonomization and agencification, as a separate 
body would make general and binding laws (although it would have to be approved within 
comitology). 
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The shape of regulatory overview, of which ACER would be part, for the network code 
procedure was laid down in the proposal for a new Electricity Regulation, but the shape of the 
new EU-level regulatory agency was also laid down in the ACER Regulation. For ACER, a 
number of comparisons were drawn: These represented different models of European 
networks or groupings, but were found to be unviable in light of legal constraints or the goals 
to be achieved by establishing a new EU-level body. On this basis – this is how it is presented 
in the impact assessment – the Commission concluded that a regulatory EU agency would be 
the suitable solution. Moreover, a viable comparison was found within the railway sector. A 
Commission representative had referred to the European Railway Agency as serving as 
inspiration for what would eventually become ACER. A brief look at the European Railway 
Agency reveals a number of commonalities with the electricity sector. The decision to 
establish such an agency was taken in 2004, and since 2006, it has been fully operational. In 
both sectors, infrastructure plays a pivotal role, transporting goods via networks (although few 
people travel by electricity networks, in contrast to via railway networks, one should add), 
and operating the system in a safe way is an important task. The Railway Agency, moreover, 
is tasked with facilitating cross-border transport by harmonising technical standards 
(EUROPA.eu 2010). Interoperability between the national networks, then, is the goal for the 
Railway Agency as would be the goal for the future energy agency. Travelling via the carrier 
of symbolic systems, the railway agency was theorized by generalizing its tasks – a functional 
definition pertaining to task of regulatory overview – thus enabling it to serve as a model that 
could be applied elsewhere. 
Moreover, at the time, the two kinds of sectors, energy and transport, were still organized 
within the same Directorate-General in the Commission (DG TREN). Thus, individuals 
working with the two sectors were colleagues, and were working in the same building at the 
time. This facilitated an understanding of similarity, as well as direct meetings and social ties 
among individuals thus working within the same building. As such, the relational systems 
carrier was available. Within this relational system (DG TREN), moreover, models utilized 
were available, as individuals working with energy could look to transport for practices. As a 
result, the railway agency offered a theorized model from a sector perceived as similar, and 
this model was imitated within the electricity sector, resulting in ACER. This meant that a 
model was not found within the organizational field of the Commission, but rather within it. 
Moreover, this was not from another DG, but from the same DG TREN in which energy was 
organized. 
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Regarding comitology, inspiration had been drawn from the telecom sector, which illustrated 
how such detailed technical rules could be made legally binding, thus providing a model for 
how it could be done. Comitology within the telecom sector was moreover regarded as having 
delivered results. Further, pertaining to the legislative output resulting from comitology – 
binding codes – comparisons were also drawn to the railway and aviation sectors, 
respectively, looking at rules for airport safety from the latter. Thus, existing models that were 
sufficiently general (i.e. theorized) in sectors that were perceived as similar, practices could 
be imitated. Moreover, these were deemed worthy of copying – imitating – because they were 
regarded as having produced good results. Making detailed rules binding through comitology 
as within these similar sectors, then, was deemed not only possible, but also attractive. As a 
result, this imitation influenced the comitology step within the network code procedure. Here, 
then, a model from a different DG, yet one also belonging to the Commission was used. 
5.3.3 A model for division of labour 
As the proposal moved from the Commission to Parliament, the organizational field changed 
somewhat. No longer within a context of the EU’s executive branch, it had now moved to 
realm of party politics of the European Parliament. The major amendment suggested – with 
implications for the extent of comitology, as noted earlier – was the concept of framework 
guidelines. This was proposed by a Parliament concerned with legitimacy, thus representing 
an organization promoting a norm as depicted in Finnemore (1993). The legitimacy-based 
motivation behind Parliament’s behaviour is indicated by its regard of the influence envisaged 
for TSOs in the procedure as too large and inappropriate. An appropriate division of labour, 
on the other hand, meant that regulators, not companies, should carry out regulatory tasks, i.e. 
rule-making. The characterization of this as a ‘natural’ division of labour implies a taken-for-
granted-ness indicative of the cognitive understanding of institutions. Thus, Parliament’s 
concern for a suitable specialization between ACER and ENTSO-E reflected a theorized 
model. As a theorized practice, this model had originated at the national level, yet diffused to 
the European level: enhancing the role of ACER (amongst others by means of framework 
guidelines) was seen as corresponding to the model found on the national level. Moreover, 
Mogg (head of ERGEG and CEER) had stated that a stronger ACER was required in order to 
safeguard the ‘public interest’ – an argument associated with practice at the national level as 
well as indicative of the legitimacy of this model. Additionally, initial EU-level application of 
this model could be identified: National regulators had already been making guidelines within 
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the Florence mini-fora and ERGEG. Additionally, direct relations among John Mogg and EU 
officials provided a relational link that facilitated this exchange of ideas. This might have 
strengthened the cause for framework guidelines that subsequently were promoted by 
Parliament. 
5.3.4 Conclusion of sociological institutionalism 
This case shows that the more appropriate organizational field might be network sectors in 
general rather than other DGs, or other organizations within the same sector. This indicates 
that the concept of an organizational field is fuzzy, because delineating what constitutues such 
a field is not obvious, but might vary from case to case. This highlights the importance of at 
least complementing the notion of an organizational field with that of relational carriers, 
where perceptions of similarity can stretch across sectors. In this case, then, models from 
other network-sectors were imitated, notably from railway (regulatory agency), telecom 
(comitology) and aviation (network codes). That models from similar sectors served as 
inspiration is consistent with Pollitt (2012 - forthcoming), who singles out the airline and 
railway sectors, respectively, as having served as models for energy sector liberalisation. 
Within the two former sectors, deregulation that had occurred at an earlier point in time was 
perceived as ‘successful’ (Pollitt 2012 - forthcoming: 2). Thus, the Commission had perceived 
practices within these sectors as appropriate models that moreover were applicable. Here, 
then, a perception of similarity (relational system) was an important carrier for generalized 
models from these sectors to the electricity sector, which influenced the procedure for 
network code development. The clearest indication of mimesis is found for ACER, which 
imitated the railway agency.
50
 
Nevertheless, still indicated is that the context in which imitation occurs could affect the 
sources of emulation. As the context changed from the Commission to Parliament, models 
were to a larger degree drawn from national regulatory arrangements within the same sector 
than from European regulatory arrangements within other sectors. Here, an ‘agentification 
trend’ had emerged especially since the 1980s, entailing the establishment of regulatory 
agencies for carrying out the administrative part of executive politics at “an arm’s length from 
political considerations” (Martens 2006: 126). ENTSO-E and ACER both reflect this trend. 
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 It is therefore surprising that alternative models for regulatory overview deemed unviable were expressly 
mentioned in the impact assessment, whereas the model evaluated as suitable was not. 
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These two bodies were mandated with rule-making (although ACER’s framework guidelines 
would be non-binding) that would take place outside the legislative process within the EU that 
would involve Council and Parliament. Moreover, in both cases, the organizations represented 
within ENTSO-E and ACER were TSOs and national regulators, respectively. These 
organizations at the national level have also increasingly become independent from national 
governments. As such, the general fashion found within the organizational field served as a 
model subsequently imitated. 
Nevertheless, the NC procedure resembles a bricolage because it reflected the imitation of 
different models, drawing on different practices, cf. figure 7. 
Model Copy 
Railway agency had a larger role in code drafting For ACER a more advisory role was proposed – 
with code drafting remaining with the TSOs 
through ENTSO-E. Double system as innovation 
Division of labour at the national level:  
 
national regulators, while less involved in the 
operative part of cross-border transmission, 
would at least in some member states be able to 
veto the equivalent of a network code through 
their regulatory oversight over their national TSO 
This option was not available for ACER vis-à-vis 
ENTSO-E 
Figure 7: Models and imitations within the procedure for developing network codes. 
5.4 Drawing the perspectives together 
In this section, the complementarity and contradictions in the explanations of power-oriented, 
historical and sociological institutionalism will be considered through their combined effort at 
explaining that the NC procedure in its particular form. Here, I will look into how they 
interact with one another, and evaluate whether or not this contributes to a deeper 
understanding. Whether or not the complementary evidence represents a necessary or 
sufficient explanation of the outcome will be treated (George & Bennett 2005; Ragin 2000). 
For the analytical assessment announced in chapter 3, necessary factors entail that this 
specific procedure would not have been enacted without their presence, requiring in addition 
that these – or their totality – are sufficient. Moreover, an evaluation of whether or not a 
different outcome might have been consistent with the presence of these factors – in part a 
matter of sufficiency, as factors might be necessary without being sufficient, thus making it 
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possible that another outcome might have occurred despite the presence of the causal factors, 
if only necessary and not sufficient. 
At its most basic level, the procedure would not have been formally enacted had it not – as 
explained by the power-oriented perspective – been proposed by the Commission, and gained 
the support of EP and of the Council. Regarding the latter in particular, the member states 
would not have supported this procedure if they had perceived of it as contrary to their 
interests. An indicator of this is the attempt by EP to introduce binding framework guidelines, 
which due to a mixed reception among the member states was subsequently dropped 
(although non-binding ones were sustained). While necessary, in isolation this offers a rather 
thin account as to why the procedure was enacted in its particular shape, making it 
insufficient. Moreover, the Commission’s proposal remained largely unchanged – with the 
noted change pertaining to framework guidelines, as well as other minor revisions – until its 
adoption, which also is not explained. If the Commission had anticipated the positions of the 
other two EU organizations as part of a rational strategy aimed at getting its own proposal 
enacted, this does not explain why it had not taken them for regulatory overview, on which 
discussions did occur. More importantly, it does not account for the particularities within the 
NC procedure. 
Here, then, the historical perspective provides a deeper and complementary explanation. The 
reason why the EU could and would pass this procedure in its particular version, as well as 
why TSOs and national regulators were available and willing to partake in it, is seen as 
structural. The NC procedure ensued from a critical juncture constituted by an early de facto 
compromise between the Commission and Council: a combined approach was taken by the 
EU in energy market regulation, consisting of incremental legal changes and buttressing 
voluntary transnational cooperation. While the isolated historical analysis pointed to this 
critical juncture as a cause that eventually brought about NC procedure, combining the 
historical perspective’s account of the new actor constellations that had emerged with the 
power-oriented perspective’s take on interests and influence, a stronger account is offered.  
While the power-oriented perspective regards the major EU bodies as the actors, it does not 
exclude the option that these might have been lobbied by non-state actors. Superior expertise 
on network operation as well as organizing market exchanges gave TSOs leverage in the 
Commission’s consultations prior to making the proposal. Given a strong cross-border 
European mandate, the TSOs supported this proposal. However, their actions under this 
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mandate could not be sufficiently controlled by national regulators, for whom no 
corresponding mandate had been foreseen. Thus, the Commission’s proposal was decisive for 
activating national regulators. Seen through the lenses of relative power, national regulators 
were interested in retaining their relative position vis-à-vis TSOs. Market actors were equally 
concerned. As a result, these joined forces, and mobilized in order to amend the proposal. 
While interested in regulatory oversight, the national regulators did not have the technical 
expertise to draft network codes. As a result, neither national regulators nor market actors 
contested that TSOs should do this. 
While a traditional approach to lobbying would expect non-state actors approaching their 
respective national representatives, in this case at least, the Council and the member states 
were evaluated as less receptive for lobbying efforts, because the member states were giving 
much attention to other issues within the third package that were more politically salient and 
had visible distributive implications. This means that the temporal co-occurrence of issues on 
the agenda influenced which EU body that the coalition sought to address – with member 
states busy, the coalition turned to Parliament. Evaluated as receptive to new input and as 
generally supportive of regulatory overview, Parliament was targeted for lobbying efforts. 
Once mobilized, national regulators had the necessary expertise that enabled them to approach 
the political arena. This political knowhow stemmed from previously having been part of a 
sector ministry. This aided them in getting their voice heard in Parliament, to the effect that 
binding framework guidelines were included in Parliament’s amendments. However, the 
Commission and the TSOs resisted the notion of ACER making binding framework 
guidelines. Given mixed views in Council, this was subsequently dropped, although a 
concession was made by including non-binding framework guidelines in the NC procedure. 
Considering non-state actors lobbying the EU through their respective transnational 
associations reveals a stronger explanation of the specific allocation of roles to ENTSO-E and 
ACER than what is accounted for by considering the interests of the Commission, EP and 
Council, or the path-dependent development alone. Notably, the power-oriented perspective 
shows how, despite subject to similar structural developments, the TSOs were to a larger 
degree empowered at the European level within the NC procedure than what was the case for 
ACER – the member states differentiated among the two, regarding the distributional 
implication greater for the latter. This combined explanation offered by the power-oriented 
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and the historical perspectives appears necessary and sufficient, and given the presence of the 
causal factors noted here, it seems less likely that another outcome would have ensued. 
While a historical account could have traced the division of labour at the national level to the 
structural changes, it does not explain why this coalition to such an extent were mobilized by 
the Commission’s proposal. Adding the sociological perspective’s notion of legitimacy could 
moreover explain the strong reaction by national regulators and market actors alike. National 
regulators and market actors alike interpreted the Commission’s proposal as giving regulatory 
tasks to TSOs. This could be seen as representing a violation of what had been established as 
an appropriate division of labour within the energy sector, but also more generally, reflecting 
a broader trend. Triggering self-interest as well as concerns for appropriateness, the 
subsequent mobilization of national regulators and market actors becomes more 
understandable. Thus, the distinction between the two logics of action is not absolute in this 
case, which is a general problem noted in the literature (March & Olsen 2004). As the 
division of labour was a broader trend, moreover, this facilitated resonance among other 
actors to the cause forwarded by the coalition, and reduced opposition. Without the leverage 
provided by legitimacy, it seems less likely that the coalition would have been able to push 
through an amendment substantially increasing the role of ACER within the NC procedure. 
103 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
In this final chapter, the main results are presented, followed by a deliberation on the 
methodological and theoretical choices taken in this thesis. The latter is due in order to 
evaluate the foundation on which the findings stand. Further, the implication that the findings 
could entail for further development of EU energy market regulation is elaborated, and the 
question is raised as to the effect on the pace towards the internal energy market. Finally, 
some lessons learned for the study of institutional change are offered. 
6.1 Research question and main results 
The research question addressed in this thesis is why the procedure for developing network 
codes was enacted in its particular form. As indicated by the presentation in chapter 1, an 
institutional approach was taken in this thesis. In chapter 2, three complementary theoretical 
perspectives were presented that would be applied. While this do not render an exhaustive 
explanation, it offers the possibility of a stronger account than what a single perspective could 
offer in isolation. 
The power-oriented perspective expected the change and design of institutions to be the 
product of rational actors that had formal influence on the EU legislative process, and that 
acted on given preferences. The historical perspective addressed the effect that initial choices 
constituting a critical juncture could have on later developments, and expected mechanisms of 
positive feedback to produce incremental adjustments that would eventually bring about the 
outcome of interest. Finally, the sociological perspective expected institutional change to be 
interrelated with conceptions of legitimacy existing within organizational field, where 
individual organizatons would adjust through imitation. 
The separate analysis from the power-oriented perspective found that this particular procedure 
for developing network codes (NC procedure) was found to follow from the interests of the 
Commission, European Parliament (EP) and the member states of the Council. The need for 
compromise between the supranational preferences of Commission and EP, and the national 
ones of member states, resulted in the delegation to separate bodies consisting of non-state 
actors. Moreover, the inclusion of non-binding framework guidelines represented a 
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compromise between the Commission and the member states one the one hand, and EP on the 
other hand. 
The historical analysis traced the origin of the NC procedure back to the initial compromise 
between the Commission and Council: energy market regulation in the EU through 
incremental top-down legislation and enhanced voluntary transnational cooperation. This 
represented a critical juncture because it changed the mechanisms of positive feedback, which 
shifted a path of decentralization towards centralizatin. Enacted relatively early in this new 
path-dependent sequence, the NC procedure displayed elements of new and old paths alike. 
The analysis from the sociological perspective found that practices were imitated from other 
network-bound sectors such as railway and telecom. Moreover, as the proposal shifted to the 
next step in EU decision-making, the organizational field shifted, facilitating imitation from 
the national level. An agencification trend spanned the different organizational field, 
buttressing imitation going in this direction. Combining different models in a bricolage 
entailed innovation. 
In the combined analysis, an important finding in this study was the decisive role played by 
non-state actors for the specific allocation of roles and tasks within the NC procedure. 
Leverage provided by information asymmetry gave the TSOs a major role in the procedure, 
however with the concession that their allotted drafting task became mandatory and subject to 
deadlines. Moreover, that network codes could become legally binding through comitology 
was welcomed by the TSOs because it alleviated them of having to impose compliance 
themselves. Moreover, this set-up served the Commission’s interest in faster harmonization 
without having to use resources on the actual drafting itself. This proposal mobilized national 
regulators and market actors, who saw this as violating an appropriate division of labour. 
Motivated by self-interest, yet aided by legitimacy, this coalition was successfully able to 
push for the inclusion of framework guidelines within the NC procedure, although the 
interests of the TSOs, Commission and a divided Council prevented these from becoming 
binding for the subsequent drafting of network codes. While initially sceptical to the extent of 
comitology, the reduced role of this through the introduction of framework guidelines 
reassured Council and Parliament. 
Moreover, these non-state actors had emerged through a gradual transformation, which 
represented vertical specialization within government, and horizontal specialization within the 
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industry. These changes fed back into their transnational associations, which were 
subsequently redefined. As networks rather than EU-level agencies as studied by Egeberg and 
Trondal (2011), their behaviour similarly diverges from an intergovernmental pattern, because 
they addressed the Commission and Parliament rather than their national governments. 
Equally caused through such feedback was a conflict line that was intra-sectoral more 
national. For ENTSO-E and ACER, to a larger extent representing agencies, it remains to be 
seen how they position themselves vis-à-vis the EU and/or the national governments – an 
interesting topic for further research. While the change of this procedural rule would probably 
not have been comprehended without the longer historical development, combining this with 
insights from the other two perspectives offered a substantially stronger explanation of the 
particular elements contained in the NC procedure. Thus, while the perspectives draw 
attention to different aspects of change, the combined analysis illustrated the benefit of a 
complementary approach. 
Data from the different sources were cross-checked, and a largely compatible picture was 
rendered from the accounts made by different informants as well as by the documents. Two 
exceptions require some attention: according to a EURELECTRIC representative, this 
association was decisive for the mobilization of national regulators, whereas this was not 
emphasized by other informants. Moreover, as no formal interview was conducted with a 
national regulator, this was difficult to establish. This might signal positive self-representation 
at work, so while the account from the EURELECTRIC representative certainly seems 
plausible, this was downplayed in the presentation in chapter 4. A final note regards 
informants’ view of particular (external) events. Probing for this without directly mentioning 
the 2006 blackout turned out to be difficult, yet fortunately previous research provided a 
better foundation for using these data in the analysis. The main picture rendered, however, 
was the same, which reduces the likelihood that data are biased. 
6.2 Towards an internal energy market? 
Non-state actors interacting at the European level could represent a challenge for national 
regulation. The regulatory gap – the lack of regulation of cross-border issues – has been 
reduced somewhat by institutionalizing self-regulation by TSOs that was made mandatory 
and subject to sanctions. However, the powers of ACER over ENTSO-E would be weaker 
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than those usually possessed by national energy regulators over their respective TSOs at the 
national level.  
The establishment of EU-level agencies are expected to “contribute to an additional executive 
centre formation at the European level and thus bring the existing political-administrative 
order further away from an intergovernmental order” (Egeberg & Trondal 2011: 882). Thus, 
the establishment of ENTSO-E and ACER could have such an effect, not only due to their 
role within the NC procedure, but also through other tasks at the European level. With 
decision-making power located at a European level for this procedure, this could signal an 
increase in integration within this policy area. However, this integration did not transfer 
power to the Commission, EP or Council, but rather to independent bodies – consistent with 
Egeberg and Curtin (2008); Egeberg and Trondal (2011); Nørgård (2006); Støle (2006). 
These studies have looked at the inclusion of such networks of national regulatory agencies, 
and the role of ACER is consistent with this. Moreover, while the boards of such agencies are 
staffed with representatives from national regulators, the inclusion of a Commission 
representative – indeed the case for ACER – could increase the influence of the Commission 
on the agency (Egeberg & Trondal 2011). 
Distinct from these studies, however, is the collective role of TSOs within the NC procedure. 
The organizational structure of ENTSO-E resembled an agency in the sense that it was a 
single body rather than a network. However, this body consisted of private enterprises, yet 
had been given a major role in making legislation that would apply generally across Europe. 
Could this speed up the process of establishing an internal electricity market? Returning 
briefly to the governance literature mentioned in chapter 1, the contents of the NC procedure 
meant that negotiations among non-state actors within ACER or ENTSO-E, respectively, 
would be conducted under the threat imposed by sanctions connected to non-compliance with 
specific deadlines. A credible threat would here be expected to speed up the process of 
harmonization, and credibility was reported by informants. A different picture is rendered by 
Meyer (2012), who finds that a credible threat of governmental intervention could be contra-
productive if it makes increases the number of veto players, and makes existing self-
regulatory processes politically salient. The NC procedure, while admittedly increasing the 
number of TSOs, the relative increase depends on which predecessor association ENTSO-E is 
compared with. Compared with ETSO and UCTE, the increase is low, whereas compared to 
the smaller regional associations, e.g. Nordel, the increase is substantial. In terms of saliency, 
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while the NC procedure has attracted some debate, this has notably been driven by actors that 
are to be consulted, but that do not have a formal say in the procedure (e.g. market actors). At 
any case, it remains to be seen in the future, but as of June 2012, but with a single exception, 
all output from the NC procedure had been delivered on time.
51
 In the end, harmonized 
network codes must also be implemented in order to have an effect on market integration,  
which thus offers a topic for subsequent research. 
6.3 Lessons learned for institutional change 
The three perspectives have different conceptions of institutional change. Concluding this 
thesis are a few lessons learned for institutional change. 
The power-oriented perspective regards institutional change as shifts in power, or, 
alternatively, shifts in interests. The sociological perspective regards institutional change as 
shifts in legitimacy. While coalitions within the former could alternate relatively quickly, 
within the latter, change does not come as easily, because legitimacy is more fundamental. In 
both cases, however, there is either institutional change or institutional stability: within the 
power-oriented perspective, there is either a shift in power giving rise to institutional change, 
or the dominant coalition keeps an institution in place; within the sociological perspective, 
while diverging conceptions of legitimacy might exist during a shorter period of time, over 
time one will be established as the correct one. 
The historical perspective has a slightly different take on this. Using path-dependency, it 
instead regards change as a gradual transformation, where continuity and change occur 
simultaneously and in interaction with one another. A development triggered by a critical 
juncture, where initial changes feed back into the system to create further changes over time 
(positive feedback), has in the literature been referred to as layering which “eats into [the] old 
core”  (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 31) – elements of the old and the new institution coexist, with 
the relative impact of the latter waxing, and that of the former waning over time. This means 
that incremental change can occur within a path, and that the temporal location in a path-
dependent sequence could affect the change. Thus, an outcome of interest could have long 
roots. Looking at the final NC procedure, this seems a fitting description.  
                                                 
51
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
Before we start, could you just briefly state your involvement in the process? (state, and ask 
for confirmation) 
Looking at the situation in 2003-2005, how would you describe the cooperation between 
TSOs (or vertically integrated companies) regarding network codes? 
- Follow-up: Were there a lot of people working with this within the separate TSOs? 
Using much time on this as compared to national activities? 
- Follow-up: Who had an interest in keeping it that way? Who wanted to change this? 
Were there any external factors influencing this assesment (either supportive or opposing)?  
Thinking back, how would you describe the changes that occurred, resulting in the revised 
cross-border regulation on electricity in 2009? 
- Follow-up: What is the change? 
- Follow-up: Would you describe this procedure as representing something substantially 
new, or as a revision of existing arrangements? 
Do you agree to the following interpretation of this change? A case where industry self-
regulation increasingly occurs under a threat of legislative or executive action by the EU, and 
the Commission. 
How do you regard the possibilities that the Commission has for imposing sanctions if the 
work with developing network codes does not proceed according to the schedule? (e.g. if 
ENTSO-E uses more than 12 months to draft) 
Why did it change? 
How did the TSOs respond to the Commission’s proposal for change? 
Question to the Commission: How did the Commission use the input received from 
(organization X) during the drafting of the proposal? And did it have any influence on the 
outcome? 
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Question to other organizations: How did the Commission respond to your input regarding 
the third energy package? (Were they heard? What and how? How did other organizations 
view this? 
When you think back at the process, were there any coinciding or preceding events that 
impacted the procedure? 
- Follow-up: Why and how did it (not) matter? 
- Did event X influence the evaluation of the at the time existing cooperation, or were 
evaluations less affected by this? In what way? 
- Follow-up: Did all actors reevaluate? Whose evaluations were (not) affected? 
- Follow-up: Did this influence the reform process? How? 
Would you say that there was a large degree of initial agreement on what changes should be 
made, or were there differing opinions that made negotiations and compromises vital? 
Who, in your opinion, were the key actors? (Supportive/opposing, active/passive) 
How did the member states respond to the Commission’s proposal of this particular procedure 
for the development of network codes? 
Did you get the impression that this was an important issue for the MS in Council – top 
political attention or an issue handled at the lower levels member states administration? 
Did the role of ACER in drafting non-binding framework guidelines represent a compromise 
between the Council (didn’t want stronger Agency) and EP (wanted stronger Agency)? 
Who suggested specific deadlines? Who were in favour, and who were skeptical? 
What were the reactions to the proposal that the Commission were to take over the drafting 
tasks in the case of failure to comply with deadlines by ENTSO-E, or ACER, respectively? 
How did you respond? How did your organization respond? How did other, relevant 
organizations (which?) respond? 
Compared to the other elements in the 3
rd
 legislative package, how much attention was given 
to this issue? (cf. ownership unbundling) 
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Are there some national regulators that, in your opinion, are more influential within 
ERGEG/CEER? Which ones? (Why?) Does this impact outcomes? How? 
Why was the procedure shaped the way it is? Were comparisons drawn with other policy 
areas? Did one look to how other sectors organised cooperation? Where there any role-models 
that was important for how to shape the procedure? Why? 
If we consider the professional/expert communities – did they have similar or different ways 
of considered such practices? (For instance between engineers and economists.) 
- Follow-up if gets a positive reply: Has there been a change in the relative position of 
professions within the power sector? Do you think this influenced the shape of the 
procedure in any way, or do you think this mattered less/not at all?  
Would you describe network codes as technical or political? 
In your opinion, are these network codes purely cross-border, or do they affect national 
system as well? 
What do you think about the preliminary results of the new arrangements, as well as 
prospects? 
Are some things happening in other ways than the way laid down in the formal procedure? 
Does informal contact alongside formal cooperation play a role? How? 
What about ownership unbundling? As this was not made mandatory – do you observe this as 
having an impact here? 
Is there anything you would like to tell me about which I haven’t thought to ask you? 
Is there anybody else that you come to think of that might be useful for me to talk to? 
Can I contact you later if I have further questions or issues? 
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Appendix 2: List of Informants 
A representative from the European Commission 
A representative from the former European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) 
A representative from the Union of the Electricity Industry-EURELECTRIC 
(EURELECTRIC) 
A representative from Statnett 
A representative from Norway’s Mission to the European Union 
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